Hungary after the Orbán era: A country on the cusp of change

When Viktor Orbán stepped in front of the cameras on that memorable Sunday evening of April 12, 2026 and conceded defeat in the Hungarian parliamentary election, millions of people both inside and outside Hungary were rubbing their eyes in disbelief before bursting into cheers. After 16 years in power, in a country ridden by corruption and a media landscape largely controlled by the government, an election victory against Orbán had seemed almost unthinkable until just a few weeks before the vote.

This election offers much to learn for the resistance against authoritarian forms of government within the EU. The new government’s next steps are important milestones for the restoration of democracy and the rule of law, which can also provide valuable lessons for other national contexts. 

Under Fidesz, the country was lost to democracy

Shortly before Orbán’s first re-election in 2014, the late Hungarian philosopher Ágnes Heller gave an interview to the TAZ in which she remarked: “If Fidesz wins the election, which is likely, Hungary will be lost to democracy in the near future. Hungary’s democratic governments have forgotten our history; they did not know our people at all. They believed that if everything was alright with the institutions of freedom, then democracy stood on solid ground. We are all now paying the price for this misunderstanding.”1 The people of Hungary paid a very high price – whilst influential members of the Fidesz party and oligarchs close to them became ever more powerful and wealthy, citizens increasingly lost their ability to shape their state, their civil liberties and, most recently, their economic security. It took another twelve long years before Prime Minister Viktor Orbán lost an election. 

Throughout this time, Orbán consistently succeeded in his masterful exploitation of national symbols and references to Hungarian history as tools in the culture war. Time and again, he also managed to conjure up new images of enemies: Brussels, Soros, LGBTIQ people, migrants, and, most recently, the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. For a long time, the tactic of ever-escalating propaganda worked. However, the constant escalation of disinformation apparently also led to Orbán becoming trapped in his own filtered world and, in the end, losing touch with reality.

What made the turnaround possible

Péter Magyar managed to translate the people’s yearnings into a political platform that appealed to the majority of the electorate.

On this remarkable election day, the Hungarian electorate clearly expressed its yearning for Europe and democracy through its vote. However, it would be simplistic to claim that it was solely the appeal of these ideas that convinced the people – in every election campaign, the Hungarian opposition promised to move closer to the EU again and to rebuild the rule of law – and lost one election after another. It was not until election winner Péter Magyar, with his TISZA party, managed to translate this longing of the people into a political platform that appealed to the majority of the electorate: an affordable standard of living, a country free of corruption, and a healthcare system that meets the demands of the 21st century. Magyar recognised that these were the issues of greatest concern to the people of Hungary not just from opinion polls. For two years, he toured the country tirelessly, visiting also small towns and villages, not skipping Fidesz strongholds, and listening to the people. And he explained to them that a well-functioning democracy, embedded in Europe, can make precisely these differences in people’s everyday lives a reality. Now his government must work hard, for it is by the fulfilment of these promises that citizens will measure his success.

For the message about Europe and democracy to reach the people, more than just a convincing political platform was needed. The message was conveyed by a charismatic and credible lead figure. Here, Péter Magyar benefited from the fact that he himself had previously belonged to the Fidesz party. He was not only able to point the finger at corruption within the state, but also to explain its mechanisms. His knowledge of the Orbán system’s propaganda machine helped him stay ahead of the curve, often anticipating and defusing attacks against him before they reached the public. For one section of the Fidesz electorate, his conservative stance and patriotism made it easier to vote for him. On the other hand, many saw him as “one of us” who had been misled by Orbán for so long. With a leading candidate who had himself left the Fidesz structures, they could now correct this mistake with dignity. 

Even if democracy seems almost lost, it is worth fighting to preserve each and every space for democratic civil society and free media.

None of this, however, would have been sufficient without democratic a civil society – reminding people that, in a democratic state, the government must serve its people and be accountable to them – that it is worth fighting for the values of freedom, justice and solidarity, in their daily lives, in courts, on the streets. Change would not have been conceivable without the independent media – not only did they tirelessly continue to fulfil their mission to shed light on the truth, they also provided a platform for Péter Magyar. It was his 2024 interview on the country’s most popular independent media platform, the YouTube channel ‘Partizán’ (guerilla fighter), which made Magyar famous overnight when he spoke about the corrupt workings of the Fidesz government. 

This sends a clear message to liberal democracies, namely that even when the political situation seems hopeless and democracy appears almost lost, it is worth fighting to preserve each and every space for democratic civil society and free media, for that is where the hope for a better future lies – at the right moment, they become the fertile ground in which the tender shoots of a new beginning can take root. 

The reconstruction of liberal democracy

For many years, Orbán’s Hungary served as a cautionary tale of how a democracy can be gradually transformed into a regime in which elections are still held, yet in which freedoms are restricted, its institutions undermined and controlled, and conditions for political competition rigged. Now, following Poland, Hungary is set to become an EU Member State that will rebuild liberal democracy. In Poland, where the illiberal PiS regime was voted out in 2023, the picture so far has been mixed – alongside successes in rebuilding the rule of law, many expectations have also been disappointed. This may be due, among other things, to what political scientist Ivan Krastev calls the post-populist trilemma – to be successful and not lose the voters’ favour, democratic governments seeking to restore the rule of law after an illiberal era must act swiftly, effectively and in accordance with the law. Krastev argues, however, that only two of these approaches can be pursued simultaneously.2 If one follows this theory, disappointment is inevitable. 2.If one follows this theory, disappointment is inevitable. 

If any government is well placed to overcome Krastev’s trilemma, it is Péter Magyar’s incoming cabinet. With its two-thirds majority, it can legally take the necessary steps to amend the constitution. Magyar’s motivation to ‘bring home’ the EU funds frozen due to breaches of the rule of law – which was one of his key election promises – is, in turn, driving the process forward at a rapid pace. 

Although Magyar has already called on the most senior officials to resign, it is questionable whether they will simply step down.

The greatest of the three challenges facing the new government is likely to be the effectiveness of its reforms. The individuals, as far as it is public knowledge, whom Magyar intends to appoint to his cabinet come primarily from the private sector and have little to no experience in politics and public administration. In the ministries and other public institutions, they will encounter experienced Fidesz loyalists. Although Magyar has already called on the highest-ranking officials, including President Tamás Sulyok, to resign, it remains uncertain whether they will simply step down. At other levels, however, his government will likely have to retain many staff members from the Fidesz era to avoid paralysing the authorities. This will depend on how deeply rooted these people’s loyalty to Orbán is, and whether the new government can motivate them to overcome it. 

There are also a number of stumbling blocks regarding the announced move to reduce dependence on Russian oil, gas and nuclear fuel. As for oil, it is expected to take up to a year before the Hungarian MOL refineries are converted to non-Russian oil. The contract with Russia for gas supplies runs until 2036. Furthermore, the Orbán government signed a contract with Rosatom for the construction of two new nuclear reactors in Paks, Hungary. Not all the details of the contracts and their exit clauses will be known by the time the government handover takes place. Russian nuclear fuel and expertise for existing reactors will also continue to be required. A proven way to become more independent of Russian energy supplies in the long term and in a sustainable manner would be to expand renewable energy sources. TISZA’s programme promises progress in this area: doubling the share of renewables in the energy mix by 2040, as well as removing the obstacles currently hindering the construction of new wind turbines.

Overcoming the Orbán system is a monumental task

Following his election victory, Péter Magyar faces the monumental task of dismantling the system created by Viktor Orbán. For despite his two-thirds majority required to amend the constitution, the reforms he has announced amount to a Herculean task. For instance, a draft proposal aims to limit the prime minister’s term of office to a maximum of two terms, with the aim of supporting democratic transfers of power, reducing the risk of abuse of power and encouraging parties to renew their leadership. However, Magyar’s suggestion that this might be introduced retroactively to permanently prevent Orbán’s return to the office of prime minister is controversial from a constitutional perspective. 

The reform carries the risk that Orbán will use the direct election as a populist platform to bring himself back into the political spotlight.

The planned direct election of the President, which is intended to prevent the concentration of power and enhance democratic legitimacy, also proves to be a double-edged sword for TISZA. Whilst a directly elected head of state can form an important bulwark against autocratic tendencies, opposing political camps risk paralysing deadlocks and disputes over jurisdiction between the President and the government. Furthermore, the reform carries the risk that Viktor Orbán will use the direct election as a populist platform to re-establish himself in the political spotlight via the highest office of state. He could potentially muster the necessary votes – in the recent parliamentary election, almost 2.5 million people voted for Fidesz. 

The electoral reform announced by Magyar would be of paramount importance to ensure that the democratic processes and principles of the rule of law restored in future cannot be promptly dismantled again should Fidesz return to power. The abolition of the ‘winner’s bonus’ would make it much more difficult for the election winner to secure a two-thirds majority and amend the constitution. The constituencies, whose boundaries were drawn to favour Fidesz, are also to be redrawn in a new and fairer way. 

Hungarian society has liberated itself

It is crucial to heal the rifts that the Orbán regime has left in Hungarian society.

As Ágnes Heller warned in the interview quoted at the beginning, relying on institutions alone is not enough for a vibrant and resilient democracy. Looking at Hungarian society, there are many reasons to be optimistic that the democratic shift will be lasting. Crucial to this is healing the rifts that the Orbán regime has left in Hungarian society. 

What would be a simple change of government under ordinary democratic conditions, amounted in Orbán’s Hungary to a revolution at the ballot box. The Hungarian journalist Paul Lendvai goes so far as to view this parliamentary election as an event of greater historical significance for Hungarian society than the transition of 1989. Lendvai justifies this assessment with Hungary’s specific starting point by pointing out that whilst the fall of the communist regime – unlike in the German Democratic Republic or Czechoslovakia – was not brought about in Hungary by protests and pressure from below, this election represents a self-liberation of Hungarian society from a rigidly woven system. To achieve this, it was necessary to break the deep apathy of the Orbán era.3.

Indeed, the TISZA Party’s election victory was the result of a mobilisation that is rather unique in modern Hungarian history: tens of thousands of volunteers were directly involved in the TISZA campaign, hundreds of thousands took part in rallies, and voter turnout, at just under 80 %, was the highest in Hungary’s democratic history. Magyars’ victory is also a victory for Hungarian civil society. Hopefully, he will involve them in his reform agenda and treat them as equal partners – his government can only benefit from their expertise and commitment. For civil society, the end of the Orbán regime brings major changes – at last, they can use the resources they had to devote to fending off attacks and fighting for survival in a creative and forward-looking way. Contributing to the debate on draft legislation, collaborating with state institutions and engaging in advocacy at the national level – these are all skills that can finally be put to use again after 16 years.

Magyars’ victory is also a victory for Hungarian civil society.

Hungarian civil society can play a key role in ensuring that institutional changes, on the one hand, reflect people’s needs and, on the other, are better understood and accepted by them. Civil society organisations will also monitor and demand that the TISZA government delivers on its election promises and speaks up for groups whose interests may be given lower priority by the government. 

Civic engagement ensures a better future for Hungary

It would also be desirable for the civic engagement of the many young people who campaigned for TISZA during the election to be further developed after the vote. If young people remain part of an active civil society and continue to engage politically in the future, they could make a significant contribution to overcoming the deep social divides left behind by the Orbán regime with its pervasive polarisation. Many people who believed in Orbán’s propaganda are genuinely living in fear and anxiety of war and decline; this too must be taken into account and addressed. 

The progressive electorate that voted for Magyar can hardly represent TISZA on its own in the long term. In a democratic Hungary, there would certainly be room for centre-left parties. This, too, will require committed people. The task now is to harness the energy and courage of this new beginning, together with the many people behind this electoral success, to shape a better, democratic future for Hungary.