From further manipulation of the electoral system to outright annulment of results, there are many ways in which the Orbán regime could prevent the current opposition from winning. What is certain is that repression will intensify over the next year; the only question is how severe it will be.
Viktor Orbán’s speech on 15 March 2025 made headlines around the world when he referred to politicians, journalists, civil society organizations, and judges who disagree with him as “bugs”. By promising a “spring cleaning” around Easter, he is in fact aiming to dismantle the remaining checks on his power. The key question is whether the Hungarian prime minister could lose power through the next general election in spring 2026 – a possibility that seems realistic for the first time in 16 years. The main reasons are the seemingly unstoppable economic downturn and the emergence of a credible challenger, Péter Magyar.
For Orbán and his inner circle, the stakes are far higher than a routine electoral defeat in a functioning parliamentary democracy. As a result, the government is expected to take even harsher measures than before to prevent their electoral defeat. Since 2010, Fidesz has effectively established a system in Hungary that secures its rule through soft political, administrative, legal, and above all, informational measures – that is why it is probably best described as an informational autocracy. However, the true extent of its capabilities may now be revealed. Driven by the fear of losing power, it is likely to resort to even more radical tactics than in the past. Below we examine some of these potential measures, while emphasizing that this list does not provide a complete picture due to the unpredictability of the regime. (Therefore, this analysis does not address the question of how the Orbán regime could keep a Péter Magyar-led government in check after a potential electoral defeat, for which preparations are already underway.)
Smear campaigns
Since Magyar’s emergence in February 2024, he has been in the crosshairs of government propaganda, facing a relentless smear campaign designed to stigmatize and intimidate him. While these efforts have failed to prevent him from dominating the opposition space and mobilizing previously inactive voters, the smear campaign cannot be considered entirely unsuccessful. So far, at least, Fidesz’s voter base has suffered only minor to moderate losses.
Among the many narratives deployed against Magyar, the one that has been most consistently reinforced is the claim that he is a “puppet of foreign powers” in Hungary. It is highly likely that this narrative will continue to serve as the basis for various accusations in the remaining year before the election. Even if these smear campaigns prove insufficient to weaken Péter Magyar personally, they could easily discourage members of his party and parliamentary candidates, especially if they too become targets. Beyond smear tactics, they may also face threats to their livelihood.
Further manipulation of the electoral system
There have been numerous rumors and ideas about how Fidesz might change the electoral rules in order to prevent an electoral defeat – or, if that proves impossible, to minimize its scope. Possible changes range from lowering the parliamentary threshold to abolishing electoral districts (see our Hungarian-language analysis here).
Whichever scenario unfolds, manipulation of the electoral system is likely to be a stop-gap measure, with far more serious measures likely to follow.
Financial strangulation and official harassment
Based on the experience of the past 35 years, the government has every reason to believe that draining financial resources is the most effective way to cripple a political force. Before the 2018 elections, for example, the rising Jobbik party was put in a dire position after the State Audit Office imposed a fine of 663 million forints (€1.65 million) on it.
Later, the whole “sovereignty protection” narrative emerged from the fact that opposition parties cooperating with each other in the 2022 elections managed to secure foreign funding for their campaign – exploiting legal loopholes, but without breaking the law. The government is now determined to prevent such funding by any means necessary.
For the time being, the TISZA party seems difficult to target on these grounds, so the government will probably have to find another pretext to cut its revenue streams. One likely avenue of attack will be the party's moderate sources of funding from the European People's Party. While this can be used as a political weapon, the government has no direct means of cutting off these funds.
In both his “State of the Nation” address in February and his “15 March National Day” speech, Orbán openly attacked civil society organizations, independent media, and judges who, he said, were threatening Hungary’s sovereignty, and promised to eliminate their “shadow army” funded by foreign money. The specific measures to follow remain unclear, but they are likely to be designed to inflict serious financial damage on TISZA as well – although the exact mechanisms are not yet visible.
In addition to financial pressure, Magyar and his party members are likely to face constant harassment from the authorities. The tax office has a long history of politically motivated investigations, and anyone associated with TISZA could become a target. Their events could also be obstructed in a number of ways, including denial of venue bookings, refusal of permits for public spaces, and restricted access to essential infrastructure. When it comes to billboard advertising, they can expect minimal access, if any.
Preventing Magyar's candidacy
According to the current electoral law, the only Hungarian citizens ineligible to run for office are those "serving a prison sentence or undergoing compulsory institutional treatment ordered in a criminal proceeding". Although Péter Magyar is currently the subject of several investigations, it is highly unlikely that any of these will result in a prison sentence.
Inspired by recent events in Romania or Turkey, it is conceivable that restrictions on passive suffrage (i.e., eligibility for office) could emerge in Hungary next year. In Turkey, stripping a candidate of his diploma was enough to disqualify him, but in Hungary virtually any Hungarian citizen is eligible to run for office, so it is unlikely this will be Fidesz’s primary strategy against Magyar. If they were able to prove his involvement in a serious crime, this could really deter voters. On the other hand, if his right to run for office were to be revoked on shaky legal grounds, it would probably only enhance his reputation and possibly even attract support from those who would never have considered voting for him before. Furthermore, if he is excluded from TISZA’s national candidate list, but his party wins the elections nonetheless, he could still be elected prime minister by Parliament (there is no requirement for the PM to be an elected MP, unless this rule will also be changed).
Invalidating the election results
If no other methods prove effective and TISZA does indeed win the election, we cannot be sure, given the events in Romania, that the Orbán regime would not find a way to invalidate the results. While the new US administration sees both the annulment of the Romanian election results last year and the obstruction of a presidential candidate there this year as evidence of the death of European democracy, it would probably see things differently if the Orbán regime were the one unwilling to accept a possible electoral defeat.
