On 4 October 2010, just a few minutes after noon, in Ajkas' alumina factory, the red mud broke through a dam and, liberated from the reservoir, proceeded through the Torna Brook Valley. It inundated three villages – Kolontár, Devecser and Somlóvásárhely – in less than 40 minutes. The reservoir holding the red mud was 40 metres higher than the surrounding countryside, so the wave of red mud was still two metres high when it reached houses in Devecser, five kilometres from the reservoir. The catastrophe was unexpected. The nearest village, Kolontár was inundated without any warning. The majority of the fatalities occurred when the victims were overcome by a wave of mud higher than themselves. The mayor of the neighbouring village, Devecser, received a phone call about what was happening with the mud, but the water of the Torna Brook was already red and the water level was rising second by second. Here the flood of mud inundated more than 200 houses, and nearly 800 people had to leave their homes. Weeks after the catastrophe, we know of eight fatalities and about 200 persons injured – the alkalinity of the red mud caused injuries similar to burns. Personal stories about the dead and injured show how unexpected the catastrophe was, but there are good examples of human self-sacrifice as well. One man was killed when he went to help others, but the red mud swept him away with his car. Women held their children above the flood and were themselves burnt by the red mud. People escaped from the mud by climbing trees and onto houses and cars. The red mud is dangerous for several reasons. The most critical problem is that the mud has a high pH because of the sodium hydroxide solution used in the refining process. In measurements, the alkalinity of the red mud has been registered at pH 13 or higher on a scale of 0 to 14. The neutral point is 7, while 14 means the highest alkalinity. Because the pH range is logarithmic, the alkalinity of the red mud is a million times higher than that of water. This alkalinity resulted in burns on victims and killed most plants and animals in the affected area. The red mud got into the Marcal River through the Torna Brook and practically exterminated flora and fauna in the river. Here was where the defence against alkalinity began, with various acids and neutral materials being added to the water to neutralize the alkaline effects. Doses of gypsum, vinegar and hydrochloric acid helped neutralise the water and decrease the damage in the Marcal and Rába rivers and at the mouth of the Danube. Nonetheless it seems the pollution reached the lower drift line of the Danube and killed fish in Budapest as well.
Three more problems appear in connection with the red mud. One of these is its heavy-metal content. Unfortunately the measurements of the heavy-metal content related to the red mud were different every time in the same way as the declarations. Though official results contend that the heavy-metal content of the red mud is safe, according to specialists from Pannon University, the concentration of arsenic, chromium and cobalt exceed accepted limits. Their measurements also showed small amounts of mercury, cadmium and other toxic heavy metals.The second problem is the potential radioactivity of the red mud. Though the radioactivity of the red mud exceeds the natural limit, measurements in the affected areas were comforting and always under the limit for human safety. A week after the catastrophe, a new characteristic of the red mud emerged. The mud dried very quickly, owing to sunny weather, and the dust got into the air. The red mud particles have high heavy-metal content and alkalinity, and so are more toxic than ordinary dust. The problem is that a significantly higher proportion of red mud is respirable than other fusions and substances. The quantity of red mud is about 100,000 tonnes! The alkalinity of the dust reaches pH 11–12, and particles could have even higher alkalinity. This is a problem, because the masks worn by volunteers and workers cannot filter dust this fine.
The moderation of damage and restoration began after the catastrophe. The immediate task was to reduce the alkalinity of the water. Removal of the red mud from the affected area has begun but could take months due to the extent of the area reached by the mud. It is highly unlikely that the clean-up will be complete. A few days later another hazard was reported. Due to the spilled mud, the pressure in the reservoirs changed and, on the north side of the pond, continually widening cracks appeared. As a result, the entire population of the village of Kolontar was resettled, and experts began building a new dam which could save a large part of the village from a second dam break. People in the neighbouring village of Devecser were allowed to stay in their homes but have to be ready for resettlement owing to the high potential of a dam break. The mud catastrophe caused an environmental and human tragedy, and the future of this countryside is also in doubt. It could be that everybody will leave Kolontar because inhabitants of the affected villages do not want to live there anymore. Starting over in houses which escaped structural damage is also questionable because of the shock effect and environmental contamination. The population of the village of Devecser fell one third in one week. The newly elected mayor of Devecser won the elections on his self-preservation programme, which is now completely impossible on mud-flooded inner- and outer-fields. However, the catastrophe has drawn attention to other areas because three additional, similar red-mud ponds are located in Hungary. One of these is next to the Danube in Almásfüzitő, where more than 12 million tonnes of red mud were placed. According to a scientific publication about the area, the reservoir is not equipped with adequate technical protection, and the red mud is in contact with the ground water which continuously flows into the Danube. Furthermore, parts of the dams can be observed to be shifting and sliding. Following the catastrophe, civic organisations immediately demanded a review of similar reservoirs, because a few days later it emerged that the leakage from the pond in Ajka had been seen in satellite images months earlier and the catastrophe could have been prevented. Following the case, expert assessments have been found which warned of the potential dangers at the reservoir years ago.
This obviously questions the liability of the operating company and the Hungarian environmental authorities. MAL Zrt., the owners of the pond in question, did not accept responsibility for the catastrophe, and their 10 million Ft insurance is ridiculously low compared to the 10 billion or 100 billion Ft in damage caused by the mud flood. Despite the situation, the company’s CEO was arrested and the company may come temporarily under state control. Hungarian environmental authorities question the effectiveness of monitoring and licensing, which could have prevented the tragedy. However, it would be a mistake to blame only the company and the authorities for the red mud catastrophe. The red mud is a by-product of the production and usage of aluminium for which there is still no solution. Producing one tonne of aluminium creates two tonnes of red mud. Knowing this, it seems irresponsible to use a metal with such a high environmental burden for such purposes as disposable packaging for food and beverages. This implicates consumers as well as manufacturers.
The red mud catastrophe is one of Hungary’s largest ecological disasters. The red mud-covered fields made everyone understand the real effects of environmental damage. The red mud painted houses, arable lands, trees and rivers. The mud marked everything. Perhaps, if the daily but less-visible pollution of the air, rivers, food, and chemicals in our lives were as visible as the red mud, maybe the recent disaster would not have occurred either.
Szuhi Attila – is an expert on waste management who works for the Waste Working Alliance (Hulladék Munkaszövetség).