Where Next? The Tasks of the Left in the Tisza Era

Hungary’s left-wing parties have not just suffered defeat; during the last decade and a half, they lost the milieu in which they were previously used to operating. The activist sphere has been shaken, the intellectual milieu dispersed, and the left-wing public — apart from the solitary exception of Partizán, an independent media outlet — has proved incapable of reaching a wider audience.

This article is intended as a contribution to the debate. I am addressing that part of the left which supports the democratic reconstruction, but does not wish to return to the neoliberal-democratic era before 2010 , and does not regard permanent minority status as the left’s destiny. Instead, this part of the left seeks to win majority support for its vision centred on social and gender equality, ecological transformation, workers’ wellbeing, and a political system that enables genuine participation.

I call this orientation “transformative realpolitik”: an approach that starts from existing social realities and seeks democratic,  egalitarian paths for political action.

The agents of left-wing renewal are unlikely to be found within the existing left-wing parties. Those organisations have lost not only their roots in society, but also a significant share of their political credibility. The experience of some individual members of those parties may still prove valuable, but only those who have moved beyond their parties’ reflex for self-preservation and who understand the depth of their failure.

My central argument is simple: in the Tisza era, the left must simultaneously serve as a pillar of democratisation, a radar for social issues, and an autonomous, egalitarian pole on the political spectrum.  All three roles must mutually influence each other. Mere support for democratisation risks turning the left into a passive hinterland; a purely critical social role risks degenerating into embittered outsiderhood while an autonomous pole on the political spectrum, without involving those other roles, risks lapsing into sectarian self-certainty.

Two Distinct Missions

Tisza’s historic mission is not the same as that of the left. Recognising this is not an act of hostility, but a prerequisite for strategic clarity.

The mission of Tisza is one of bourgeois democratic restoration: restoring the rule-of-law framework, dismantling the illiberal dependency structures of the National Cooperation System (NER), and reintegrating Hungary into the European constitutional order.

The horizons  of the left are much wider. Ecosocial democracy means not just the restoration of political liberties, but also the pursuit of social and gender equality, workers’ wellbeing, genuine access to public services, and environmental justice.

Here I am not speaking about the convergence of the separate green and left agendas, but about a common green-left project. Ecological crisis, social inequality, and democratic erosion are intertwined manifestations of the same unregulated global capitalist order. There may be areas of cooperation between bourgeois democratic restoration and ecosocial democracy, but they are not identical to one another. Restoration typically reaches its limits where the interests of capital and the stability of a broad electoral coalition are at stake. Ecosocial democracy begins by posing questions precisely at that point.

What Kind of Tisza Government Might Emerge?

The direction of Tisza’s governance remains open. Three trajectories appear conceivable.

The first would be a deeper democratic transformation whereby the government voluntarily limits its own power: building participatory institutions, creating legally-entrenched checks and balances, and protecting independent media and civil society through structural guarantees. There are early signs pointing in this direction, though history offers few examples of governments with constitutional majorities willingly restricting their own power.

The second—and, in my view, the most likely—is a centrist restoration. In this scenario, the restoration of the rule of law proceeds and anti-corruption reforms yield tangible results, while economic strategy remains fundamentally market-oriented. To borrow Pierre Bourdieu’s metaphor, the “left hand” of the state—education and healthcare—may move in a more egalitarian direction, while the “right hand” of economic governance remains market-friendly.

The third possibility is majoritarian overreach. In this case, Tisza would remain democratic in substance, but would increasingly adopt modes of governance reminiscent of what Fidesz did with its two-thirds majorities. Participatory institutions would become channels of mobilisation for the party, critical voices would be marginalised, and precedents would be created for the next authoritarian challenger from the right.

Centrist restoration may also reproduce the very social discontent from which the radical right draws strength. If Tisza fails to offer credible answers to workers’ vulnerability and the anxieties of precarious lives, industrial workers and the provincial lower middle classes may once again rally behind Fidesz or Mi Hazánk.

From this follows an important hierarchy of threats: today, the greatest danger to ecosocial democracy would not be a centrist restoration, but the possibility of a return to right-wing authoritarian rule.

The Left’s Triple Role

A Pillar of Democratisation. The left must not downplay the significance of bourgeois democratic restoration. Wherever Tisza genuinely dismantles illiberal dependencies and restores institutional guarantees, it deserves support. This is not a concession, but a strategic position: building the left requires a functioning democratic framework.

A Radar for Social Issues. Support for bourgeois democratic restoration must not mean blindness to its effects. The task of the left is to observe and communicate what different social groups experience: where public services improve or decline, who remains excluded, where relations of dependency are weakening, and where they persist. This requires fieldwork and a sustained local presence.

An Autonomous, Egalitarian Pole on the Political Spectrum. The left must speak in its own language and according to its own priorities wherever the logic of bourgeois democratic restoration reaches its limits. This does not imply destructive oppositionism, but independent diagnosis and sustained social engagement.

Tensions between these three roles are inevitable. The democratising efforts of Tisza will be supported by the pillar, while the social radar and the autonomous, egalitarian pole on the political spectrum will highlight the limitations of those efforts.  For this reason, the triple role requires the strategic division of labour: different actors and institutions can assume different functions within a common, pluralistic, political space.

Where Will the Main Points of Conflict Arise?

The role of the autonomous pole on the political spectrum must take shape precisely where bourgeois democratic restoration encounters its own structural limits.

The first such area is workers’ wellbeing and collective bargaining power.Tisza never promised to repeal the so-called “Slave Law”, the controversial 2018 labour law that expanded employers’ overtime rights, nor does the new structure of government include a dedicated social affairs ministry. One central element of the new government’s employment policy is the restriction of guest-worker inflows. Yet the key to protecting workers lies not in restricting such inflows, but in strengthening trade union rights, enforcing strict health and environmental regulations, and pursuing an ambitious wage policy. The left’s position should be clear: without empowered labour,  democracy will not be durable in Hungary and will just lead to another cycle of disillusionment.

The second point of conflict concerns the emancipation of groups pushed to the margins of society, particularly Roma communities. The issue is not simply whether Hungary becomes more democratic, but whether politics is prepared to challenge the hierarchies continually reproducing vulnerability and exclusion.

Environmental justice deserves special mention. The Tisza programme promises the elimination of substandard housing and a review of battery-industry investments. The decisive question, however, is whether there will be a willingness to enforce the polluter-pays principle against large-scale investments which are of significant weight in terms of employment. It is in these arenas that we will discover whether democratic renewal will remain merely  institutional and legal reconstruction, or whether it will extend to the shaping of social relations themselves.

Not Party-Building, but Social Embedding

If the left is to emerge as an autonomous, egalitarian pole on the political spectrum, the key question of the coming cycle is what kind of strategy will make this possible.

Building a left-wing party that will be viable by 2030 is an unrealistic aim. Such a project requires a durable social base, local networks, tested candidates, and a functioning political culture. At present, all of these are lacking. The Hungarian left has repeatedly made the mistake of attempting rapid party-building around prominent figures emerging from social movements. Such efforts have consistently exhausted the energy of those movements without producing lasting political organisations.

Instead, what is realistic is deeper social embedding: creating relationships, maintaining local presence, establishing spaces for debate, and building trust. The left must construct this new social world around itself precisely where bourgeois democratic restoration reaches its limits.

I see four key arenas for this work: the world of labour, community-based left-wing education, housing, and environmental justice. Two dimensions must be present in each: the emancipation of Roma communities and the reduction of gender inequalities.

Renewal can presently emerge from three milieux: the younger activist generation, the critical intellectuals building the left-wing public sphere, and the handful of veteran politicians who have distanced themselves from their former parties. These milieux operate according to different logics and will not spontaneously converge. What is needed are forms of coordination built not around charismatic individuals, but around creating space for shared thinking and collective work.

If such embedding genuinely begins, electoral participation by the left may become possible after 2030—first at the local and municipal level, and  later, nationally.
Renewing Left-Wing Political Culture

Social embedding requires renewing left-wing political culture. Fifteen years of illiberalism have left their mark on us: impatience, distrust, and sectarian self-defence have spread. Renewal requires openness and spaces in which accumulated grievances can be openly discussed—a broad tent in which pluralism of opinion is not an obstacle, but a precondition to a more accurate diagnosis of the situation.

Ultimately, the question is not who owns the label of “the left”, but whether together we are capable, in the shadow of the bourgeois democratic transition, of buildingour own social mission and political vision from which the prospect of a deeper ecosocial democracy may emerge – supporting democratic restoration while keeping our radar tuned to social issues and holding up our autonomous pole of the political spectrum.