"Eastern Partnership: Towards Civil Society Forum"

The EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative is off to a bad start. Presented by Sweden and Poland with much fanfare in 2008 as a new forum for the EU to engage the eastern neighbourhood[1], its recent launch in Prague proved, on the contrary, to be a major disappointment. The list of EU leaders that decided the summit wasn’t worth their time was embarrassingly long.[2] Interest and political will are clearly lacking in this new initiative. As such, the chances that the European Union will sooner or later consign the EaP to the same historical dustbin as its predecessors are high. But so are the EU’s stakes in the region.

Developments in EaP countries are damaging EU interests

Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus are plagued by a creeping authoritarianism, political infighting and regional instability, which are damaging EU interests. This is particularly the case for the European Union’s energy security. January’s Russian-Ukrainian gas stand-off sent shivers across Europe forcing the shutdown of gas supplies to 18 European countries for almost two weeks and seriously disrupting European industry. In a similar vein, the 2008 conflict in Georgia shutdown key oil and natural gas diversification pipelines such as South Caucasus (Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum), Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Supsa.

With regards to energy, the region is of tremendous importance to the European Union in at least two ways, which are largely defined by their geography. Eastern Europe is the EU’s major transport corridor with the existing pipeline infrastructure transiting 80 per cent of Russian and Central Asian gas exports to the rest of Europe. The Southern Caucasus, on the other hand, is considered a major diversification corridor providing access to non-Russian gas supplies from Azerbaijan and potentially Central Asia.

Initial EaP energy policies increased possibility of Russian retaliation

In order to strengthen the EU’s position in the region vis-à-vis energy security the Eastern Partnership initially proposed to include ‘energy interdependence’ provisions in new Association Agreements, the extension of the continental European UCTE electricity grid and the promotion of the Nabucco pipeline. As outlined in an earlier article[3], these policies would have been an affront to Moscow, which would have felt forced to use its economic and political clout to torpedo any such EU advances. This, however, is not to say that the Kremlin will refrain from spoiling the Eastern Partnership, which it views with much contempt, but that the possibility of a more head-on confrontation over energy has for the moment, to some degree, been reduced as few of the aforementioned recommendations found a place in the Prague Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit.

Civil society policy recommendations taken on board

Instead, the Eastern Partnership Summit Declaration adopted numerous policies in line with proposals formulated at a civil society forum supported by the Heinrich Böll Foundation, which was entitled “Eastern Partnership: Towards Civil Society Forum” and took place on 5-6 May in Prague.  These proposals stressed the need to strengthen energy efficiency, technology transfer, and renewable energy in the EaP as well as to support good governance, transparency, administrative capacity, and the empowerment of consumers in the field of energy through the EU’s Comprehensive Institutional Building Programme (CIB).

Effective vs. attractive policies

This forum, however, also identified the difficulties in engaging the EaP countries as few experts were able to name relevant incentives and policies that would be of interest to these states. This is particularly the case as the most effective policies, such as the aforementioned recommendations, are not necessarily attractive, which significantly limits their implementation. Energy efficiency, for example, is unattractive as long as the pricing structure of the respective energy market remains subsidised by the state. Liberalising these markets, however, puts greater budgetary constraints on a population that is already struggling. This could aggravate popular unrest – a scenario the ruling elite would wish to avoid.

As such, many Eastern Partnership countries are loath to reform their energy sectors and increase transparency and good governance. It would be quixotic, however, to believe that this is only the case because the governing leadership wishes to avoid putting more strain on their population. Controlling valuable natural resources and energy infrastructure translates into power. The financial resources made available from energy provides the existing ruling elite with the means to buy influence and cement their authority. As such, why would they be interested in giving this up through a reform of the respective markets?

One potential policy tool discussed at the civil society forum was the promotion of a quid pro quo of technology transfer, energy investments, and possible entry into a free trade zone in return for a serious reform of the energy sector. But even then it is unsure whether such policies would indeed wield enough attraction for the governing leadership unless their own pockets are lined and their hold on power guaranteed.

It is clear that the Eastern Partnership, particularly in the field of energy security, is fraught with a variety of intractable difficulties. Not only does it lack the necessary financial backing [4] and political will but it also, illogically, aims to solve the region’s energy security without its main supplier, Russia. Maybe most importantly, it is faced with an opaque energy structure in the region in which business and politics coalesce and the incentives in the economic sphere (transparency, good governance, market access – i.e. effective policy) are not necessarily in line with the interests of the political sphere (maintenance of power – attractive policy). Unless the EU is able to seriously address these shortcomings, which is doubtful, its initiative is doomed for failure.