Schwarzenberg’s Mission to the Middle East

January 29, 2009

Translation Gwendolyn Albert

The Czech EU Presidency has evidently begun more abruptly than the Czechs ever wanted. At the very moment the country took up the “scepter” of the presidency, the conflict between Hamas and Israel in Gaza was in full blaze, and the Czech Republic immediately had to engage in one of the most closely-followed world conflicts ever. It later proved that Czech politicians were not able to adopt the EU diplomatic language as their own immediately. Unlike the majority of Western European politicians, who stressed the opinion that Israel’s reaction was disproportionate, the first statements by the Czech Prime Minister and the Czech Foreign Minister clearly labeled Hamas as to blame for the conflict.

Immediately after the initiation of the Israeli operation, the atmosphere in European circles was such that the Czech representatives were faced with one option only, that of responding by attempting European mediation directly on the spot. Without any lengthy preparations, Czech Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzenberg immediately set out as the head of the first diplomatic mission to the Middle East on 5 January. However, the importance of this step was not much appreciated in Bohemia. Almost all of the Czech newspapers wrote unflatteringly of Schwarzenberg’s mission. For example, the headline in Hospodářské noviny read that “Schwarzenberg failed”, while Mladá fronta Dnes announced that “Czechs have nothing to show”. This response was rather startling; it would have been naïve to think that Schwarzenberg might have forced the warring sides to a cease-fire when they were not interested in ending the fight. Prior to his departure, Schwarzenberg said the mission was a fact-finding one – he wanted to inform himself and prepare the ground for further negotiations, which was a completely realistic estimate of the Czech options as well has European ones. 

The Israeli rejection of the plan brought by Schwarzenberg for the quick conclusion of a cease-fire was labeled a Czech failure. The demand for an immediate halt to the fighting was a European mantra which the Czech minister had to accept if he wanted to give the impression of representing the opinions of the EU as a whole, even though in diplomatic language there is a difference between an immediate and a quick cease-fire.

It was practically certain that the Israelis would reject a proposal for an immediate cease-fire, just as it was certain they would reject the proposal to place observers in Gaza. Why? These proposals did not correspond to reality at the time. Israel went into Operation Cast Lead in order to achieve the long-term security of its border regions, not to conclude a cease-fire as soon as the EU (which is not threatened from Gaza in any way) called on it to do so.

The lack of realism of the European proposals can be illustrated through the example of the international units the EU proposes to put in place as a component of maintaining the cease-fire. If even highly-motivated Israeli units have not succeeded in stopping Palestinian rockets, it is hard to imagine that foreign units will be able to do so at their own risk should they come to do their work as professional solders and not to defend their own homeland. It is therefore logical that the presence of international units would only make sense after the basis for a long-term cease-fire has been laid.

Instead of monitors, the Israelis proposed what it called a “credible presence” at the borders. This would consist of the presence of front line units which would actively seek out and destroy the tunnels through which weapons are smuggled from Egypt into Gaza. The presence of weapons financed from Iran and Syria is one of the main causes of the current crisis. As one Israeli diplomat told the Financial Times, “the question is what the units proposed by the European Union will do when members of Hamas start shooting at them. Will they take notes and write a report, or will they go after the attackers?" This anonymous diplomat responded to another question as follows:  “If it turns out to be necessary for the members of foreign military units to pursue the attackers, then show me the country that will send its soldiers or police officers to Gaza." It is clear that musings over whether to send in military units are often only a rhetorical aid to diplomats who want to show they are doing something. No one is prepared to defend providing their own men and women as this assistance, or to risk their own credibility. As became apparent over the next few days, one of the main problems was finding a scheme to prevent the smuggling of weapons which would suit Egypt, as it did not want to allow the presence of foreign military units on its territory.

Whether the Czech missions – or the Swedish ones or the French ones – were successful may become clear in the future, and some aspects of Schwarzenberg’s trip may remain secret.

However, there is no doubt that the Czech position was a difficult one, for three reasons. In the first place, the Czech Republic is perceived as a small, inexperienced country, and the number of skeptical commentaries about it in the European press is not exactly comforting. Even though Minister Schwarzenberg gives the impression of an experienced, balanced man with a rather cosmopolitan style, he does not have much diplomatic experience. Sometimes the conducting of an important negotiation requires a great deal of accumulated experience from many crisis situations and an apparatus that has been refined over many years – and unfortunately, the Czech Republic has neither of these. The diplomatic weight of the Czech Republic naturally cannot exceed the strength of its economy, its military or its population, and cannot be compared to states with populations of 60 million such as Britain or France.

The second reason is that the Czech Republic has been perceived for a long time as a state which is inclined towards friendly relations with Israel. This is often erroneously interpreted to mean that Czech policy is hostile to Palestinian interests, which is not correct. The Czech Republic would certainly never defend the killing of innocent people, as Operation Cast Lead was described to have done in the Arab and Western media. Moreover, from a long-term perspective, Prague and all other European countries advocate the opinion that the solution to the Palestinian problem can only be the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state within reasonable borders and a resolution of the refugee problem. Of course, the Czech Republic differs from other European countries in saying out loud that it will not be possible to move forward until the terrorism, corruption and other problems of Palestinian society are brought to an end.

In the final analysis, many of the other post-communist EU Member States share a similar point of view, which makes them comparatively more sober when evaluating the situation in the Middle East. These countries have no current power interests in the Middle East, as France does. They do not suffer from guilty consciences over the colonial past and are not hosting large minorities of refugees. Unfortunately, the directness which has been characteristic of Czech policy in the Middle East in past years now seems to be a barrier to the country playing a role as an impartial referee or facilitator. Of course, Czech diplomats very often say things which need to be said, even in the interests of the Palestinians. It is possible that in the future this will prove to be the greatest investment the Czech EU Presidency can make into resolving both the acute and the long-term crises in the Middle East.

A third complication for the Czech mission was the parallel trip by French President Nicolas Sarkozy to the Middle East region. Sarkozy’s solo trip received much more attention from the international community than Karel Schwarzenberg’s mission. On the one hand this is completely understandable, as many people do not understand the complicated structure of the common European foreign policy within the EU, much less outside it. Explaining who the main spokesperson for the EU is and why – whether the foreign affairs minister of the presiding country, the Commissioner for External Relations, or the High EU Representative for the Common Foreign Policy – is sometimes a hard nut to crack even for the initiated. Room for any European mission to negotiate is always restricted by the necessity for compromise between the 27 Member States and the 27 complicated administrative apparatuses in which the Member States create their positions on foreign affairs.

The goal of the French president’s trip, especially when conducted by such a self-confident, voluble person as Sarkozy, is completely clear. The French president seized the opportunity at the moment when everything in Washington was focused on the changing of the guard between the Bush and Obama administrations, which meant that suddenly the traditionally most active mediator of most of the conflicts between Israel and the Palestinians was suddenly missing in action. Sarkozy, in keeping with his political style, did not hesitate and called for the convening of a large Middle East summit to take place in France to revive the stagnating peace process. The question is whether Sarkozy’s initiative will succeed when the Obama administration presents its plan for resolving the Middle East conflict. However, at the moment it is clear that the common European foreign policy has suffered further damage. One Member State overshadowed the other 26 and completely weakened the EU’s efforts as a result. The conflict in Gaza offered the Europeans a unique opportunity to demonstrate that the EU has means at its disposal that are not to be ignored and which might contribute in the long run to calming the stormy situation between the Israelis and the Palestinians. However, the weaknesses of the project of the common European foreign policy have been demonstrated instead. All it takes is one Member State to start its own initiatives and the common EU foreign policy is left completely defenseless