From EU integration champion to Brussels critic: How Fico miscalculated in his campaign against the EU

“I know exactly where I want to take Slovakia: into the core of the EU,” said Robert Fico back in 2017. At the time, Bratislava under his government advocated close cooperation with France and Germany and the deepest possible integration into European structures. For Fico, there was “no alternative other than being in the Union.”

He also defended Europe during political clashes. For example, when then-opposition leader Richard Sulík of SaS promoted Eurosceptic views, especially on migration, Fico called him “an adventurer who constantly criticises the European Union while happily taking the 21,000 euros he receives as an MEP allowance for his activities.”

When the SNS party threatened to leave the governing coalition, the prime minister accused its leader Andrej Danko might be responsible for pushing Slovakia away from the EU core.

Today, however, it is 2026 and all of that belongs to the past.

Critical rhetoric towards the EU has taken many forms since the start of Fico’s fourth government (2023 – date), including comparisons to a “war cabinet”, a “ship of suicides”, and even a massage salon.

“What applies to a massage salon also applies to the EU. If it does not work, it is not enough to replace the beds. The staff must be replaced,” the Slovak prime minister said in a video in January.

The euBrief analysis focused on three main questions: how Fico shifted to his current stance, whether he is succeeding in convincing Slovaks, and which anti-European narratives have dominated in recent years.

What Fico wants to achieve with his campaign against Brussels

Even before Fico’s return to power in 2023, there were concerns about his strongly anti-Ukrainian, pro-Russian and populist statements during the election campaign.

While some believed this was only a temporary attempt to attract extremist voters, the communication strategy did not disappear after the election. On the contrary, it became an integral part of his new government.

Its government manifesto, on one hand, assures that the European Union is a “unique and exceptional project” and a “living space” for Slovakia. On the other hand, it criticises the functioning of EU institutions and commits to “radically” rejecting what it calls unjustified transfer of competences from member states to the EU.

According to political scientist Radoslav Štefančík from the University of Economics in Bratislava, Smer-SD has historically held mildly Eurosceptic positions but never fundamentally opposed the Union.

“During Slovakia’s presidency of the Council of the EU, Robert Fico even presented himself as the biggest European in the galaxy, a supporter of Slovakia being in the core of European integration,” he reminded euBrief.

The shift towards more aggressive rhetoric can be traced back to the period of his third government. A turning point was the murder of journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée Martina Kušnírová in 2018, followed by Peter Pellegrini’s departure from Smer in 2020 and the creation of Hlas-SD, which quickly became a competitor to Smer.

At that time, Smer faced low polling numbers.

“Robert Fico realised at the time that this was not the right path for him, and that a possible strategy was to ‘strip right-wing extremists of their appeal’. To win them over, he radicalised his rhetoric, which also aligned well with how social media algorithms operate,” Štefančík explains. 

Anti-Ukrainian disinformation feeding into anti-EU rhetoric

Disinformation expert Peter Dubóczi from the Department of Political Science at UPJŠ in Košice previously pointed out that today’s MEP Ľuboš Blaha showed Smer a way out at the time, with his aggressive and often disinformation-sharing communication.

As tensions between Russia and Ukraine escalated, eventually leading to Russia’s invasion in 2022, Fico’s party also adopted increasingly strong anti-Ukrainian rhetoric, which it maintains to this day.

Dubóczi said anti-Ukrainian disinformation has become “a key tool for maintaining power” for Fico’s government. These messages are often intertwined with broader anti-EU narratives.

Fico accuses EU of Russophobic policy, of supporting “the killing of Slavs,” and its representatives are labelled “warmongers.” Fico has also repeatedly claimed that the West allegedly prevented Ukraine from negotiating peace in 2022 and wants to wage war “to the last Ukrainian.”

“It may have been pragmatism at the beginning, but now it is difficult to tell whether it is still not a matter of conviction,” Dubóczi told euBrief in April 2025.

Despite everything, Štefančík rejects the idea that Fico is genuinely aiming for Slovakia to leave the EU. In his view, the radicalisation of Smer’s communication is about “finding a new voter base that would otherwise lean towards right-wing extremists.”

If Fico truly wanted to leave the EU, he would behave differently in EU institutions, the political scientist argues. Instead, he often acts “like a convinced European, perhaps with mild reservations on some issues, but never as an anti-European politician.”

“The answer lies in the fact that Robert Fico criticises the EU outwardly, but in reality he depends on it – as does the entire country,” Štefančík added.

What effect this has on Slovaks

Fico’s turn towards anti-EU rhetoric does not align with majority public opinion in Slovakia. Eurobarometer surveys consistently show that Slovaks have a highly positive view of the EU.

According to the latest EU-wide survey published on Wednesday (1 July), 74 percent of Europeans consider their country’s EU membership beneficial. In Slovakia, the figure is significantly higher at 81 percent. 

A clear mismatch can also be seen between Slovak public opinion and Fico’s policies, during which he has at times disrupted EU unity by blocking its decisions. As many as 90 percent of Slovaks want EU member states to act more united.

Political scientist Aneta Világi from Comenius University in Bratislava pointed to an interesting nuance: Slovak support for EU membership is consistently higher than support for the EU itself.

“In the latest Eurobarometer, we can see that the EU has a positive image among 45 percent of Slovaks, which is also the EU average, but 57 percent consider Slovakia’s EU membership a good thing – the EU average is 58 percent. As many as 81 percent of Slovaks say the country benefits from membership, compared to 72 percent in the EU,” Világi told euBrief.

She sees the success of government rhetoric mainly in which benefits people associate with EU membership. Forty-nine percent point to job opportunities, followed by economic growth at 34 percent.

Világi also notes that the fourth Fico government rarely claims outright that EU membership is bad. Instead, its euroscepticism is based on the idea that Slovakia should remain in the Union and benefit from it as long as possible.

“This rhetoric can rather be described as populist Euroscepticism, where the traditional ideological divide of populism between ‘the people’ and ‘the elites’ is shifted onto a divide between the ‘nation state/citizens of Slovakia’ and a ‘Brussels/EU elite detached from reality,’” the political scientist explains.

For Fico’s government, Brussels also serves as an external enemy to shift responsibility onto when political goals are not met, she added.

Other surveys also point to strong pro-European sentiment among Slovaks. According to Globsec Trends 2025, 68 percent support EU membership and 63 percent support NATO membership.

At the same time, Slovakia ranks among the most vulnerable countries in the region when it comes to susceptibility to misinformation, especially compared to Czechia and Poland. A significant part of the population believes at least some false or misleading claims.

Slovakia is also among the countries most prone to conspiracy theories, with very low trust in traditional media (only 25 percent) and strong activity by pro-Russian actors. An example is the Russian Embassy in Bratislava, which, through its activity on Facebook, outperforms all other embassies in the EU.

All of this contributes to the fact that various disinformation narratives promoted by Fico’s government often find fertile ground.

What has Fico been saying about the EU in recent years?

Problematic narratives in Slovakia are no longer confined to the margins of the information space. They are now frequently echoed by government representatives, who also amplify arguments commonly used by pro-Russian actors and disinformation-spreading outlets, lending them greater legitimacy and reach.

We divided Fico’s and his government’s statements about the EU into three main categories.

1. Criticism of the EU over its support for Ukraine

Fico repeatedly uses narratives that question the role of the EU and NATO in the war in Ukraine, portraying the West as an actor that prolongs the conflict rather than helping to end it.

As aforementioned, the prime minister has repeatedly claimed that Ukraine was “forbidden from making peace” in 2022 because the West opposed negotiations. There is, however, no evidence that peace talks were deliberately blocked in this way.

The first post-invasion negotiations between Ukraine and Russia, including those held in Istanbul in 2022, collapsed because of the Kremlin’s maximalist demands, which would have amounted to Kyiv’s capitulation.

This category also includes Fico’s repeated claims that Western military aid only “prolongs the war” and that the EU has become “a party to war” rather than a force for peace. In reality, if Russia were to lay down its arms, the war would end. If Ukraine did so, it would effectively cease to exist in its current form.

Fico has also suggested that the war is the result of Western policy and NATO’s eastward enlargement. At the same time, he paradoxically adds that he condemns the invasion as “a flagrant violation of international law” and supports Ukraine’s accession to the EU.

2. A progressive Brussels detached from reality

While mainstream left-wing politicians generally place human rights and minority rights at the centre of their agenda, Fico and his party, Smer-SD, have taken the opposite approach by openly mocking liberal values.

Fico frequently portrays the EU as an actor imposing “progressive ideologies” in areas such as family policy, education and gender identity against the will of national governments. By contrast, he presents himself as a leader defending “traditional values.”

Under his fourth government, this approach translated into constitutional amendments defining Slovakia as a society based on two sexes and giving Slovak law precedence over EU law in selected cultural, ethical and value-based issues. As a result, Slovakia is already facing infringement proceedings for violating EU law.

Fico has also signalled confrontation with the European Commission over the recognition of same-sex marriages concluded abroad. The Court of Justice of the European Union has ruled that member states are obliged to recognise such marriages, but the Slovak government openly rejects this interpretation.

3. A powerless EU in decline

Fico frequently criticises the EU both at home and abroad. He did so during meetings with US representatives, including his January visit to Donald Trump at Mar-a-Lago, where, according to Fico, both men agreed that “the EU is an institution in deep crisis.”

In a January euBrief article, three foreign policy experts argued that Slovakia belongs to the group of so-called “healthy EU nations” that Trump seeks to strengthen as allies in what they describe as a cultural struggle against the EU. They share similar positions on national sovereignty, illegal migration and opposition to the so-called “woke agenda.”

Fico has also openly challenged European policies in Russia. After becoming the first EU leader to appear on Russian state television since the invasion, he accused European powers of prolonging the war through support for Ukraine and claimed that sanctions against Russia had failed.

He is similarly critical of the EU’s climate agenda, repeatedly arguing that its green policies are economically damaging and describing them as “nonsensical” and “unsustainable.”

The remarks that generated the strongest public backlash, however, came from Tibor Gašpar, deputy leader of Smer and one of Fico’s closest allies. At the beginning of 2025, he suggested that Slovakia could eventually leave the EU.

“At this moment, Smer-SD does not have leaving the European Union or NATO as its priority or objective. But both organisations evolve over time. Some of the basic principles on which we joined them may change. That is why we must keep the door open to the possibility that one day we may have to consider even such an extreme solution as leaving the EU,” Gašpar said on Slovakia’s public broadcaster STVR.

His comments triggered unusually strong criticism not only from coalition partner Hlas-SD and the president, but especially from civil society. In response to Gašpar’s remarks and Fico’s meetings with Vladimir Putin, activists organised mass protests under the slogan “Slovakia is Europe.”

Fico initially defended Gašpar by saying that while the EU is Slovakia’s natural living space, “just as the Warsaw Pact collapsed within a year, global developments could also send both the European Union and NATO into the history books.”

After the public backlash, speculation about leaving the EU largely disappeared. Some political scientists see the episode as an attempt to test public opinion, while others argued it should be taken more seriously because it may reflect Smer’s genuine thinking about the EU.

Original Slovak text: https://eubrief.sme.sk/europska-politika/c/najprv-chcel-byt-v-jadre-eu-potom-ju-prirovnal-k-masaznemu-salonu-fico-sa-v-tazeni-proti-bruselu-preratal