March 9, 2009
Translation Gwendolyn Albert
Ever since the most recent wave of enlargement (at least), the European Union cannot exactly be described as an homogenous entente. The coexistence of 27 countries of such varied geopolitical and economic weight and with such different traditions of political culture can only occur on the basis of coalitions created to balance out their various interests and aims. The current EU Presidency trio of France, the Czech Republic and Sweden is more than instructive as concerns this problematic situation.
Security
If any French politician other than the current occupant were sitting in the Elysée Palace today, much greater resistance to the creation of an American radar base in Central Europe would have been fostered by now. Sarkozy’s thought is close to the pro-American (if not Americophile) thought of the Czech political elites, and unlike his predecessor Chirac, Sarkozy does not view the American project as being a fundamental contradiction of the European defense and security policy concept. Sarkozy also grasps that it is difficult for American allies to reject a US proposal to locate bases on their territory (even though the Americans would never permit themselves to ask this of France). For Sarkozy, the starting point and main forum for transatlantic cooperation is NATO, and France is therefore returning to its military structures. The agreement (at least formally) to “NATOize” the American missile defense shield in Europe is therefore a common interest of the Czech and French governments. Unless President Obama halts the construction of the European pillar of missile defense, the NATO anniversary summit in Strasbourg will become a forum for Czech-French understanding, a good basis for a positive EU stance that will have come from the workshop of the Czech EU Presidency.
It is often said that the EU Presidency in the second half of any year actually lasts only a little longer than three months, beginning in September and ending before the Christmas holidays. However, France immediately entered the “hot” phase of its EU Presidency with the summer conflict in Georgia, and when Israel initiated its attack on the Gaza Strip one day after the holidays, it was clear that the problems would not end until the last day of 2008. The Czech EU Presidency also had to stick to the security agenda at the start, whether in the form of energy security (the halt to Russian natural gas supplies) or in the negotiation of the cease-fire in Gaza. Sarkozy’s course, which in the French context was very pro-Israeli (again, contrasting with Chirac’s reputation as an Arab ally) was strongly echoed by the dominant Czech policy on the Middle East.
As far as the essence of the matter is concerned, the opinions of the Czech and French representations are the same, a fact which testifies to Czech-French understanding in the security field. Of course, France strove mainly to confirm its international political prestige, while the Czech Republic was very concerned to have some initial recognition of its ability to serve in the role of an actively presiding country. Sarkozy’s visits and parallel negotiations in Syria and Egypt weakened the exclusive position of Czech diplomacy and introduced uncertainty among Middle Eastern leaders, accustomed to negotiating primarily with superpowers and not oriented in detail towards the institutional structure of the European Union. The fact that a different presiding country negotiates in the name of the EU every time, or that negotiations are handled by officials such as Javier Solana or Benita Ferrero-Waldner, is not evident at all to the leaders of some non-western countries. The legalistic, less flashy position of the Czech Republic achieved its own aims, but the prestige of the French president as a key European politician has not suffered as a result of his actions.
Economy
The global economic crisis was an unplanned force that shaped both the French and the Czech EU Presidencies. Their responses to it reflect the differing political cultures of these countries, which were then projected onto their EU Presidencies’ priorities – despite the fact that neither of them ever counted on such a crisis during their preparations to lead the EU.
One of the accents of the French EU Presidency was a focus on Europe as the protector of her citizens from the negative results of globalization. One of the specific faces of globalization showed itself precisely in the rapid approach of the impacts of the American financial crisis on the entire world. Among European countries, for the time being, there are great differences in the levels of intervention in response to the crisis. For some of them, the crisis was a triggering mechanism for the surfacing of long-term, unsolved economic problems (Hungary), for others their close connection to the American economy came to the forefront (Iceland, Ireland), while in others the crisis showed that their high economic growth to date did not have a healthy basis (the Baltic countries). Such a broad spectrum of causes to the crisis makes it difficult to seek a common European answer to it. The modest formulae offered by the Czech EU Presidency are different from those of the French, primarily as concerns the level of state intervention (or EU intervention) into the economy.
First it must be noted that no one has offered a global formula for addressing the crisis. The current Czech-French debate is primarily being conducted at the level of calls for more or less protectionist measures. First, President Sarkozy proposed a special summit of the eurozone countries at which economic measures against the crisis would be coordinated. The Czech representatives saw this as an open door to extending the French EU Presidency and setting the Czech EU Presidency on the back burner. In a long television interview in February, Sarkozy used the example of an automobile manufacturer producing French cars for the French market in the Czech Republic as an “indefensible” example of subsidizing jobs outside of France. The Czech media construed his words as a demand for Peugeot to return to France, while Sarkozy was actually using them as an argument against the so-called business tax, which makes exports from France more expensive and leads to jobs draining away to countries abroad.
The debate on delocalization (the transfer of production abroad) was also revived in France; four years ago, debate over fear of the notorious “Polish plumber” led the country to reject the EU Constitution. The opening of this Pandora’s Box of protectionist measures helps not only the socialist opposition, but also the growing anti-capitalist opposition in France (Olivier Besancenot). On the other hand, a weak Czech government is facing a Social Democratic opposition which is proposing a blanket increase of pensions and wages and a lowering of VAT as opposed to the more cautious proposals of the current ministry.
Other challenges
Concerns that the hyperactive President Sarkozy would somehow outshine the internationally inexperienced Czech politicians have not borne fruit. On the contrary, Czech-French relations have significantly improved thanks to Sarkozy, whose family roots extend into the Central European region, and the distrust expressed by his predecessor, President Chirac, is already a thing of the past, at least at the highest level.
Sarkozy has accepted that his political future is not connected only with the EU Presidency and that with three years to go before elections – and during a time of crisis, moreover – political points must be scored primarily at home. Otherwise he would repeat yet another of his predecessor’s mistakes; Chirac was so fixated on leaving his mark on the map of EU politics (the EU Constitution) that he lost everything from one day to the next when the French rejected his “baby” in the referendum. Sarkozy is more circumspect and reserved in his actions – but he gives away his words too often.
The Czech EU Presidency takes a skeptical view of all proposals for a global answer to the political crisis. Since the eurozone’s largest economy – Germany – has approved a generous economic aid plan, no one is hoping for a coordinated European solution to the crisis. Two genuine battles for the economic future of the European Union await us during the Swedish EU Presidency: Developing a unified European position on the Copenhagen climate protections conference, and the preparation of the European budget for next year.
Václav Nekvapil,
Association for International Affairs