Translation Gwendolyn Albert
After 23 days of fighting in the Gaza Strip, it is now possible to ask whether the moribund Middle East peace process can be successfully restarted and result in a solution to the decades of ongoing conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. The peace process languished over many months prior to the intensifying of the conflict in Gaza. Israel continued to build settlements on the West Bank, one of the greatest obstacles to resolving the conflict. The Palestinian leadership was once again irreconcilably divided and the radical Hamas movement refused to respect the results of the negotiations led by the leading representative of the Palestinian Administration, Mahmoud Abbas of the Fatah movement.
The Israeli offensive in Gaza against Hamas, which continues to reject the existence of the Jewish state, did not come out of a clear blue sky. The 2 046 Kassam rockets that have fallen on the southern part of Israel since Gaza has been under Hamas control have paralyzed the 200 000 residents of the Western Negev region to a significant extent. On the other side, a million and a half residents of the Gaza Strip found themselves in a difficult situation after Hamas took control of Gaza in 2007 in a violent coup. Israel and Egypt responded to the coup with a blockade and announced an embargo with the aim of weakening Hamas in Gaza as much as possible. The six-month cease-fire Hamas and Israel concluded in June 2008 did not become the basis of a long-lasting peace, but rather made it possible for both parties to prepare for a sharp conflict. Israel did not relax its blockade of Gaza and continued the targeted liquidation of the armed members of Hamas and the places from which they launched rockets. Hamas exploited the cease-fire to strengthen its armed units by smuggling weapons through the tunnels from Egypt and improving its fighting strategy with the aid of Hezbollah and the financial, military and ideological support of Iran. In the days prior to the expiration of the cease fire it was more and more frequently violated by both sides, and when Hamas made it clear just before its expiration that it would not agree to its renewal, it was only a matter of time before the outbreak of open conflict.
What has this conflict brought the main actors?
Israel has learned from the embarrassing result of its war in Lebanon in 2006 against Hezbollah and did not give its Gaza offensive a particularly concrete aim. It was mainly concerned with preventing further rocket fire onto the southern part of its territory and renewing its own military’s deterrent force, which was weakened in Lebanon. Israel also hoped the military route would weaken the position of Hamas in Gaza so much as to prepare the way for Fatah’s return. Now that the fighting has stopped, it is very hard for Israel to say whether its aims have been achieved. Armed Hamas units did not stand up to the Israeli Army openly; instead their members remained in deep hiding or tried to hide among the civilian population. Even though Israel succeeded in destroying around 80 % of the tunnels, of which there were as many as 300 between Egypt and Gaza, Hamas took over the still-functional or less damaged ones as soon as the Israeli Army started to withdraw from Gaza, to the detriment of the Palestinian clans that once controlled them. Israel’s deterrent force has been renewed to a significant degree and Hamas and other radical organizations must count on a sharp Israeli reaction should they continue to threaten the security of the inhabitants of the Jewish state. On the other hand, in Israel itself there is a discussion on whether the massive military operation, which brought the civilian population of Gaza such significant suffering, has really brought about the desired results and whether it is at all possible to defeat Hamas and weaken its position when it is so intertwined with the civilian infrastructure of Gaza. It is also a disappointment for Israel that the offensive ended before it succeeded in liberating the soldier Gilad Shalit, whom Hamas has been holding for more than two years and wants to exchange for hundreds of its own members imprisoned in Israel.
Hamas, which primarily wants the blockades and political embargo lifted, was evidently surprised by the intensity of the Israeli offensive; despite its representatives’ harsh rhetoric that the Israeli soldiers would not leave Gaza alive, Hamas chose to fight a media war rather than a direct one. Even though Hamas threatened to mass kidnap the Israeli soldiers and said it had the capability to destroy Israeli tanks, the main topic of the news from Gaza become images of dead Palestinian children and destroyed homes, meant to demonstrate the disproportionate power of the Israeli Army in its fight against Hamas. Nevertheless, Hamas proudly announced when the fighting was over that Gaza had resisted and triumphed in the conflict with Israel, although it has yet to convince the inhabitants of Gaza, heavily harmed by the fighting, of this victory. Hamas might also lose support due to its harsh approach towards the Fatah representatives remaining in Gaza after its violent takeover by Hamas in 2007. Concerned that Fatah would take advantage of a possible weakening of Hamas to again seize control of Gaza, Hamas killed or intentionally mutilated dozens of Fatah members during the Israeli offensive. There is a large possibility that Hamas will come out of this entire conflict strengthened, despite having temporarily acceded to the cease-fire without conditions when the Israeli Army was still on Gazan territory. Much will depend on how the long-term conditions of the cease-fire will be established and whether Hamas will succeed in negotiating key concessions from Israel. Should Hamas achieve the opening of the borders and the ending of the embargo on which it is conditioning its agreement to a cease-fire, it will feel like the victor despite the great material losses it has suffered.
The Fatah movement is another key player in the conflict in Gaza. The great extent of the divisions among the Palestinian leadership was demonstrated once fighting began, when Mahmoud Abbas blamed Hamas for provoking Israel to conflict. During the conflict, the Palestinian Administration also arrested many Hamas representatives or sympathizers in the West Bank. The enmity that prevails between both camps is beginning to clearly show that the division between Gaza and the West Bank is not just a geographical one. During the Israeli offensive, the West Bank surprisingly did not experience large demonstrations in support of the Palestinians in Gaza, and we can only speculate as to whether that was out of fear of possible reprisal by the armed units of the Palestinian Administration or whether Palestinian society is no longer unified and Palestinians on the West Bank, whose standard of living has improved in recent years, are no longer as interested in the fate of Palestinians in Gaza. The future Palestinian state will remain an open question should the division between the Palestinians in Gaza and those on the West Bank continue to deepen. Yasser Rabbo, a member of the Palestinian Administration and a close associate of Mahmoud Abbas, has sharply criticized Hamas for misusing the blood of the Palestinians spilled in Gaza for its own plan to permanently separate Gaza from the West Bank, threatening that the Palestinian Administration will never permit Hamas to destroy the Palestinian national project, i.e., the dream of a single Palestinian state on the territory of Gaza and the West Bank. For Fatah and the Palestinian Administration it is essential that Hamas be weakened in the Gaza Strip to the greatest possible extent and that there be the possibility to regain control of Gaza. However, it will not be good for Fatah’s legitimacy for such a return to Gaza to be made ‘on the hoods of Israeli tanks’. If Hamas opens up after agreeing a cease-fire and is able to claim the renewal of Gaza by international resources as its own success, it will be very difficult for Fatah to renew its political influence in Gaza.
The Arab/Muslim world
The clashes in Gaza demonstrate how other states in the region have seconded the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Arab/Muslim countries have held a whole series of summits at which Gaza was discussed according to the various interests of key actors. Syrian President Assad, Iranian President Ahmadinejad, High Representative for Hamas Meshal and representatives of Islamic Jihad attended the summit in Qatar, while Mahmoud Abbas, Egypt and Saudi Arabia did not. As in the case of Hezbollah after the 2006 war, this bloc of countries wants to aid Hamas financially and militarily in order to renew its strength as soon as possible. It is offering financial aid to renew civilian infrastructure in Gaza, not through Palestinian Administration institutions, but through Hamas ones. Iran, the dominant state in this bloc, which makes no secret of its ambitions in the Middle East region, is exploiting fundamentalist movements to strengthen its own position, irrespective of religious issues or the particular interests of these movements. Thanks to its support for Hezbollah, Iran has strengthened its own position in Lebanon’s political system, and Tehran can try the same tactic in the case of the Palestinians through its aid to Hamas.
The growing influence of Shiite Iran is of concern to the Sunni countries, primarily Egypt and Saudi Arabia. During the Israeli offensive in Gaza the Egyptian president came under great pressure from the Muslim world over his unwillingness to take a sharply anti-Israeli stance and open the borders. Egypt has many reasons to hope Hamas fails, as it is a branch of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, which represents the strongest opposition to the Mubarak regime. After Hamas took over the governance of Gaza, Egypt became the main negotiator of reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas, which was unsuccessful thanks to the unwillingness of some Hamas representatives to compromise on their most radical positions. Egypt is also concerned that the political instability in Gaza can overflow onto its own territory as happened at the start of 2008 when the wall separating Egypt from Gaza was violently destroyed and up to 75 000 Palestinians crossed the border. What is important for Egypt, one of the main negotiators in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, is to not lose credit in either Israeli or Palestinian eyes. No less important is preventing Iran from expanding its influence to the Mediterranean Sea through Hamas. This is why Egypt is determined to increase its activity in monitoring the tunnels through which military equipment for Hamas is being smuggled into Gaza; Cairo evidently will permit the presence of foreign experts on its territory to accomplish this.
However, Egypt faces another difficult task, that of helping the United States to prepare and negotiate the terms of a long-term cease-fire between Hamas and Israel. As has already been mentioned, this will be crucial for both Fatah and Hamas. If Hamas is treated as an equal partner without having to back down from its most radical positions, which are an obstacle to its cooperation with Fatah and the Palestinian Administration, it will contribute to legitimizing the methods Hamas uses not only vis-à-vis Israel, but also vis-à-vis Fatah members in Gaza.
The response of Turkey is also interesting. For quite some time, Ankara has maintained very correct relations with Israel and has been engaged as a negotiator in the indirect talks between Israel and Syria. Despite this, Turkish politicians did not hesitate to use the sharpest possible words in condemning the way the Israeli Army conducted the fighting in Gaza. This sharp criticism could indicate that Turkey, so long ignored by the European Union, is getting ready for increased engagement in the Middle East. Through its critique of the Israeli offensive it can become a more respected player in the Arab world and compete with Egypt. As one of the politically and economically most stable states in the region, and one where Islam and democracy are not completely at odds with one another, Turkey has a great opportunity to become an important negotiator in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Western states
The European Union has “demonstrated” that it is not able to act on the question of its common foreign policy. Brussels was not able to step into the diplomatic field left empty by the traditionally most active negotiator in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during the handover of the administration in Washington. The European will thus continue to play the role in the Middle East of an entity that pays merely to observe essential diplomatic negotiations, not to lead them. Great tension surrounds the wait for Barack Obama to present his plan for resolving the Middle East crisis. The administration of George W. Bush concluded an agreement with Israel that the United States will support international efforts in the fight against the smuggling of arms and explosives from Iran to Hamas weapons dealers. Part of that agreement should be sharing information between intelligence services, naval cooperation in identifying boards carrying military equipment, and technical cooperation in unearthing the tunnels between Egypt and Gaza. This is important, but it is only the first step towards finding a long-term solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In order to prevent the situation from returning to the status quo prior to the crisis in Gaza, which would lead to even greater radicalization and strengthening of fundamentalism throughout the region in the long term, the approach of all the interested parties must be resolute. Washington should force Israel to facilitate the creation of a viable Palestinian state, which would primarily mean an end to settler activity on the West Bank. The United States and EU should condition their financial support for the Palestinians on their much greater effort to build civilian infrastructure and should uncompromisingly condemn not only the rampant corruption there but also, at a minimum, the indirect support for the Palestinian political system from various armed units and terrorist groups. The conflict in Gaza, which has brought so much misery to its inhabitants, should show the main actors that it is necessary to find their courage and, at the price of great compromise, find a way to live next to one another without the threat of terrorism for one side and the threat of military intervention for the other. However, as has happened many times in the past in this conflict, a single event can turn the entire peace process upside down and set the cycle of attacks and counter-attacks in motion once more.
Irena Kalhousová has a degree in Political Science from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and European Studies from Cambridge University. She is currently teaching at the Metropolitan University Prague and working as project coordinator for activities related to the Czech EU Presidency at the Heinrich Böll Foundation, Office Prague.
The article was first published in February 2009 in Mezinarodni politika (International Politics) by the Institute of International Relations, Prague.