The Future of the European Union and Green Policy
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FOREWORD

In December 2007, after intense discussions and negotiations about the future of the European Union, the Heads of State or Government of the 27 EU Member States signed the Treaty of Lisbon. This so-called 'Reform Treaty' still includes the Constitutional Treaty's most substantial changes for more democracy and efficiency in decision making processes.

The Treaty of Lisbon will apply only after being ratified by each of the 27 members. It is due to come into force in January 2009. At that same time, the Czech Republic, for the first time ever, will hold the Presidency of the Council of the European Union.

This publication presents a discussion of the future of the EU from a Green perspective. In what direction should the European Union head now? What should the future distribution of tasks between the EU institutions and the Member States look like? Where should the external borders of the EU lie in the future? How is it possible to reconcile the political, social, and cultural diversity of Europe with a joint capacity for action?

Since June 2006, the Czech Green Party (Strana zelených) has had six deputies in the Parliament of the Czech Republic and is represented in the cabinet, which won a vote of confidence in January 2007. Greens hold four ministerial posts in the coalition government.

The Green Party places great emphasis on European policy issues in its work and also stresses the need to strengthen and deepen European Union integration in order to meet the global challenges of the future. The electoral success and participation of the Czech Greens in government is a positive signal, not only for the European Green movement, but also for the future of the European project as a whole.

The articles included herein were written in May 2007. Due to the success of the Czech version, we decided to translate it into English in order to make the authors' ideas available to the wider European public. Since connection with civil society is characteristic of the European Green movement, we have also included four contributions by representatives of Czech non-governmental organisations whose work and exacting analyses we greatly value.

We would like to take this opportunity to thank the authors for their committed work, as well as the editor Václav Nekvapil, sub-editor Eva Jelinková, and Ondřej Liška (Minister for Education, Youth and Sports since December 2007), for their excellent co-operation. Our thanks also to Gwendolyn Albert for her translation and editing of this English edition.
We hope the positions and ideas of the authors contained herein will provide inspiration for a broad, constructive debate, and demonstrate how the European project might move forward.

Prague, December 2007

Eva van de Rakt,
Director, Prague office
Heinrich Böll Foundation
INTRODUCTION

The European Perspective of the Greens

According to political science manuals, in Europe the Greens are the most Europeanised of the political movements. This means that despite the fact that the Greens are the youngest political tradition in Western society, they are the most connected to European themes, structures and political processes in terms of their policy content and organizational structure.

For the Greens, Europe has always meant more, geographically and politically, than just the European Union. Since its foundation in 1983, the members of the European Coordination of Green Parties have come from both EU and non-EU countries. Today the European Green Party includes 35 parties in 31 countries.

In this era of globalisation, environmental and social problems know no borders, and therefore the question of how to face these problems is rising repeatedly and with renewed urgency. One response that has developed over the last few decades has been the rise of global civic movements in the areas of human rights, the fight against poverty, development cooperation, and other fields. The Greens themselves have their roots in these movements, and many current Green politicians in Europe and around the world are active in non-governmental and civic initiatives in addition to their activities in the party.

The process of European integration has demanded the Green movement take a unanimous stance on this issue. The movement’s response to the problems transcending state and cultural boundaries was to develop close international cooperation, especially bearing in mind the tragic experiences of war and intolerance of the first half of the 20th century. The idea of a peaceful, prosperous Europe thus gained the added dimension of an environmentally and socially sustainable society.

It soon became clear, however, that two parallel tendencies were developing in the EU, which to many seem at odds with one another. The EU as a whole continues to enlarge to include new members, and at the same time the European institutions themselves are undergoing great changes. These two processes are not inseparable from one another. In the beginning, the EU organs corresponded to concepts of democratic legitimacy current at the time, as well as to the number of Member States; today we are witnessing efforts to make the EU institutions even more democratic while absorbing more countries - there may soon be more than 30 Member States. It is therefore interesting to note that those who often call the most loudly for further EU enlargement - regardless of the efficiency and flexibility of EU decision-making processes - are the same as those who resist deeper political integration of the EU.
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From the beginning, the Greens have played the role of those who stand for a fundamental democratisation of the EU institutional framework as well as for further enlargement. Today we see enlargement as the main instrument for spreading stability and peace in Europe and its region. The Greens consider it essential that both these processes continue hand in hand; without making the current form of the EU more efficient and more democratic, it will be impossible to preserve today's standard for political negotiations and the creation of consensus among the Member States after further enlargement.

The Greens are very agile participants in European politics, which demand the determination to ask difficult, unpleasant questions. The European public as a whole shaves many of today's problems. In many areas, continuing social injustices, difficulties for young men and women to make a living, lack of respect for human and civil rights in the era of terrorism, the growing influence of organized crime, the spread of atomic energy, and above all the state of the environment are all areas of consideration from which the EU cannot randomly be excluded - in fact, the EU is an integral part of all these matters.

For the Greens, the EU has always had and continues to have one main aim: The creation of sustainable peace and cooperation on this continent after centuries of wars and conflicts between its peoples, and, after centuries of colonisation, the gaining of a positive influence in global politics. The Czech Green Party, therefore, cooperates closely with its partner parties and non-governmental organisations both at home and in Europe. This collection of opinions and cogitations is to serve as an entryway into the debate on Green policy in Europe and the place of the Czech Greens in that policy.

We would like to take this opportunity to thank the Prague office of the Heinrich Böll Foundation and especially its director, Ms Eva van de Rakt, for facilitating the existence of this collection. Green policy has significant advocates and supporters at the level of parliamentary policy and civil society in the Heinrich Böll Foundation. We thank them.

Prague, May 2007

Martin Bursík
Deputy PM of the Government of the Czech Republic, Minister of the Environment of the Czech Republic, Chair of the Czech Green Party

Ondřej Liška
Czech MP, chair of the Committee for European Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, Vice-Chair of the Czech Green Party in charge of foreign policy

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Ondřej Liška has been Minister of Education, Youth and Sports of the Czech Republic since December 2007.
WHAT WILL THE NEXT EUROPEAN TREATY BE LIKE?

Ondřej Liška

Europe now faces the question of how to newly define a democracy that functions at the supranational level. The European Union is a unique project, combining elements of an international organisation with those of an integrated political system. The EU executes the powers entrusted to it, but is not yet considered a legitimate democracy by the citizenry, at least not in the sense of the democracies with which they are immediately familiar from political life in their own countries. This is the fault of those politicians who have not managed to communicate to the public the fact that the European Union is already an ordinary - in fact an essential and inseparable - part of their everyday lives and political decision-making.

The Treaty on the Constitution for Europe was to have been at least a partial response to the democratic deficit in the EU. However, the Dutch and French voters rejected the Constitution in their referenda, deciding thereby that negotiations on the new form the EU institutions will take will have to continue. The debate on what form democracy in the EU will take in the 21st century must therefore continue also.

The constitutions of all the EU Member States share the following aims: To establish harmony between the executive, legislative and judicial branches; to guarantee basic civil rights and the democratic legitimacy of power; to establish principles separating church and state; to provide for a public legislative process; and to make it possible for the courts to control the activities of parliaments and governments. All these basic principles of a democratic order should also work at EU level, but that is currently prevented by a decision-making system based on intergovernmental cooperation. The future of European democracy, therefore, lies in a new, ambitious, coherent European treaty. At the start of this new cycle of negotiations on the treaty base of the EU, this brief article summarises the most interesting arguments in the debate on EU institutional reform from a Green point of view.

When former German President Roman Herzog, a recognised constitutional expert, published his critical analysis1 of the current state of European integration on January 13, 2007, he created an upheaval both among those who are attempting to deepen integration and among those who see it as a threat. In Herzog’s view, in addition to the indisputable benefits of the European Union, there also exists the 'danger' that, if the decision-making processes become even more centralised in Brussels, democracy in the Member States might be weakened. Herzog also appreciates the fact that, at a minimum, the existing text of the Treaty on the Constitution for Europe partially resolves the democratic deficit by strength-

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enhancing the legislative role of the European Parliament in the area of the budget; as the second pillar in the decision-making process on the budget, the European Parliament would decide on expenditures on the Common Agricultural Policy. The existing text of the treaty also strengthens the role of Member State parliaments in the EU legislative process and the purview of the European Court of Justice.

Internal security, cooperation between the courts and the police, border controls, and asylum and immigration policy would no longer depend on decisions at the intergovernmental level, since from the standpoint of European democracy this level is not transparent due to insufficient parliamentary control both at the level of the Member States and at EU level. Such matters would thus be decided by the 'communitarian method,' which means that, per the Constitutional Treaty, these areas would fall under the legislative process, which includes a co-decision power for the European Parliament as well as the option of court control.

It is obvious that the democratic deficit, which has been discussed since the beginning of European integration and to which Roman Herzog also refers, has only been partially resolved. What is left of the intentions of the constitutive Convention? Can it continue its efforts? While the Convention intended to continue creating more transparent decision-making processes in the EU, the governments of the Member States have been blocking these democratising proposals. For example, Member State governments blocked a regulation that would have increased the transparency of the legislative process at the Council of the EU, which is composed of representatives of the Member State governments and continues to enjoy the strongest position of all when it comes to creating EU norms. The European Greens were the first to demand that the Council perform this legislative activity as the EU legislative council, and Roman Herzog made a similar demand in his article.

It is, therefore, paradoxical that the Czech euro-sceptics, headed by Czech President Václav Klaus, welcomed Herzog’s critique, which they evidently did not understand. The Greens, and indirectly, Herzog, point to the fact that the imperfection of European democracy is caused, among other factors, by non-transparent decision-making by the Member State governments behind the closed doors of the Council of the EU. Václav Klaus and those close to him have favoured decision-making according to the purely intergovernmental principle, without strengthening public control. Here we can clearly see that the Czech euro-sceptics’ critique of the democratic deficit is in fact directed against themselves without their even being aware of it; on the other hand, the example of Roman Herzog, whose analysis comes from many long years of debate on the strengthening of European democracy, demonstrates that it is possible to critique the current forms of the European integration process from within a perspective that counts on deepening that integration.

The mini-treaty: How to resolve content through form

At the time this text is being written (May 2007) it seems that a shortened treaty, which will not be referred to as constitutional, will obviously be the most likely starting point out of the current dead end of the negoti-
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The fundamental aim of including the Charter is to hold EU institutions to European human rights standards. If the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms were to be included instead of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, this aim would then be fulfilled by the accession of the EU to the Convention.²

During the negotiations on the Constitutional Treaty, the Charter vs. Convention debate was one of the most controversial points. From the beginning, the Greens have preferred inclusion of the Charter, since in the opinion of many experts it provides a better standard for human rights protections. On the other hand, those favouring adoption of the Convention defend the legitimate view that a European standard should create a pan-European system corresponding to the intentions of the Convention, not a 'cellular' system. It should simultaneously facilitate the preservation of any legislation within the individual states that exceeds these standards. The effort to develop a pan-European system is testified to by references to the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and also to the case law of the European Court for Human Rights, in those explanations according to which the Charter is to be bindingly interpreted. The aim, therefore, is to connect or approximate both systems, not to create a new 'EU' system for these classic, fundamental rights.

The social and economic rights contained in the Charter, about which a stubborn fight has been waged and will continue to be waged, are formulated in the text of the Constitutional Treaty itself as principles and theses, not as rights the enjoyment of which can be pursued by law. For an individual to be able to pursue legal protection of his or her rights, such rights must be included in legislation to which the Member States will agree or which has already been agreed. Now and in the future, the goal of the Greens is that either the Charter or the Convention be included in the final version of the next treaty.

Institutional reforms - what remains of the Convention is good

In recent months an interesting consensus has been developing in the debate on the European Treaty

² Today the EU is not a party to the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
amongst euro-sceptic circles in the EU, especially in Great Britain. According to these critics, the EU should forget about changing the text of the Constitutional Treaty and concentrate on the essential challenges facing the EU, such as completing the Doha round of negotiations on liberalising world trade, reforming the EU budget, reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and instituting economic reforms. The necessary response to this consensus is that the EU will not be able to address these challenges unless it can first manage to agree on its own institutional reforms, i.e., on changes to the next treaty. Only with a new treaty will the Common Foreign and Security Policy or the area of Justice and Internal Affairs become genuinely communitarian policies. We must not forget that part III of the existing text of the treaty also establishes a joint energy policy.

The existing draft of the Treaty of a Constitution for Europe simplifies existing treaties and defines competencies. The first section defines the competencies of the EU according to the principle of subsidiarity and introduces important institutional changes, such as election of the President of the European Commission by the European Parliament and the creation of the new position of a European Minister of Foreign Affairs. This position is a further step toward the EU being able to better and more efficiently conduct joint negotiations in the area of foreign policy at the global level. Some Member States, including the Czech Republic, are demanding the removal of this title because it is too reminiscent of a quasi-state structure.

From the point of view of Green policy, it is a marginal matter what title a position will carry - what is important is whether the competencies flowing from this role will be preserved to the extent originally proposed by the current text of the Constitutional Treaty. The Greens consider the strengthening of the global role of the EU to be one of the EU’s most important tasks and believe the next European Treaty should provide better tools for achieving this than are available today. Strengthening the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU and creating its institutional framework and tools will remain a priority of the Greens even after the text of the treaty is adopted.

A favourite but often misleading point of the euro-sceptic critique is the question of whether the European Union will not violate the sovereignty of the nation states after the new treaty is ratified. In the first place, when we acceded to the EU in 2004 we already gave up part of our sovereignty in specific areas for the benefit of the union as a whole, and in exchange we gained the possibility of influencing the direction in which all of European society will head, of co-deciding on that direction. On the other hand it must be stressed that, as in the past, the sovereignty of the Member States remains completely preserved in the new treaty. As opposed to the nation state, which has powers in all public matters, the European Union can act only in those areas made possible by the Member States, and then only for the aims and with the instruments approved by them. The division of competencies between the EU and the Member States does not originate in decisions made at European level: The EU members themselves decide which tasks to transfer to the European institutions. This principle continues to be included in the text of the Constitutional Treaty.
What will the next European Treaty be like?

A role for the Czech Republic?

Unfortunately, the parliamentary parties in the Czech Republic have not achieved consensus on the basic questions of European integration. Euro-sceptic and euro-realistic parties like the ODS (Civic Democrats) or the KSČM (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia) insist on their conservative stances. When the Czech Social Democrats were in government, they considered the theme of European integration to be a matter of course; now that they are in opposition, they consider it a weapon to use against the governing coalition and nothing more. The Greens are the most pro-European party in the current governing coalition, which includes ODS and the Christian Democrats; they consider European integration to be in the best interests of Czech society and are striving for the Czech Republic to participate as actively as possible in its further development and intensification. However, given the circumstances described above, it remains difficult for the Greens to find partners for this stance.

The options of alliance with the current government in Poland or closer cooperation with Great Britain definitely do not represent alternatives for the Czech Republic. The positions of these countries are, to a significant extent, obstructionist ones leading to nowhere but isolation outside the mainstream of European society. The Czech Republic’s place is among those countries trying to find a balanced approach both to the question of EU enlargement and to deepening its political dimension. Today the majority of EU countries are of the opinion that, along with the accession of other members, it is necessary to introduce fundamental institutional reforms and strengthen the role of those institutions both within the EU and outside it.

What will the next European Treaty be like?

The only country to have expressed extreme disagreement with the division of votes on the Council of the EU per the Constitutional Treaty is Poland. That country’s alternative proposal, the so-called Jagellonian compromise, would strengthen the weight of Polish votes, but in a politically insignificant way; the same applies to any eventual benefit to the Czech Republic from this compromise. Instead of demonstrating its negotiating power by fighting over an insignificant change in the weighting of votes, Czech foreign policy must concentrate on the real challenges of European integration, i.e., strengthening European institutions and making them more efficient with a view to the problems which are in the pan-European (indeed the global) interest.

It is more than probable that the future treaty, adopted according to the wishes of the majority of EU countries by 2009, will not be called a ‘constitution.’ However, the fundamental question is whether the final treaty will include the majority of the democratic innovations now proposed and whether it will open up space for European citizens to participate in EU decision-making processes. That will remain both the programme and the task of the Greens in the Czech Republic and in Europe once the treaty is finally adopted.
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DEEPENING EU INTEGRATION AND THE ROLE OF THE NATION STATES

Milan Horáček

The further political integration and deepening of the European Union has prompted significant controversy during the current debate on the European Constitutional Treaty. It has not been in vain that the Berlin declaration adopted by all the EU Member States in March 2007 settled on directly referring to a Constitution. At the present moment it is difficult to predict when, whether, and in what form this next step toward deeper integration will take, since the voices of criticism are as diverse as the Member States themselves. A new political formation for the European continent is, of course, essential; so strengthened, the EU would be able to advance even further. The advantages the nation states gained by integrating their societies economically must now be transferred to the area of political cooperation.

Deepening economic integration

In the area of economics there has always been a strong tendency among the nation states to closer cooperation and to clear steps towards a further deepening of the European internal market. Even in England, which views political integration sceptically and is concerned about any intervention in its national sovereignty flowing from such integration, the economic perspective is what led the country to accede to the EU. Deeper integration could most easily be realised in the area of the economy, since the gains to be had there are the most tangible from a short-term perspective: Today, the European Union, together with Japan and the USA, is among the largest internal markets in the world, and its associated regions represent an effective counterweight to those countries in the globalised world economy. As far as the economy is concerned, the EU nation states have assumed the roles of advocates and supporters of deeper integration, creating thereby an example of a successfully integrating area from which all participants profit. There are still disagreements at the nation state level in this area, since it has been necessary to unify diverse economic and social systems. Economic and social standards in some of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe continue to be unsatisfactory in comparison with the most developed states in the EU (even though Greece and Portugal, for example, also remain behind). Besides, a reform of the EU economic relationships toward third countries is urgently needed in order to create a more just world economic system. Other steps toward deepening integration are therefore necessary and more than probable in the economic arena.

Deepening political integration

From the very beginning, the European integration process has also had a political dimension. The nation states did not initiate European unity purely for economic reasons, as is sometimes incorrectly
Deepening EU integration and the role of the nation states

claimed. The first step towards deepening integration was made by the six founding states - Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands - on April 18, 1951 through the founding of the European Society of Coal and Steel. The ESCS made it possible for all the Member States to access production facilities for coal and steel without paying customs. Industry, which had played an important role during the war, was now transferred into the competency of the EU: In the aftermath of the Second World War, European integration became a peace project. Whoever views the EU today as being a purely economic association in the first place is overlooking the significance of this founding act, which led from the very beginning to the rise of a political community.

For these competencies to be transposed to EU level, the nation states naturally had to increasingly strengthen their protections in the area of political integration. The testament to this is the EU pillar structure. The first supranational pillar, in which economic relationships are based, demands the greatest cooperation, while the second and third pillars, the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice and Internal Affairs, involve the least transfer of competencies to EU level. Here voting has to be performed mostly according to the principle of unanimous consent.

To exercise political influence on third states, the European Union has had to indirectly influence them through its global network of economic relationships, given the fact that it is economically strong but politically less integrated. Through clauses in agreements and treaties it has obliged itself and its partners to respect the principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The EU has also initiated long-term political talks and encouraged countries to set up regional associations. Despite its obvious lack of a common foreign, security and defence policy it has become a specific strength of the EU, as a unique formation in the world, to base its activities in global politics on the instruments of long-term talks and the strengthening of trust, cooperation and multilateralism. However, acute crises such as the Balkan wars show that, for the time being, the EU is not sufficiently capable of taking action in foreign policy.

The process of enlarging the EU to the East and the deepening of its political integration did not occur without other conflicts among the Member States, as shown by Denmark’s and Great Britain’s rejection of the Maastricht Treaty. Enlargement was an important impetus to overcoming the artificial division of the continent from the cold war era, and the process is not completely finished even today. The Copenhagen Criteria of 1993, through which the EU espouses the market economy, democracy, human rights, minority rights, and the principles of the rule of law, have since that time represented the conditions for EU membership.

The next steps

In addition to the USA, the European continent comprises a part of the world where such principles have been most actively institutionalised. The policy of enlarging the EU has turned out to be one of the most effective mechanisms for preventing conflicts and for stabilising and assuring the peace after the collapse
of the Soviet bloc. However, during the process of enlarging by 12 new Member States to the European 27, deficits in the community have also grown. In order to guarantee the ability to govern and the capacity for action of this larger EU, a further deepening of integration is essential at the institutional level at the very least. When we look to the future, the political weight of the EU will continue to grow with the entry of Croatia and, in the longer term, the states of the Western Balkans and Turkey (I hope that states such as Ukraine and Belarus will also be able to become part of the EU). The complex problems of the globalised world know no boundaries and naturally require more than mere institutional reform.

Establishing a just world economy, climate protection, and international security are among the most urgent challenges of the 21st century. The EU can deal with these challenges and become a constructive, major player only on the basis of a strong, politically integrated society. In a speech at Berlin’s Humboldt University in March 2007, Joschka Fischer called the strengthening of a joint approach in the area of foreign policy the ‘fatal question’ for Europe. The positions taken in this area by the nation states are very diverse and dependent on their geopolitical situations, permanent alliances or foreign policy traditions. The nation states often refuse to give up their national prestige, interests and short-term gains when it comes to foreign policy. As opposed to the economic area, the foreign policy goals of the Member States are heterogeneous and the advantages of increased cooperation can only be seen from a longer-term perspective. This can be demonstrated, for example, by the current debate on the USA’s plans to construct an anti-missile defence system in Europe. As America wants to locate a part of the system in the Czech Republic and Poland, she has initiated negotiations with both of these European countries. Even though the EU Member States have agreed on discussing this plan within the NATO, parallel consultative talks at EU level have not yet occurred. Such talks are absolutely essential to achieving an optimal solution for the whole of Europe. The anti-missile shield as it is currently planned would create various security zones in Europe, as South-Eastern Europe would remain outside. The European Community could establish an effective multilateralism and a foreign policy based on cooperation against the wilful, unilateral behaviour of the USA as the 'only' remaining superpower. In the conflict between Russia and the USA the EU would thus be able to occupy a unified, strong position corresponding to the specific relationships of Europe to both powers. Relations with Russia especially require a firm, united stance by the individual EU Member States: In its policies, that country is building an authoritarian state to a growing extent and is summoning the threat of a confrontation reminiscent of the cold war.

A responsible, constructive discussion inside the European Community would make it possible to find a compromise between the dangers of a future attack, for example, from Iran or a terrorist group on the one hand, and the threat of an arms race on the other. Nevertheless, Europe continues to lack unity. In the Czech Republic it is only the Greens who are attempting to transfer this debate to EU level. Further deepening of political integration is therefore unavoidable if we want to attain a strong EU, capable of action, on the world political scene.
Deepening EU integration and the role of the nation states

The future

The future treaty will aim for a strong political association - even though in the social dimension and the areas of the Common Foreign and Security Policy or environmental protection it will be necessary to undertake even stronger action. However, in the first place it is necessary to strengthen the political will toward the EU, the ability of the nation states to consider themselves its members. This does not mean that nation states will become superfluous in an era of European integration. The fact that the nation states bestow identity, provide a cultural homeland, and take proper care of cultural uniqueness will create the framework essential for each individual citizen and will also represent an important point of orientation for socio-political life. Deepening political integration does not mean, therefore, that the nation states might lose their unique linguistic, cultural and identity-creating characteristics. The motto to be realised is 'unity in diversity'.
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A EUROPE OF KNOWLEDGE

Dana Kuchtová

Since the end of the 1990s there has been discussion in the Czech Republic among both experts and the lay public on the topic of changing the educational system. An important impulse for this discussion was the opening of the European market and the Czech effort to achieve competitiveness there.

The vision of acceding to the European Union gave Czech politicians of all ideological directions the fundamental opportunity to begin addressing the problems of the Czech educational system more comprehensively. One of the specific results of these discussions was the general consensus on the need for essential changes in education, later anchored in a government White Paper. The public became aware that the most important task for the schools was to create their own ‘school education program’ to support these changes. However, far fewer members of the public have learned why change is necessary, what changes are intended, what they will bring to children and what the overall vision of education in the European context is.

Education for the future

The future of the European Union is not just the future of its institutions and policies, but primarily of its current and future citizens. It is our task to prepare for the open European space in which we are encountering stiff competition today from the half-billion of our fellow-citizens in the other EU countries. We must assume that, given the extent of today’s understanding and the rapid development of production technologies, we do not precisely know what today’s children will really need when they are adults in 20 to 30 years (during the past decade only 20 % of the overall workforce has had to change, but at the same time 80 % of all their technical equipment has changed as well). Therefore, education is based on a certain amount of appropriately interconnected fields of knowledge, and great emphasis is placed on skills which are timeless and which will facilitate rapid adaptation to the needs of further education and employment later in life. Because we cannot teach everything even if we wanted to, when selecting subject matter great emphasis is placed on what is essential and what will really be used later in life. It is very important that schools motivate students for the future and support each and every pupil in instruction, that they prepare instruction materials that are interesting and accessible to all, and that children enjoy going to school and desire to learn.

More than Bologna

The European Union realises education policy is significant to its future. The Bologna process, which began with a declaration signed in 1999 by the education ministries of 29 European states, aims to create a unified European field of higher education. The aim of this process, in which the Czech Republic
is actively participating, is to create a 'Europe of knowledge' as a firm basis for active and self-confident European citizenship.

The aims of the Bologna declaration correspond to the vision of a future Europe shared by the European Greens. The still rarely coordinated policies in the area of higher education in the European countries should be unified according to several basic features, such as a system of equivalent and 'transferable' credits (ECTS), equivalent denomination of diplomas (Bachelor's, Master's, and Doctorate) or the support of Europe-wide mobility of students and teachers. Some Czech colleges began to transition to the Bolognese system rather late, but today they are making up for lost time. Without maximal harmonisation in this area, Czech students will not be able to fully exploit the options offered to them by an open Europe.

Of course, it is necessary to set our sights beyond the horizon of the Bologna declaration. It is far from sufficient to create a joint European education area only at the level of higher education - cohesion of the national school systems must be achieved also at lower levels, i.e., at middle and primary schools. Today the high level of intra-European mobility requires this.

There are also European citizens who have neither college nor high school diplomas whom we cannot exclude from participation in the shared area of education. A big challenge for a future Europe in this direction is that of international cooperation in the area of lifelong learning, which in the Czech Republic must become a fully valued alternative at any phase of professional life. Moreover, the field of education is still just a space, an opportunity, an option - and it needs to be given specific content. The creation of that content is just at the beginning of a process of close trans-national cooperation, breaking down national borders inside the school system, the nature of which should be based on universal values.

**Solving the problems of the future**

The future European Union should better reflect current events in its education system and should encourage students and pupils to reflect on current questions concerning not only the future of their country, but of the European Union and the planet in general. We should be aware that today's 'occupants' of our classrooms are the ones to decide in 20 years or more what stance to take on the growing danger of global climate change. They will also be the ones to mine the last kilogrammes of coal, the last barrels of oil, and later the last cubic metres of natural gas. They will be faced with hundreds of thousands of tonnes of spent nuclear fuel accumulating in temporary storage, and they will have to find the place to store our civilisation's waste for tens of thousands of years. Global problems such as climate change, migration, terrorism, the exhaustion of resources, which every country is facing alone today, will have to be resolved by the European Union as a whole in several years. The alibis of small Central European states claiming that global problems don't concern them (as some Czech politicians believe) will not be sustainable in the long term. We will have to take responsibility and the Green Party does not intend to keep silent in this regard.
Openness, active citizenship and responsibility

What, then, should a future EU look like from the point of view of Green educational policy? Above all, it should be an open space in which the national borders of the educational systems have lost the restrictive role they play today. Europe-wide transmission of knowledge should be natural at all levels of the educational framework. Primary schools should produce people whose skills include the ability to learn, to be creative, to problem-solve, to actively communicate both with people and with technology, to cooperate, to know their rights and to respect the rights of others, to be tolerant, to relate to both nature and culture and protect them, to know how to care for their health and safety, and to recognise their own abilities and develop them. A young person equipped with a high school diploma should, above all, have an active knowledge of at least two major languages, which he or she would have already used during several months at a middle school abroad. The curriculum must include education in 'European-ness' and mutual understanding between nations, for example, through joint European (or Czech-German or Czech-Austrian) history textbooks. Higher education, at least at the Bachelor's degree level, should be achieved by at least half of every graduating high school class, as is already the case today in Finland or Ireland. It should also be a matter of course that students spend at least a semester at a foreign university.

In today's era, when responsibility for the polity as a whole and for the future is being lost from public life, the schools should take it upon themselves to initiate an active approach to citizenship. The challenges facing not only the European Union but the entire world require responsible, thoughtful, active people. It is up to us to educate them.
GREEN PRIORITIES IN SUPPORT OF RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND INNOVATION

Alexandr Prokop and Ondřej Mirovský

Motto: 'Kennedy’s space programme and the flight to the moon changed America forever and made it the technological superpower of the 20th century. Europe now needs a programme that will be just as ambitious and generous in order to successfully manage its transformation and face the challenges of the 21st century. It is solely up to us whether we shall succeed. Are the Greens ready to take up this challenge?'

In a mono-polar, rapidly globalising world, it is economic performance above all that determines the positions of countries or regions on the international scale. The quality of research, development and innovation (RDI) is becoming a more and more determinative factor in a country’s or region’s competitiveness.

Europe espoused this trend in 2000 by announcing its Lisbon Strategy, a joint programme of radical reforms which are to make Europe an area of high economic performance and competitiveness. In addition to strengthening global economic competitiveness, the adoption of the Lisbon Strategy goals is also an effective way to seek answers to many other burning problems of contemporary Europe, such as the socio-economic disparity between the new and old EU Member States, the aging European population, the risk of new pandemics breaking out (bird flu), terrorism, global climate change, and potential energy and raw materials crises.

One of the key elements of the Lisbon Strategy is the joint European Research Area (ERA) as an essential precondition for the creation of a European knowledge society. This will be a society in which research, education and innovation are fully mobilised towards achieving the economic, social, and environmental aims of the EU and fulfilling its citizens' expectations. Due to intensifying globalisation, advances in research and development (R&D), and the arrival of new science and technology superpowers (especially China and India), the creation of the ERA is more important than ever before.

One priority of the Green Party programme is its oft-repeated emphasis on modern, innovative approaches and technologies. This is of course related to support for basic and applied research, the building up of scientific capacity, the creation of adequate support systems for scientific research, etc. The following overview lists recommendations for building the European Research Area which overlap with both the Green Party programme and the Lisbon Strategy.
Five basic priorities towards building a common European Research Area

1. A satisfactory flow of professionally competent research workers into the field

One of the basic aims of any efficient support for science and research is the provision of a sufficient number of top-notch scientific workers. One of the EU’s primary aims in this area is to stop the European brain drain to Japan and the USA. The key to success is support for young scientists in their professional growth so they will head toward advanced research work within the ERA. Here it is especially necessary to support greater availability of stipends (e.g., the Marie Curie) inside the EU; paradoxically, it continues to be easier to access stipends outside the EU, mainly in the USA. At the same time it is necessary to strengthen an active pro-immigration and reintegration policy in the EU in the direction of attracting top-notch foreign or European scientists working abroad. In this context there is sometimes talk of creating a common European research labour market as one of the essential precursors to providing for such mobility. No less important is the provision of greater mobility of research workers between individual disciplines, particularly greater mobility between the academic and industrial spheres, which is key from the point of view of creating innovation, an area in which Europe is significantly behind its global competitors for the time being.

From the point of view of the Green Party, the creation of a unified European framework for legislative and social systems is a clear priority. This includes specific measures supporting the inter-sectoral mobility mentioned above, which currently encounters many obstacles. Within the framework of equal opportunities for women on the European research labour market, it is also necessary to continue to advocate for the removal of discriminatory barriers and the ‘handicaps’ associated with maternity.

2. Development of research infrastructure at the global level

In addition to providing sufficient capacity and mobility for scientific workers, it is essential to build top-notch research infrastructure. The influence of such infrastructure on the quality of R&D continues to grow, and in many areas of R&D, the question of scientific infrastructure is taking on a truly European dimension. In this context the ongoing process of identifying key infrastructures at EU level (the ‘ESFRI roadmap’) is very important.

The construction of large-scale (pan-)European Infrastructure (EI) in various locations, whether created completely from scratch or by strengthening the capacity of existing scientific institutions, has great potential to become one of the main engines of EU regional development. The location of such EI must be evaluated from the point of view of the broader EU cohesion policy so that the concentration of research institutions in one area does not worsen structural differences between the Member States or regions.
Top-notch infrastructure always attracts top-notch scientists, regardless of its location, thus becoming an outstanding cohesion policy tool. It is key to create synergies with EU Structural Funds in this regard.

3. Strengthening research institutions

One way to strengthen European R&D is to deepen the integration of the European education and research sector through supporting the 'research universities' formulated within the framework of the Bologna Strategy. However, it is also important to preserve public support for a broadly diversified palette of other non-university research institutions, since it is precisely these institutions (even though they do not participate in the education process) which are often the engines of development and innovation, and universities clearly profit from collaborations with them.

Connecting the individual European R&D institutions into common 'virtual research communities', 'virtual centres of excellence' and 'ETI knowledge and innovation communities' at EU level with the aim of accumulating a sufficient 'critical mass' from the point of view of knowledge and human and financial capital only makes sense as a systemic measure. The impulses for the creation of such communities must clearly come 'from below', from the needs and opportunities in the public and private sectors, and cannot be determined by a central authority.

Of utterly essential significance in this domain is support for a functional partnership between science/research/education on the one hand and industry on the other, since it is precisely the area of private capital investment into RDI and the production of specific technological innovations in which the EU most obviously lags behind its global competitors. This serious problem is reflected in the Lisbon Strategy, which presumes that investment into research and development should grow to 3% of GDP by 2010, of which - and this is key from the EU perspective - 2% should come from the private sector.

One of the ways these aims can be achieved is the creation of common technological platforms. These are comprised of representatives of various key actors (academic and educational institutions, industry, and the public sector) in specific strategic areas of the European economy, with the aim of identifying common needs, initiatives and opportunities for RDI in those areas. The resulting strategic R&D plans are then realised within the framework of the common technological initiative programmes, the Framework Programme of the European Community, or the ERANET projects, with significant co-financing from the private sector.

Another type of initiative is innovation and research clusters, which arise as joint projects of education facilities and public and private research and industrial institutions of a regional nature, based on the existence of an actual contract co-financed by the private sector. This functional approach has become the basis of an efficient process of modernisation and growth in competitiveness in some regions of Europe which were previously stagnant.
4. Sharing knowledge

The efficient and rapid transfer of information between research, industry and society is the basis of success when creating innovation, but it also encounters many obstacles related to questions of intellectual property protection. In particular, the question of sharing first-order data generated by research is to a great extent specific to the field in question and requires a sensitive approach. For efficient connection of a larger segment of institutions and organisations to the use of data from various research areas, it is therefore necessary to support the creation of publicly accessible databases. Support for the efficient communication of this knowledge can also be of great significance as an effective instrument for supporting the innovation potential of the less-developed regions of Europe.

5. Optimising research programmes and priorities

In addition to the development and optimisation of the EU Framework Programmes for research and technological development as one of the main instruments for building the ERA, the European Greens also place great emphasis on coordination and optimisation of national and regional research programmes so as to avoid fractionalism and duplication in European R&D, as well as establishing a clear direction for future common R&D. However, this process must not mean coordination 'at any price', and should not lead to the levelling-out of national programmes based on specific national opportunities, problems and priorities, nor should it eliminate competition, which is the essential engine of progress.

The upgrading of existing programmes and tools and the creation of new ones, as well as their thematic focus, should come from commonly communicated prognoses as to how various analyses will develop. This process should respect the adequate representation of the technological platforms and the scientific community, represented by leading scientists in the EU.

The creation of a common R&D programme is key, particularly in questions of a truly European dimension, such as new energy resources, the environment, transportation, health, and security. It is also important for areas where the seeking of a solution exceeds the financial possibilities of the individual Member States, such as space research, nuclear fusion programmes, particle physics, or advanced areas of new and developing technologies such as nanotechnology. One example of supranational programmes already in operation are the projects of the ERANET type, which facilitate the channelling of national-level financial support from various Member States towards the design of common international projects.

In addition to the creation of common R&D programmes, these coordination activities should also aim at creating shared principles and methodologies for quality control in the spirit of sharing 'best practises'. At the same time, it cannot be forgotten that there is a need to simplify the evaluation process and make
it more efficient, to improve the evaluation of scientific performance, and to lower the bureaucratic bur-
den accompanying the allocation of state support for RDI.

Last but not least, it is necessary to take care to preserve the political independence and plurality of sci-
ence, particularly in the area of basic research. In this context the Green Party welcomes and supports
the creation of the European Research Council (ERC) as a truly European grant agency with an out-
standing budget and autonomy.

Even though significant effort and finances have been expended by the EU since the announcement of
the Lisbon Strategy in 2000 to build a unified, efficient European Research Area, by now it is becoming
obvious that Europe will not reach all of the aims it set itself at Lisbon by 2010 (e.g., the above-mentioned
investment into RDI in the amount of 3 % of GDP). For this reason the Green Party supports the attempt
of the European Commission at a political vision and review of the approach to the establishment of ERA
Perspectives. Nevertheless, this 'self-reflection' must also be connected to an analysis of the successfulness
of the plan and an evaluation of the efficiency of its various instruments and measures. This primarily con-
cerns the re-evaluation of projects five and six of the Framework Programme (FP) which ran from 1999
- 2006 and their impact on the Lisbon Strategy, such that those experiences can be used in the future
when formulating new FPs and re-evaluating the priorities for their implementation.

Concrete goals for the Czech Republic
(Armed with education, defended by prosperity)

Despite many positive steps, the current situation in the area of innovation in the Czech Republic is very
grave. The competitiveness of the country is dependent to a great extent on temporary advantages (the
low cost of labour, etc.). On the European Innovation Scoreboard the Czech Republic remains far below
the EU average. The greatest deficiencies are felt in patenting activity, in support for innovative (tech-
nologies) firms, in the field of education (a low number of graduates of higher education, a low per-
centage of such graduates in the natural sciences and engineering) and in support (financing) for RDI.
In order to achieve a marked improvement in building a knowledge society, it is necessary to adopt measures in the area of the state administration, higher education, support for R&D, transmission of R&D results, and the financing and management of the corporations which are the object of this policy.

These measures can be divided into four strategic areas:

1. **Strengthening Research and Development as a source of innovation**

   - Increase annual public expenditure on R&D by 20-25% in order to achieve, by 2010, public expenditure at the level of 1% of GDP. Change the ratio of institutional and publicly allocated support for R&D and increase industry’s share in R&D.
   - Establish specific R&D priorities and update them regularly. Focus future R&D support from public resources on those areas and research directions of great technological, environmental and economic potential.
Green priorities in support of research, development and innovation

- Regularly evaluate the results of R&D and allocate public resources to R&D according to the results. Support the creation of development and innovation clusters. Create an effective monitoring and evaluation system of the effects and results achieved on the basis of clusters as instruments of regional innovation policy.
- Financially support intellectual property protection for those R&D results with high economic potential. Harmonise Czech legal regulations with Community law, and implement changes in the methodologies and rules for public R&D tenders. Stimulate R&D in the business sector through tax relief. Support increased communication with the public in the area of RDI, including PR activities.

2. Create functional cooperation between the public and private sectors

- Improve mobility of workers between the academic and business spheres, including the mobility of young research workers and students.
- Support the creation of technological platforms for selected fields. Programmatically stimulate the creation of 'spin-off' firms.
- Provide for the operation of centres of technology transfer, technological incubators, and scientific/technical parks at colleges and within the framework of RDI.

3. Provide human resources for innovation

- Change the system for evaluating education at colleges such that it depends more on the parameter of outputs than of inputs. Motivate colleges to collaborate with the business sector. Initiate development programmes for increasing the number of graduates in the natural sciences and engineering.
- Support projects for educating workers in the area of R&D aimed at seeking and evaluating the commercial potential of R&D results and new technologies.

4. Make the performance of the state administration on RDI more efficient

- Improve the coordination of these various support RDI activities. Create a standard Technology Agency of the Czech Republic for the area of industrial R&D.

In the current EU budget period (2007-2013) the Czech Republic has a unique opportunity to draw on approximately CZK 752 billion from the Structural Funds through various Operational Programmes (OP) for general support to the economy and social solidarity. One of the thematic operational programmes is 'Research and Development for Innovation' (VaVpI), which has been allocated approximately CZK 58.4 billion, i.e., 7.8 % of the total monies available for the Czech Republic. The VaVpI programme will therefore mean a dramatic increase in financing for R&D by more than 30 % annually over existing state budget allocations. Here we must remember that the annual budget of the Seventh EU Framework...
Programme for Research and Technological Development has also been increased by approximately 40% in comparison with the Sixth FP. It is therefore desirable to create coordinated implementation of the FP and Structural Funds such that they become an integral component of the national RDI strategy and facilitate the exploitation of mutual synergies. This process should reflect the recommendations adopted by the European Committee for Scientific and Technical Research (CREST).³

Leading the public debate on RDI

It is completely obvious that the realisation of the long-term vision of the Green Party for the transformation of Europe (and of the Czech Republic) into an environmentally cleaner, more energy-efficient and permanently sustainable society is unthinkable without the widespread application of new methods and technologies in agriculture, transportation, energy and manufacturing industries.

The Green Party is therefore the most natural ally for support of an R&D aimed at transforming the economy from one intensive in consumption of resources to one intensive in knowledge. If well-articulated, this position has the possibility of becoming one of the most beneficial, high-profile axes of the Green Party programme. The current image of the Green Party, however, is dominated for the time being by its openly confrontational position on Euratom, GM foods and to a certain extent even on nanotechnology, which profiles the party in the eyes of both experts and the general public as rather technophobic. On the other hand, the Green Party programme leans heavily on progressive technologies, but at the current time many see the technologies the party favours as economically unfeasible and dubious.

It is therefore key that a broad-based dialogue on these questions be conducted among experts, and also that emphasis be placed on objective, efficient communication of these topics to the general public. Here as on many other European topics, a great contribution of the Green Party could be precisely its emphasis on the expert side of these discussions. Our position, for example, in the area of the ethics of research into new technologies should also be reflected to the public in addition to the Green Party programme priorities, primarily the expert point of view of recognised international authorities such as the European Group on Ethics of Science and New Technologies.

³ For more, see http://cordis.europa.eu/documents/documentlibrary/2851EN.pdf
The collapse of Soviet Socialism in 1989-1991, as well as developments in Western thought since the 1960s, have resulted in growing doubts about the whole notion of 'progress'. On the whole, this scepticism is desirable. Indeed, much of the 'primacy' which European civilisation or the individual European superpowers have assumed in the past now has a somewhat bitter taste to it. The spreading of 'progress' to other continents through colonial conquests, accompanied by the enslavement and murder of their indigenous inhabitants, are no longer idealised by Europeans for the most part. The same applies to the domination of human life by technology and industry, about which more and more people today are expressing significant doubts. The constantly rising number of automobiles is no longer considered an example of 'progress', and the loss of biodiversity or the accumulation of toxic waste are no longer considered the inevitable price to pay for this 'progress'.

In the shadow of all these doubts about the true meaning of (and fallout from) our past and current 'successes', is there any bright, unspoiled place to be found in the development of Euro-Atlantic civilisation? Is there any area in which an originally uncritically celebrated benefit has not, over time, become clogged with the ashes of unexpectedly negative results? Enthusiasm over growing industrialisation has become muted by the inexorable growth of a general alienation. The mass media, which were expected to contribute to the transparency of the political environment and the cultivation of free thought, have rather turned out to be sensationalist synthesisers of prefabricated, shorthand information. Science, which since time immemorial has been considered an instrument of knowledge, has to a large extent managed to elude the restraints of any sort of ethical or philosophical foundations, often serving above all the economic interests of private corporations or military objectives. Indeed, it would take too much time to list all the forms of contemporary disillusionment with civilisation.

One of the few areas in which the 'progress' of Western modernity has maintained its original, optimistic interpretation as a 'social good' is the area of human rights, which during the past 250 years has undergone unequivocally positive developments. The arc of human emancipation begins with the carving out of the basic civil and political rights and continues with the expansion of those rights to groups who were originally left out (women, minorities) and most recently to special legal protections for individuals and groups which essentially occupy weak positions in society when compared to the 'able-bodied average' (children, the disabled).

Where does the European Union fit in? A mere 15 years ago the EU seemed relatively unconcerned with such matters. After all, human rights questions and other 'soft' idealistic agendas were traditionally the concern of the Council of Europe, while the European Community was involved in everything related to
realpolitik, especially economic power. With the exception of the area of discrimination against women, human rights remained on the fringe of European Community activities until the beginning of the 1990s.

In 1957, the first Treaty on the European Community - the Treaty of Rome - contained Article 119 (today Article 141), which outlined the principle of equal pay for equal work for men and women. However, it must be recognised that the motivation for this principle was pragmatic and economic rather than based on human rights. The prime motivation was for the states with this principle already in their legal code (such as France) not to be exposed to underhanded competition by those who had not yet introduced it (such as Germany). It was only during the course of the following decades that the interpretation of this article gradually moved towards that of a basic right of each individual, rather than that of a regulation contributing to undistorted, fair competition on the common market.

**New problems and a new consensus**

How did it come about that, from the beginning of the 1990s, human rights did become of primary interest for the European Union? It seems the EU did not fully claim the human rights area as its own until it decided to enlarge to include the states of the former Eastern bloc after the fall of the Iron Curtain, embodying these principles in the Copenhagen Criteria as part of the framework of requirements for this unprecedented number of new candidate countries. Prior to this enlargement, such political criteria had not been based in any treaty; the candidate countries, therefore, were being required to meet human rights criteria that the European Union had never demanded of the existing Member States. The best-known example is that of protection for minorities, a theme that 'Brussels' had previously taken great pains to avoid in its relations with the Member States.

At the same time - and perhaps also in relation to the demands made on the new candidates - there was increasing pressure for the Community to devote greater attention to human rights inside its own borders as well. The Amsterdam Treaty (1997) for the first time expressly declared human rights as part of the basis of the EU. In addition, it defined support for equal treatment of men and women across all policies as one of the aims of the Community and expanded protection against discrimination on other grounds - racial and ethnic origin, age, religion, world-view, disability or sexual orientation. On the basis of this Treaty, directives against discrimination on such grounds were actually adopted in the year 2000. The old Member States were obliged to implement these directives into their legal codes by the end of 2003, while the new Member States had to do so as of the date of accession. To this day, the Czech Republic has yet to implement these directives, despite the fact that a unified Anti-Discrimination Act was prepared for adoption several years ago. When we finally see the adoption in the Czech Republic of anti-discrimination norms into law, it will above all be thanks to the legislative requirements of the EU - and in the current situation, thanks to the untiring efforts of the Greens.
The European Union and human rights

At present, new human rights issues are coming to our agenda, such as the rights of senior citizens; legal guarantees for asylum seekers; the rights of settled foreigners; setting limits on new technologies; bioethics; and the protection of personal data in connection with new security problems. It is quite reassuring that the current human rights concept has been accepted across the political spectrum, and no relevant political tendency is calling it into serious question. Admittedly, the Liberal Right and the Social Democratic Left - or the defenders of natural rights and legal positivists - still differ in terms of the importance they ascribe to social rights. However, this is a continuum of opinion with a large area of consensus; the positions are neither radically different nor mutually exclusive. Marxist dogmatism, which until 1989 offered social rights as a universal 'substitute' for all other rights, has simply left the scene, just as the opponents of human rights per se disappeared in 1945.

The human rights consensus which now reigns across the European political landscape proves that protecting the rights of disadvantaged groups is by no means an unnecessary luxury which extravagantly exhausts public finances and thereby reduces competitiveness in the economic struggle against countries which do not assign human rights such significance. At some point every single person will find himself or herself in the role of the disadvantaged, at least at the very beginning and very end of life. Guaranteeing human rights protection is therefore a significant instrument of social and political cohesion from which all individuals reciprocally benefit.

Reasons for scepticism persist

Can we therefore take heart that we have found a cure for our scepticism about civilisation? Have we discovered the one bright line in the intricate development of European civilisation that is not encumbered by destructive side effects? Is the area of human rights the last bastion of positive, untarnished progress? Unfortunately, I am of the opinion that this 'fixed point in the universe' must also be placed in perspective. This strengthening of the significance of human rights is presenting us with many difficult ambiguities and dilemmas, and we will only deserve true relief and optimism when we have discovered the answers to these questions. In a world of economic globalisation, such relief may only be possible at the price of ruthlessly separating our own successes from all other contexts.

It is not so easy to take pride in one's noble intentions on the question of protecting the rights of our children while simultaneously consuming goods produced by child labour in developing countries. We can never be truly proud of even the fairest pension system or most effective protection of employees' rights when we are simultaneously economically completely dependent on imports from regions where the slaves of this new era do our dirty work without any hope for a better future. The significance of our tolerance for freedom of religion and belief goes completely by the wayside if we continue to indirectly contribute to the enriching of elites who imprison or even murder their political opponents or believers in 'unacceptable' religions by the thousands and transform their bodily organs into hard currency!
If our efforts to establish a universal codex of human rights are truly to be believed, we must uncompromisingly put pressure on authoritarian regimes that violate human rights. We must also take action in those countries where human rights violations are due to poverty. Decisive pressure from the European Union to implement human rights in developing countries must be understood as a certain debt we owe to the rest of the world, which Europe subjected to merciless conquistadorial oppression in the past, and which to this day it freely preys on under the pretext of mutual necessity. The current pathetic state of the developing countries is, in the majority of cases, the lingering result of former European colonial domination, which to this day is one of the main causes of the economic advantage the European countries enjoy over the developing part of the world. If the European concept of human rights is truly to be interpreted in an optimistic light, then its message must be spread thoroughly and on a global scale. To believe that conditions for people in developing countries will automatically rise with the growth of their GDP would be an obvious fallacy.

Certainly, despite all this, the human rights narrative can be called one of modernity’s most optimistic stories. However, it has not yet reached its happy ending - and it is not likely that it ever will. Just as they did during the past decade, new challenges will continue to surface for individuals, states, Europe and the world, and these must also be approached from a human rights perspective. We hope the general sensitivity of the European public to the rights of ‘others’ will increase during this process. At present, there are fundamental differences in this regard between the old and the new Member States, but also between the North and the South, not to mention the differences between those who are within the EU and those who remain outside it.

Of course, it is not enough just to hope. We have a lot of work ahead of us in various areas, especially at the macro-political level, not least because the threatening re-nationalisation of European politics could set the human rights field back decades.
This year we are commemorating the 50th anniversary of the foundation of the European Community, the basis of today’s European Union. The EU is concurrently celebrating this year as the European Year of Equal Opportunities for All. The combination of these two events has a deeper symbolic meaning. The project of a common Europe was founded on reconciliation, respect, and tolerance among nations, and was to guarantee the permanent overthrow of ideologies based on the concept of human inequality, the poisonous fruits of which were experienced by the nations of Europe during the Second World War. The celebration of this year as the European Year of Equal Opportunities is related to these ideas - but at the same time it balances and underscores the long years of internal struggle inside the European Union to promote the ideas of equality, a ban on discrimination, and equal opportunities for all individuals at the practical, everyday level, particularly in terms of working life.

Since its inception, the European Community has devoted great attention to eliminating discrimination on the basis of gender and achieving equality between men and women. The development of European society at political and legislative level, strongly supported by the decisions of the European Court of Justice, has led over the course of the decades to the rise of one of the most comprehensive systems in the world for eliminating discrimination on the basis of gender.

In 1997 a new breakthrough occurred in this area. Ten years ago the Amsterdam treaty was signed, which in its newly established Article 13 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community gave the Community a mandate to take measures to eliminate discrimination not only on the basis of gender, but also on the basis of five other reasons - race or ethnicity, religion or belief, physical disability, sexual orientation, and age. This list of reasons for discrimination is not exhaustive, as can be seen through a brief comparison of Article 13 with the relevant international treaties or national constitutions. However, from a practical point of view it does cover the most frequent reasons for discrimination and denial of rights in the area of working and social life, i.e., in those spheres that are also regulated by EU law.

In the 10 years since the signing of the Amsterdam treaty there has been an unprecedented development in the area of eliminating discrimination and supporting equality, primarily in the legislative sphere. The mandate given by the Community has been gradually realised through several innovative directives, which entail the responsibility for national legislators to adopt appropriate laws banning dis-
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criminal and facilitating the achievement of equality. These directives far exceed the framework of the traditional European topic of equality between men and women.

The European Year of Equal Opportunity for All in the EU and in the Czech Republic

The decision of the European Parliament and Council of the EU on 17 May 2006, which announced the year 2007 as the European Year of Equal Opportunity for All was to have been an opportunity and an instigation for evaluating what has already been achieved as well as the discovery of new directions in this area. It is useful to take a break from this 'legislative marathon' now, as can be seen from a recent Eurobaromètre finding that as many as four out of 10 Europeans do not know that discrimination is banned by law, and only one-third of Europeans know how to defend themselves should they become the victims of discrimination.

In the Czech Republic the European year officially began at the start of April 2007. The Czech Republic has tended toward a broad inclusion of the non-governmental sector in the realisation of the European Year, and therefore the European Year has been realised as a series of interconnected NGO projects. 2008 will be celebrated by the European Union as the European Year of Multicultural Dialogue.

The idea of equality and modern Czech history

Equality is the starting organisational principle and value of all free and democratic societies. This is confirmed by modern Czech history. The idea of equality as the basis of the constitutional order was included both in the basic imperial law on general civil rights of 1867, which also considered the basis of the legal tradition to be equality of all nationality groups living in one state and a ban on discrimination against racial, ethnic and religious minorities. The Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic of 1920 devoted its Article 106 to 'equality', stating inter alia that 'franchises on the basis of sex, ancestry and profession' are not recognised, and it similarly legislated protections for ethnic, religious and racial minorities. The current Czech Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, which is a component of the constitutional order, guarantees the fundamental rights and freedoms in Article 3 regardless of gender, race, skin colour, language, religion or belief, political or other sentiments, national or social origin, membership in a national or ethnic minority, property, ancestry or social position. It also legislates in detail the protection of minorities.

Historically, therefore, there has always been the consideration of a ban on discrimination in Czech society, as well as consideration of equality connected primarily with nationality, or rather race and ethnicity. However, the Roma unfortunately were often left out of this scheme, as they were perceived in the past rather as an 'inadaptable' social group than as a national minority. Today the Roma belong among those minorities who face the most discrimination. On the other hand, some other reasons for discrimination (e.g., physical disability or age) have not been reflected very well in law up until now. Other rea-
Equal opportunities and support for equality in the EU

sons, such as religion, have not played more serious roles in the Czech Republic as a result of actual historical circumstances. The strategy of the European Year of Equal Opportunities is to do its best to reflect these specifics, primarily by indicating that the removal of prejudices against the Roma is a priority, as are recognising blind spots in the area of discrimination and breaking down barriers flowing from the culturally, socially, and ethnically closed nature of society.

Protection of ethnic minorities and the European Union

The European Community was founded with the aim of supporting the economic development of the Member States. This original economic focus was expanded to include other areas, for example, the achievement of a certain level of social protection. However, despite the activity of the European Union, this focus has not yet been expanded such that it would include questions concerning national identity, state citizenship or the self-concepts of the nations of the Member States. It therefore follows that the European Union does not have at the present time the power to directly influence the approach of the Member States on such sensitive topics as a vision of multicultural (or any other kind of) coexistence of the majority with ethnic minorities in society.

Nevertheless, the European Union is contributing in various directions to supporting an open society and the tolerant coexistence of various groups, primarily ethnic ones, within the framework of the Member States and the EU as a whole. Since 1999, the European Community has had the option of adopting, on the basis of Article 13 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, measures in the fight against discrimination on the basis of race or ethnic origin. In the year 2000, the Council of the EU adopted a special directive through which it introduces the principle of equal treatment of all persons irrespective of their race or ethnic origin. This directive was the first to exceed the traditional field of EU activities in eliminating and preventing discrimination, i.e., the area of working life. The directive covers a ban on discrimination in access to social security, health care, education, and goods and services including housing.

Adoption of this directive was truly an unprecedented step which has led to a marked improvement in the level of protection provided against discrimination in many EU Member States. The directive has become an instrument for the spread of ‘good practices’ from countries with more developed systems of protection, such as Great Britain or Ireland, to countries where this issue has been less developed (e.g., Austria or Germany). The Czech Republic falls into this second group of countries, which explains its difficulties to date with transposing this directive.

However, the role of the European Union in supporting the fight against discrimination is not exhausted merely by adopting the Antidiscrimination Directive. From 2001-2006 the EU Action Programme to Combat Discrimination supported efforts to eliminate discrimination. Within the framework of this financial programme, the European Commission supported many Europe-wide and nationwide projects aimed at a bet-
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ter recognition of the actual state of affairs, and assisted in introducing new antidiscrimination legislation in practise. In the Czech Republic, the national activities realised within the framework of the Action Programme were included in the governmental campaigns against racism. For the 2007 - 2013 budget period the European Union will continue to support the civil sector and public institutions in their effort to eliminate racial discrimination within the framework of a new, broad-based programme called PROGRESS.

Integration of immigrants and the future of the EU

An important area in which the European Union can support the creation of an open, tolerant society is the area of integrating immigrants. The integration of immigrants is one of the current topics relative to almost all the European countries, including the Czech Republic. Traditionally the European countries have implemented various models for integrating immigrants. Experts agree that these approaches to integration follow three basic models:

1. The differential exclusion model
2. The assimilation model
3. The multicultural model

The prototype of the differential exclusion model is the system for integrating guest workers in Germany. Germany has accepted guest workers as participants on the labour market, but not as the permanent immigrants they have later de facto become. The model of differential exclusion includes legal and administrative measures that clearly distinguish between temporary populations and citizens. The barrier between these groups is very difficult to overcome.

The prototype of the assimilation model is France. The basic vision of this approach is that the offspring of the original immigrants are integrated into the host society to such an extent that they become indistinguishable from the other inhabitants and have the same rights and responsibilities as everyone else.

The third model has its roots in Australia and Canada. Models of multicultural coexistence in these countries were introduced at the start of the 1970s given the existence of large groups of indigenous inhabitants there. On the model of these traditional 'countries of immigration', multicultural policies spread to Europe, especially to the Royal Kingdom of the Netherlands and Sweden. Multiculturalism means accepting immigrant and minority groups as special communities which are different from the majority population in terms of language, culture, and social behaviour, and which also have their own associations and social infrastructure.

In practise, however, it has been demonstrated that none of the models above has been able to guarantee the effective integration of immigrants. Currently there are enclaves of ethnic minorities and immi-
grants everywhere in Europe, especially in big cities, in which conditions are significantly worse than in the neighbouring areas, and where socially problematic phenomena accumulate, such as high unemployment, crime, etc. It would certainly be unfair to exclusively blame multicultural approaches for this state of affairs. Nevertheless, it is obvious that this model has not been effective and must be re-evaluated. In opposition to the classic multicultural approach, a trend is now being much more markedly implemented in the policies of EU Member States such as Great Britain or the Netherlands towards an emphasis on the personal, individual dimension of integration.

As has already been stated above, the European Union cannot directly intervene in these processes. Nevertheless, it is taking on a significant supportive role when it facilitates the exchange of positive experiences between the Member States and structured dialogue. The EU's new financial forecast also counts on supporting the integration activities of the Member States and of civil society.
THE VISION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY

Gabriela Hrabaňová

The coexistence of people from various cultures and environments, speaking different languages, has been perceived as a problem for centuries. This problem primarily concerns larger cities, which become the port of call for immigrants. These people arrive with their own values, which they then propagate, resulting in a clash with the culture and values of others. In reality we are all the same - we simply have different skin colours, or different religious faiths, or we love people of our own gender, or those of the opposite sex. No matter our differences, we are all just people, and we should never forget that simple fact.

There is a saying: 'Everywhere is good, but home is best'. However, not everyone has a place to call home, and the problems of coexistence do not concern new immigrants only. Some nations that have been living on European territory for centuries have never found it easy to say 'this is my homeland' about the country in which they live. In the case of the Czech Republic, the majority society views minority groups as foreigners, or even as enemies. You can ask why this is, and the answer is that the minorities maintain their own customs, or simply look different.

We live in a country whose culture and values are closely connected with national identity, and which, just like all the other countries of the European Union, was based at its inception on linguistic nationalism above all. Nationalism connects Europe, and the European Union still supports it. Even though the EU is known to be a great mixture of cultures and languages, few people actually realize that more than 80 different languages are spoken in the EU, not including dialects. Of these, 23 (including Czech) are official, and European Commissioner Leonardo Orban has recently been appointed to a new position overseeing the EU languages (EU commissioner for multilingualism).4

This focus on multilingualism goes hand in hand with multiculturalism, a relatively new ideological direction emphasising the benefits of cultural diversity for society and the state. We can encounter multiculturalism in a developed form in countries where people come from diverse cultural environments, and in some cases it is even implemented from above through state policy which aims to show that people can live together, regardless of their origins or convictions, without having to give up their cultural differences.

Multiculturalism should also be a pivotal policy of the newly enlarged European Union. Even though the EU is composed of many seemingly homogeneous nation states, we find many cultural differences with-

4 Orban: V EU je více než 80 jazyků, pestrost je třeba podporovat. See http://www.romea.cz/. (Orban: There are more than 80 languages in the EU, diversity must be supported)
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in each country. According to Jan Patočka, 'it is] not nationality defined according to language or
blood, but civic nationality which will give life to a society of a truly universal dimension, so that the
bearers of the widest possible variety of group identities and interests will be able to argue about their
coeistence as equals, without resorting to weapons'. Multiculturalism, therefore, is the path toward ful-
filling the vision of a socially just society, an aim that can only be realised through education and aware-
ness-raising.

The current situation, in which the European countries are closed in on themselves, stands in marked
contrast to the current reality of military conflicts, natural disasters, and the starvation and disease such
events bring to the rest of the world. In the Czech Republic, insufficient support for minorities insisting
on their customs, traditions and culture is leading to segregation and the rise of ghettos. There should
be no room in a multicultural society for ghettos. Government policy should strive for a multicultural soci-
ety, for the integration of and support for specific ethnically and culturally distinct groups. The majority
society must stop clinging to the ethnic dimension of the state; neither the loss of the country nor the loss
of cultural identity will result, as the identity will always remain that of the majority.

Lakmus' paper on the success of multiculturalisation in European countries should not only be read in
relation to new immigrants, but also in relation to national minorities who have long been settled here;
in all European countries these include, to a great extent, the Roma. The Roma are a minority that has
often been living for several centuries already on the territory of a given state. Previous government poli-
cies focused on erasing differences and, despite the Roma's unwillingness, implemented their assimila-
tion. This resulted in many Roma ending up in a social, economic and political exclusion from which it
is very difficult for them to extricate themselves.

A good illustration of exclusion can be found when we review history. Roma have been living on Czech
territory since they settled here in the 18th century (some even earlier), i.e., more than 300 years ago;
however, some 'Czech' families have only been living in Bohemia for three generations. There may not
even be a skin colour difference between Czech and Roma families. Which family has a 'greater right'
to the Czech Republic? Naturally both have a right to call this country their home, but in practice we see
that the 'white' majority often will not accept Roma families. For example, if a Rom yells support for the
Czech team during a hockey or a football match, everyone else in the stands is visibly uncomfortable;
they do not feel that a Rom could be a 'Czech' just as much as they are.

The media, primarily television, plays a great role in the creation of identity and support for a multicultural society. Many people perceive celebrities as their role models, and therefore it would have a great influence if celebrities generally supported multicultural society and turned their backs on xenophobia and racism. Unfortunately, the fear still predominates that if the stars of show business and politics publicly supported minority groups - above all, if they were to support the Roma - public opinion would not remain on their side. Such support could be very risky for them, primarily due to the possible loss of voters or fans from the majority society. However, we must do the political work necessary for change; support objectivity in the media; present the Roma and other, smaller new groups as part of society; and open the discussion of these questions with celebrities and the political elite.

Including minorities in public life is also an important step towards creating a multicultural society. It is very important that all of society perceive its minority groups as an inseparable component of society; their representatives, therefore, should not only be seen in the media, but in seats of political power at the local and national levels. Such a positive change would certainly influence the tendency of some politicians to use politically incorrect and sometimes discriminatory rhetoric against some of the minority groups, which unfortunately affects public opinion and makes coexistence between the minority and the majority difficult.

As I mentioned above, two key aspects leading to a multicultural society are education and enlightenment. The creation of opinions about the world around us begins at a very early age. Social plurality in the Czech Republic is first damaged by the fact that history as a school subject is based on the history of just one nation, and does not mention the history of other groups. The dominant feeling of the majority society is therefore artificially shored up, and the minority, which is unable to identify with the people in the textbooks and on the school bulletin boards, feels oppressed. For dark-skinned Romani children, school textbooks are 'culture shock' in and of themselves. A Romani child who manages to get into a majority-ethnicity school despite the segregation currently in place in the educational system, and who is used to seeing others similar to him or herself in the family environment, will never encounter anyone else similar to him or herself at school - not even in a picture. Interpersonal relations are also created on the playground, where it is up to mothers and fathers whether they will permit their children to play with those who look a little different.

Communication is important for multiculturalism. Only open dialogue and the recognition of difference (or even the discovery of shared features) can lead to mutual understanding and the maintaining of good relations. In some European countries certain elements of multiculturalism have already successfully been put into practice. It would be ideal if one or more examples of good practice could be used from each country as an inspiration for implementing instruments of multiculturalism in Europe. Nevertheless, as in other matters relating to society as a whole, solutions must come gradually; it is not possible to resort to extremes.
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Assimilation has already been tried and resisted by various ethnic and national groups, and insufficient integration can also be a problem - this can be seen, for example, in an insufficient focus on the language instruction needed for being able to enter various types of employment, in segregation, in an ethnic group becoming closed to the outside world and ending up on the edge of society, in a ghetto. This heightens tensions, increases conflicts, and primarily deepens differentiation between 'us' and 'them'. In order to maintain social stability, the 'golden mean' must be found which will respect the rights of ethnic and national minorities to their own cultures, develop civic understanding, and support equal opportunity for all.
EU REGIONAL POLICY AND GREEN PARTY PRIORITIES

Ondřej Mirovský

The following contribution is a brief evaluation of the development of EU structural policy in terms of its current state, as well as a sketch of potential opportunities for future development of the European regions. In it I will also attempt to evaluate, from the Czech Green Party’s perspective, the experiences to date in drawing on EU funds for policies which are Green Party priorities (environment, transportation, etc.). In conclusion, I will summarise the basic recommendations of the Greens for the efficient, sustainable use of these funds.

The topic of European funds is different from the other topics in this collection due to its 'horizontal' nature, i.e., it extends across many other policies. European funds must be understood as an auxiliary financial instrument, augmenting the state’s own budgetary options for the development of poor regions, and supporting development in areas that are priorities for the European Union as a whole. Thanks to this 'horizontal' character, the topic is very complex, and it is difficult to cover the entire range of all its aspects in just a few pages.

EU regional policy – its development and basic facts

European Union regional policy is one of several policies of which the EU can be proud, as its past successes have produced rather clear, demonstrable results. To a great extent this policy also visibly justifies the existence of the European Union as such, targeting support for the development of the poorest regions regardless of state boundaries. Each and every EU citizen, therefore, has had the opportunity to directly participate in one of the principle benefits of post-war European integration as embodied by the current European Union.

Even though today EU regional policy is one of the basic EU policies, in contrast to the other (economically oriented) policies it did not come into being until the 1970s. In 1975 the European Fund for Regional Development was founded, intended to redistribute part of the Member States’ budget contributions into development of the poorest EU regions. Actual regional policy, or the policy of cohesion, did not start until the Single European Act of 1986. In 1988 it was decided to completely redesign the functioning of the cohesion policy financial instruments, and the Maastricht Treaty achieved this in 1993. In this treaty, cohesion policy is defined as one of the EU’s main aims, along with, for example, the common market, the common currency, and economic union. At the same time, in addition to the already-functioning Structural Funds, which were the main cohesion policy instrument, a so-called Cohesion Fund was started, intended to support projects in the areas of environmental protection and transportation in the EU’s poorest regions. The year
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1992 saw another breakthrough in Edinburgh, when the Council of the EU decided to allocate one-third of the EU budget to this policy. Since then, allocations to the Cohesion Fund have stayed at approximately one-third of the EU budget; after the Common Agricultural Policy, it is the second-largest part of the EU budget.

The purpose of EU regional policy is to serve as a structural instrument complementing the other EU policies, which usually fail or do not work at all for the solution of some EU-wide problems, i.e., those which are not merely economic. For example, the free movement of goods and services could lead, in the extreme case, to the growth of economic differences between places of production and consumption. Through its financial instruments, EU regional policy helps prevent any such differences from developing. For three decades, cohesion policy has worked as a truly common EU policy, based in principle on the fact that even though the European Union is one of the richest parts of the world, there are enormous economic differences between the European regions. In terms of the development of the EU as a whole, stagnating regions curb development, and therefore they become a target of support through cohesion policy instruments. This policy is a means of financial solidarity and, at the same time, represents a very influential factor for economic development EU-wide.

EU regional policy today

Today EU regional policy is based in principle on the functioning of its financial instruments - the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund. In 2007 the EU entered another budget period with a new system, and 35.7% of the EU budget was allocated to regional policy. In accordance with the pressure to implement the Lisbon strategy, the main motto for this budget period is support for growth and employment in EU regions and cities. Most of the finances (81.5%) of the EUR 308 billion total allocated from the EU budget for regional policy will go to support economic growth in the regions and to support employment within the framework of the 'Convergence' aim. Another 16% is targeted for 'Regional competitiveness and employment', in which the areas of innovation, sustainable development and education are priority areas. The third aim is 'European territorial cooperation', which in the current budget period includes support for cross-border and interregional cooperation; the remaining 2.5% of the budget has been allocated to this aim.

In practice, these three aims will be fulfilled primarily through the Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund, just as during the preceding 2000 - 2006 budget period. The Structural Funds (the European Fund for Regional Development, ERDF, and the European Social Fund, ESF) are intended for poorer or otherwise disadvantaged regions (e.g., rural and problematic urban areas, decaying industrial areas, or areas with geographical or natural disadvantages). The Cohesion Fund is meant to finance support for the development of poorer states, not regions. Similar to the ERDF, investment projects in infrastructure are supported from this fund, but only those focused on large-scale transportation infrastructure (Category One motorways and roads, railways, water transportation, and the management of highway, rail, river, sea and air transport) and the protection of the environment. From the point of view of coverage of the
EU Member States, the Cohesion Fund can be accessed by all of the 12 new EU Member States plus Greece and Portugal; Spain will also have restricted access to this fund.

Figure 1 shows the approximate allocation of finances approved within the framework of regional policy for the states of Central and Eastern Europe - i.e., the new Member States except for Cyprus and Malta. The amount of the portions primarily corresponds to the number of inhabitants, but it also reflects the current value of the economic indicators of the economy’s performance (GDP). In terms of seeing regional policy in context from a Green Party perspective, we must warn that GDP as an indicator is not the ideal instrument for evaluating the states. GDP growth never simultaneously guarantees that a society is modern, healthy, and/or environmentally sensitive. GDP does not take into consideration negative externalities (such as the costs of pollution cleanup, addressing environmental risks, waste, etc.; strangely enough, the more desirable evaluation concept, the so-called Green GDP, which includes evaluating the impact of negative externalities, is now being used even in China to measure growth in its regions). Evaluation methods for the EU countries should use ‘broad spectrum’ indicators, including measurable environmental and social parameters able to evaluate real differences and the living standards of citizens in the various EU regions.

New instruments of EU regional policy

After certain inconsistent experiences with including some Member States and their regions in regional policy programmes, it was decided to introduce three new regional policy instruments for the 2007 - 2013 budget period to help the Member States and regions properly implement and effectively manage the funds. Closer cooperation between the European Commission, European Investment Bank (EIB) and other financial institutions will strengthen capacity building at the level of domestic and regional institutions. These instruments are - JASPERS, JEREMY and JESSICA:

- **JASPERS** (Joint Assistance in Supporting Projects in European Regions) attempts to develop cooperation between the European Commission, the EIB and the European Bank for Renewal and Development with the aim of collecting expert experience and assisting the Member States and regions in the preparation of meaningful projects;
EU Regional Policy and Green Party Priorities

• JEREMY (Joint European Resources for Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises) is a joint initiative of the European Commission, the EIB and the European Investment Fund in the interest of improving access to financial development for micro, small and medium enterprises in the EU regions;

• JESSICA (Joint European Support for Sustainable Investment in City Areas) is an initiative of the European Commission in cooperation with the EIB and the Development Bank of the Council of Europe to support sustainable investment into urban areas.

How does the system work in the Czech Republic?

The EU funding system has been thoroughly developed over a long period of time and aims to achieve maximum efficiency when addressing the needs of regions or poor states. At the same time, a pivotal interest of the funds is the achievement of the greatest possible transparency, including quality and target control mechanisms; later on we will discuss whether these ambitions are being fulfilled in reality. The diagram in figure 2 indicates how the national priorities are realised at project level in terms of funding options. The realisation itself occurs already at the second level (the National Strategic Reference Framework), which is in the hands of the national governments. At operational programme level, thematic areas are defined with a view to their current relevance and provide options for resolving problems through monies from the Structural Funds. For example, the Czech Republic has eight thematic operational programmes - OP Transport, OP Environment, OP Enterprise and Innovation, OP Research and Development for Innovation, OP Human Resources and Employment, OP Education for Competitiveness, the Integrated Operational Programme, and OP Technical Assistance. Furthermore, seven Regional Operational Programmes have been defined for the regions of the Czech Republic and two operational programmes for Prague. The redistribution of funds occurs at the intersection of the programme and project levels, where, on the basis of competition between the submitted projects, the decision is made through a standardised procedure as to whether or not to support a given project. At the same time, the applicant must demonstrate the influence of the project on several selected EU priorities - primarily, its influence on sustainable development and equal opportunity. The vast majority of programmes require applicants to co-finance projects from their own resources (municipal budgets, the private sector, other grants and support, etc.).
The Future of the European Union and Green Policy

EU Funds - justified scepticism from the point of view of Green priorities

We have summarised the basic facts of EU regional policy, its instruments, and its gradual development since the start of the 1970s through the changes in place for the current period. For a long time now, EU regional policy has been receiving a third of the overall EU budget and is one of the basic EU policies in terms of significance. For this reason, its functioning must be viewed critically in order to discover where it overlaps with Green Party priorities.

Mixed results of the EU funds in the 'old countries' of the EU

From the point of view of the EU as a whole, both the growth process and the 'harmonisation' of living standards across the EU regions truly do work. Many regions, primarily in Greece, Portugal and Spain, very quickly grabbed the opportunity to access the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Funds, and rapid growth was the result: Employment rose, the emancipation and labour mobility of the citizens increased, transportation infrastructure was improved, and investment into environmental protection increased. Nevertheless, the total budget is still not sufficient in terms of some fundamental parameters. Moreover, when evaluating the funds in detail at project level, the entire system has encountered the barrier of administrative problems, which of course is of most concern to the new EU Member States. For example, in Greece or southern Italy, EU funds were wasted for many years by being invested into unsystematic, poor-quality projects with little effect accompanied by an unheard-of level of corruption. On the opposite end of the spectrum, Ireland, for example, learned over the years how to use the EU funds as efficiently as possible and focused on developing a well-coordinated system of targeted, direct aid in the areas where it was needed. In contrast to other less-developed EU regions, Ireland also made transport infrastructure its top priority, and massively invested EU funds and its own national resources into research, training programmes, and innovation.

EU funds and corruption

Many studies point to a demonstrably higher level of corruption in the construction industry than in any other branch of industry. The construction industry is also one of the greatest recipients of EU fund financing, and is, therefore, fundamentally at risk of abuse. Corruption and abuse of EU funds have already been proven in various EU countries, but the new Member States are now prompting great concern, as corruption in these countries remains firmly intertwined with all levels of the state administration. This is yet another reason why pressure for maximum transparency and public oversight is a fundamental challenge of this new period of drawing on the EU funds.

The environmental budget of the EU funds is, to a great extent, embarrassing. In many of the poorer EU regions there has been massive investment into so-called environmental infrastructure in the form of
wastewater treatment plants, canalisation, and waste incinerators. Unfortunately, very little investment has been focused on systems providing solutions to the root causes of environmental problems (prevention of pollution, prioritising waste separation over building incinerators, etc). In the area of protecting nature reserves and the landscape, there are currently several potential threats, primarily for the relatively untouched landscapes of the new EU countries, where thanks to the blind desire for unlimited interconnectivity in European transportation, extensive investment is being planned into transport arteries which will cross very precious protected areas in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.

Evidently the greatest partial negative of European regional policy (which for the time being is not much emphasised) is the EU funds' contribution toward worsening climate change in several countries. The so-called Cohesion Countries - i.e., Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, which to date have received the most monies from EU funds - have also recorded the highest growth in greenhouse gas emissions in the entire EU (see figure 3). Even though all this growth cannot be attributed to support from EU funds alone, there are serious doubts as to whether EU funds do not actually contribute to rising emissions, and therefore to climate change problems, instead of introducing instruments for resolving them.

Another sensitive topic is the relationship between European funds and transportation. During the 2000-2006 budget period, 50% of all funds allocated for transportation projects were invested into roads and motorways, while railways received only 29% of this investment. In many countries, the European funds support a preference for automobile transport, which has a fundamentally negative influence on the environment in the form of increased air pollution, urban sprawl, destruction of the landscape, etc. There is also a greater need for EU funds elsewhere, for example, in several metropolises or large cities in both the old and new EU countries, where due to stagnating support for public transport, the growth in the use of personal automobiles has negatively impacted traffic congestion and urban air pollution.

European funds in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe - the 'new states' of the EU

For the time being, the new countries in the EU have had the option of drawing on EU funds for only a relatively short time - especially the most recently acceded countries of Bulgaria and Romania - and it is therefore rather difficult to evaluate the results of the funds in this rapidly developing area at present. At the same
time, there is still time in these countries to establish a system for drawing on these funds that would learn from and avoid some of the negative experiences of the 15 'old' EU countries, primarily in the areas of environmental protection and transport infrastructure. Unfortunately, it is already evident today that the vast majority of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe will not take advantage of this opportunity.

Given their brief experience, the most burning current problems in drawing on EU funds in the new Member States, summarised below, concern the administrative/organisational level at both programme and project level. A symptom shared across the region as a whole is the insufficient and not very progressive development of the national development strategies, which often basically forget to integrate progressive EU policies - environmental protection, support for education and innovation (so-called 'soft' projects) - focusing instead on infrastructure projects in the form of motorways ('hard' projects). At the same time, the new Member States are also encountering problems in drawing the funds. On the one hand, it is possible to make use of the funds, but on the other hand there is not sufficient motivation and support for applicants in regions where funds are most needed. Often those who apply for subsidies either simply never receive them, or lack the capacity and the opportunity to orient themselves in the complicated system. This problem is the most acute for small municipalities and civic associations. Another problem is the lack of additional finances for co-funding projects, since EU funds will not cover 100% of project costs, but 85% at the most (sometimes less, depending on the type of project and the applicant). Last but not least, it is a sad fact that in many countries the system for using EU funds faces strong political pressure, and both the definition of priorities and the processing of projects follow the interests of a few interest groups instead of actual, objectively established needs. Problems at the administrative level, in addition to problems with focusing the funds, often lead to serious doubts as to the efficient, targeted use of these instruments in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

Efficient, environmentally sustainable use of EU funds

The successes listed above and the burning problems of EU regional policy and its instruments (the Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund) make it evident that, despite the progressive steps which this policy made during the preparations for the 2007 - 2013 budget period (an effort to simplify the system and the new regional policy instruments JASPERS, JEREMY and JESSICA), the future is not entirely rosy for the prioritisation of sustainable development and environmental protection in regional policy. The Green Party, in cooperation with international organisations, has been processing and proposing long-term methods for optimising the efficiency and effectiveness of the targeting of EU funds. At the same time, we want to strive in the long term to fulfil the priorities of environmental protection, protection of the earth’s climate, and other priority areas through the Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund instruments.

• Strategic vision at all levels: Good examples from the EU-15 countries show that local, regional and national authorities must develop and maintain clear, conceptual strategies for redistributing monies from the funds instead of distributing the money to ‘ad hoc’ projects with short-term impacts.
EU Regional Policy and Green Party Priorities

- EU funds are also for small applicants: The national administration must become more broadly supportive of small applicants and their participation in high-quality projects (and provide this assistance free of charge). At the same time it is necessary to guarantee applicants the option for co-financing from other funds.

- Inclusion of civil society: Local administrations, civic associations, small business associations and the academic sector deserve a greater influence on programming and setting up the EU funds; it is also necessary to include them to a much greater extent in monitoring the EU funds, in order to prevent the influences of various lobbies and corrupt behaviour.

- Evaluating environmental impact: The negative impacts of European regional policy should be prevented by using the Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). These obligatory processes, which include public participation, facilitate a wide spectrum of possible measures for minimising eventual environmental damage.

- Establishing motivational priorities with a view to environmental protection, modernisation and innovation: The growing need for modern instruments to protect the climate and the environment must be felt in support which motivates applicants to realise projects which will contribute in the future to protecting the environment and reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

- In terms of projects for the development of transportation, emphasis must be placed on developing and supporting rail transport. In cities, local administrations must strive to use these funds for infrastructure for the sustainable methods of pedestrian and bicycle transport. In the regions, not only must a high-quality basic road system be provided, but EU funds could also support transport services that are currently falling apart there.

- In terms of the issue of waste, money from the funds must also go to waste prevention and recycling, not to incinerators.

- European funds should broadly support the production of sustainable energy without greenhouse gas emissions. They should also motivate energy savings.

- Selection criteria - impacts on the environment and society: The selection criteria for distributing monies from EU funds should take into consideration whether a project has a positive impact on the environment and society and should prioritise those projects that do have this added value, including the value of guaranteeing equal opportunity for all.
The European Union needs a new approach to energy policy – and that applies doubly to the Czech Republic. We need an approach based on high energy efficiency and new renewable technologies, an approach focused on implementing decisive modernisation which views the current situation as an opportunity rather than a crisis.

This project has already been given many nicknames: The 'new industrial revolution', the 'green industrial revolution', or 'environmental modernisation'. Over the next several decades it could transform Europe's energy metabolism as well as its industry.

The economic burden

Thomas Friedman, columnist for The New York Times, wrote that to be 'green' today means to be 'geostrategic, geoeconomic, capitalistic and patriotic'. Increasing energy efficiency, promoting clean technologies, and spurring radical innovation will not only reduce carbon emissions, it will relieve the economy, strengthen competitiveness, develop new industrial sectors and release us from our dependency on unstable countries.

Europe is dragging around the burden of its high demand for energy like a ball and chain. Every year the EU economy swallows up billions of tonnes of coal, thousands of terawatt hours of electricity, billions of barrels of oil, thousands of tonnes of uranium and hundreds of billions of cubic feet of natural gas. The new Member States are particularly bad examples. The Czech Republic consumes 1.8 times more energy per each Euro of GDP than do the 15 states of the 'old' EU.

High levels of energy consumption raise costs to industry and harm the competitiveness of European businesses. The burden becomes heavier and heavier as that consumption causes energy prices to rise. The EU imports a large part of its raw materials and has increased its dependency on imports through its high consumption of oil, natural gas and uranium. Each additional tonne imported increases the deficit column in the EU trade statistics.

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In 2005, for the first time in its history, the Czech Republic achieved a foreign trade surplus, exporting more than it imported. However, consumption of fuel (and other minerals) had exactly the opposite effect. The trade deficit in oil and oil products alone for that same year was more than 3.3 billion. In the years 2004 - 2005 the financial extent of imports of mineral fuels and so-called 'inedible' raw materials (i.e., mainly minerals) rose by 25 % and the deficit in this category rose by 1.4 billion. The overwhelming sums of the European economy are exponentially larger than the Czech numbers.

These fuel imports mean the European economy is unhealthily dependent on the whims of corrupt elites in risky countries. In practice, the import of minerals forces us to cooperate with authoritarian regimes, whose views are in total conflict with our basic values. Do the manoeuvres of the Russian Army bother you? We pay for them when we import their oil. A recent report by Hnutí DUHA (Friends of the Earth Czech Republic) and Zelený kruh (The Green Circle) has calculated that the money from every ninth litre of petrol that Czechs buy for their cars is propping up the Alijev dynasty, rotten with corruption, in the state of Azerbaijan.

The European states have been giving a helping hand to those promoting freedom and democracy in countries to the south and east of the EU; the aim of this aid is to expand the zone of peace and stability in our region. However, through fuel imports, the very same European states also finance the unpredictable dictators responsible for the terror in the very same countries.

The carbon factor

Climate change is another problem. Europe - along with other industrialised countries - bears the largest share of responsibility for the growing concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. On average the EU emits approximately 9 tonnes of CO₂ per capita per year (the Czech Republic is one of Europe's top polluters, at 12 tonnes annually). For comparison: One inhabitant of India is responsible for roughly one tonne annually, and the average Chinese is responsible for approximately two tonnes.

The cause of this pollution is mainly coal-fuelled power plants, which produce 39 % of European carbon emissions; there is also significant energy waste occurring through aging industrial facilities and poorly insulated buildings.⁹ Pruněřov, the largest coal power plant owned by ČEZ, the Czech national utility, produces only a few percentage points less carbon than all the cars in the Czech Republic combined.¹⁰

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Energy production results in more than just megatonnes of greenhouse gases. In its current form, it is sadly the case that only bad options are on offer. Opencast coal mining turns landscapes inside out; if the Czech government gives the go-ahead to further expansion of coal extraction, another 2 000 people will have to leave their homes in Northern Bohemia. Nuclear power involves many unresolved problems, primarily the great environmental damage caused by uranium mining and the tonnes of radioactive waste we are leaving to our descendants with the message: 'This must remain perfectly isolated for 100 000 years, we are not certain it can be done, but if there should be problems, deal with them somehow.' The high consumption of petrol and diesel for transportation is also causing the pollution in large European cities to regularly exceed health standards, killing thousands of people.

Efficiency as a leitmotif

What is to be done? First we must change the basic question being asked. Coal? Nuclear? Renewables? Oil? Natural gas? Biofuels? The answer is: None of them.

A few new reactors, a few more coal power plants, or even a new pipeline will not resolve the difficulties facing Europe. We need more than new projects. We must change the underlying concepts.

Until now, the basic starting point has been to project how consumption will develop and assure the demand will be covered. We have been asking: Where will the energy come from? First, however, we must ask ourselves: How much do we really need?

We must seek opportunities to reduce consumption. Greater energy efficiency must become the leitmotif of the energy debate.

A large part of the coal, oil, natural gas and uranium that is annually swallowed up by the economy is simply wasted. Outdated industrial plants, heat leaking from poorly insulated buildings, inefficient electric appliances or gas-guzzling cars - this all increases the burden on the European economy, for no good reason.

Governments must promote high efficiency in industrial technology and motivate industry to innovate. A 20% reduction in energy consumption - which could realistically be achieved by the end of the next decade - would save the European economies up to EUR 60 billion annually.11

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11 Rocholl, M., Giljum, S., et Schlegelmilch, K.: Factor X and the EU: How to make Europe the most resource and energy efficient economy in the world, Aachen Foundation, Aachen 2006.
European countries must not give up simply because we do not see an opportunity to make a radical change within five or ten years. Any technological innovation only enjoys a small share of the market in the beginning. As long as we condemn an innovation a priori as insignificant, it will remain on the fringe. However, conditions will change if growing efficiency leads to lower costs. Therefore, we need to kick-start such trends, and this applies to renewable resources even more than it does to reducing our demand for energy. Is solar-powered electricity fabulously expensive? Sure it is - today. That will never change as long as we continue to keep it from even starting.

This is not just an academic debate. European Commission research shows that mass production in and of itself - without any further innovation - would lower the price of photovoltaic panels by 60 to 80%. The cost of one kilowatt-hour of wind power has fallen by more than 80% over the last 20 years.

'Negawatts' - more room to manoeuvre

Increasing energy efficiency gives us more room to manoeuvre than the choice between coal, uranium, or natural gas. The potential of so-called 'negawatts' - opportunities for savings - is much greater than that of the individual fuels. For example, take heat loss from buildings. By conservative calculations, cost-effective measures in this one sector alone could reduce energy consumption in the EU within 15 years by an amount equivalent to three-quarters of the natural gas imported from Russia.

In comparison with such opportunities, the options provided by additional production are relatively small. Take nuclear power plants. Reading the newspapers today one gets the impression that the European energy future is equivalent to the debate on nuclear reactors. However, in reality there are discussions being held about only a few new nuclear projects throughout the entire EU. Moreover, often the aim is not to increase the share of nuclear energy, but merely to replace the aging plants that are to be closed down. Nuclear power plants provide only 15% of the energy consumed in Europe (14% of that consumed in the Czech Republic). Even if nuclear were to undergo truly rapid development, it would still remain a mere supplement.

The main issue of the Czech energy debate is the proposal to evict and resettle two towns in North Bohemia in order to expand local coal mines. ČEZ has already announced what it will do should the

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12 Solar energy: from perennial promise to competitive alternative, KPMG pro Greenpeace, Hoofddorp 1999.
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towns be relocated: Increase the planned capacity of its brown coal-burning power plants by 1320 MW, i.e., by approximately one-fourth\(^\text{15}\). This is not a great increase, and it certainly does not represent a turning point in energy production.

The European discourse

The arguments given above are not dramatically new in the European debate, as illustrated by the Energy Package approved by the EU summit in March 2007. EU energy policy is not based on scrapping out the last dregs of fossil fuel or nuclear resources. Rather, the flagship concept is innovation: Dramatic increases in energy efficiency and the development of clean, renewable resources. For the moment let us set aside questions of whether the proposed measures are sufficient, effective, or whether they are exploiting all available opportunities; European environmental groups campaigned for a number of improvements that did not make it into the final document. Nevertheless, the general direction of the discourse should not be dismissed.

Movement in big business is proceeding along similar lines. Do you remember that 10 years ago an alliance of big corporations led a campaign against the Kyoto Protocol? Since 1997 their positions have undergone a dramatic transformation. This past January, 10 big American corporations - including DuPont, General Electric and Alcoa - joined forces with four influential US environmental organisations. Together they issued a set of recommendations for legislative change that would guarantee ambitious reductions in carbon emissions.\(^\text{16}\) Giant oil firms such as Shell and BP are strategically investing into renewable energy resources.

Why are the big companies doing this? In the first place, they have understood that there is a huge economic opportunity to be had in increasing energy efficiency and developing green technology. In the second place, they have begun to very seriously calculate the impact that global climate change will have on the world economy - i.e., on their profits. In the third place, they need to plan their investments. They want politicians to come up with long-term, binding targets for reducing emissions, rather than taking slow, short-term steps every few years.

Czech results

Whatever has been said about the European debate ceases to apply the minute we exit the train at Prague's main station. The contrast of the European approach with Czech policy is almost dumbfounding. It is not just

\[^{15}\text{ČEZ News, September 2005: 27 - 30.}\]

\[^{16}\text{More at www.us-cap.org.}\]
that Czech PM Mirek Topolánek headed a strange alliance of several critics who did not like the focus on green energy at the Brussels summit. The tone of the debate on domestic measures says it all: The Czech minister for industry and trade evidently considers the main energy questions to be whether the coal mines will be allowed to destroy the remaining protected areas near the North Bohemian villages mentioned above, and whether two more reactors will be built at the Temelin nuclear power plant. Even though the previous Social Democratic government’s energy policy vaguely declared energy efficiency to be a main priority, that document once again focuses on new reactors and coal mining.

Carbon intensity is one of the most serious problems of the Czech economy. The political elites must begin to address this problem, like it or not. To date they have not shown even a glimmer of a concept of what to do about our contribution to climate change; they have pretended that the problem concerns Washington and Brussels, perhaps Beijing, but that it has nothing whatsoever to do with a country like ours.

Waiting for an energy JFK

For all its focus on modernisation, the European debate still has a serious flaw. Pleasant discourse and a useful measure here and there are all well and good, but the energy package adopted cannot be considered an ambitious plan. The package is comprised of not very coherent sets of partial measures that give the impression of trying to curry favour with everyone.

The European Union does not need pleasant-sounding measures in energy policy. It needs a systematic project. In this instance it might be good to take an example from overseas. There, in the energy debate, more and more references are being made to the Apollo project of the 1960s. President Kennedy came to office with a courageous vision: To land on the Moon in 10 years. The federal government concentrated its money and effort on this goal - and succeeded. The benefits reaped were not just samples of lunar dust; the programme transformed American society. It gave the basic impetus to a great technological step forward and created new industrial sectors. Not only did it lift the nation’s spirits, it moved the economy forward.

The Apollo Alliance, an unprecedented coalition of large American environmental organisations, practically all the labour unions, and many community initiatives is now expressly presenting Kennedy’s project as an optimistic inspiration. The Alliance is pushing for another ambitious plan, proposing that the government invest USD 300 billion - the approximate equivalent of the United States’ annual military budget - over the next 10 years into renewable energy and energy efficiency, and breakthroughs in reducing dependency on fossil fuels.17

17 For more see www.apolloalliance.org.
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Measures

Europe has already taken the first partial steps. Some states have started actively supporting renewable energy: The most successful models are those of Denmark, Germany and Spain. In the Czech Republic, the Renewable Energy Act has opened the way for wind and small-scale hydroelectric power plants, photovoltaic panels and, mainly, biofuels on the market. By the end of the decade, almost CZK 250 billion in private investment in renewables is expected to have been encouraged by the new legislation. Despite several serious flaws, it is the best such legislation in the new Member States of the EU. However, the other European states must get on board and similar measures must follow. For inspiration, here are several points being promoted by Friends of the Earth and other environmental groups:

- **Large-scale shift of the tax burden:** After more than 10 years of discussion, the European Union finally decided in 2003 to transform its ambitious plan of environmental tax reform into a mere set of minimal excise duty rates, which, moreover, are very low. Germany, the UK, the Scandinavian countries and others decided not to wait for the EU and have started their own extensive green tax projects. We need to revive the European debate and return the plan for extensive reform to the table. The original plan proposed shifting the tax burden from jobs to energy and pollution. If this were to be adopted, politicians would be killing two birds with one stone. The taxes would motivate industry to invest into efficient technologies and also to create new jobs. The Czech Republic and other countries must simultaneously continue with their own domestic initiatives.

- **The European billions:** Billions of euros from European funds will change the face of a substantial part of the EU over the next seven years. The Member States have a brilliant opportunity to make a breakthrough here. They should target the investment of this large package of money into the dramatic improvement of energy efficiency and modernisation of their energy production. Grants for solar panels or biomass-fuelled boilers for private homes, investment into insulating buildings and support for similar projects could help tens of thousands of households. Similar projects can be implemented in industry. For the time being, it does not seem this opportunity will be seized. For example, the Czech Republic is investing only 3% of Brussels’ billions into energy efficiency and renewable energy - altogether less money than the cost of one minor motorway from Brno to Česká Třebová. Yet, the Czech government is one the better performers; in Poland such investment does not even equal half a percent of the total funds available.

- **New efficiency standards:** Legislation must require manufacturers to make highly efficient products, thereby saving consumers money. New standards are needed for cars, houses, electric appliances, light bulbs and other products.
• **Green heating:** New legislation in some countries has helped start production of renewable electricity. A European directive on this issue was an important motor for change. Similar EU legislation - and national laws - for the production of heat from renewable energy resources are also needed.

• **Carbon budgets:** Industry needs to be able to make long-term forecasts in order to make the best investment. The EU and Member States should provide that perspective by establishing binding, year-to-year targets on carbon emissions that would gradually decline until 2050. Businesses would then be able to plan accordingly. The voice of world business, the British weekly The Economist, notes: 'industry can work backwards from those targets, infer a carbon price and build it into its investment plans. So those targets are not grandiose political gestures but pragmatic attempts to address a practical problem.'
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Václav Nekvapil

The debate on defining both the EU’s territorial and institutional limits has accompanied the process of European integration for more than 50 years. The European Community has been constantly developing its format, and from the beginning it was never established what the conclusion to this integration process would eventually be. A unified Europe gradually expanded north, south and east from its original ‘core’, and political integration has also steadily increased, from the Rome Treaty, through the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, to the most recent attempt (unsuccessful, for now) to adopt a Constitutional Treaty for Europe.

When expanding the European integration process to these other countries, however, European leaders made their decisions according to external historical events rather than any conscious effort to achieve a certain form for the European Union. The expansion of the EU to include the post-communist states - and before them, the southern European states - was primarily based on the efforts of these countries to join the prosperous economic area and affirm their freshly acquired democratic identities. This process is still in action today, as the EU continues to attract more countries into its orbit through the vision of future membership. The Balkans, moreover, are literally ‘surrounded’ by the European Union today, and the Member States would find it difficult to argue that the Balkan countries should be excluded from the integration process. Many southern and eastern neighbours of the European Union are also expressing interest in participating in the European project.

Should the openness of the European Union, which until now has been a matter of principle, have some limits? If so, what should they be? These questions have been debated from the very beginning of the EU. For the citizens of the new Member States, there is also the question of whether we can deny other slowly transforming post-communist countries the right to what we ourselves sought for years, i.e., full EU membership. How do we determine who does and does not have the right to ‘return to Europe’?

The easiest answer is: Those countries that have something to return to, that belonged to Europe in the past, should have the right to ‘return’ now. There is just one catch: What is Europe? Do we define it on the basis of geographical territory, or political values? If values, which ones do we have in mind?

Any international organisation must fulfil the aims it was founded to achieve, and the European Union is no exception; moreover, the EU has gradually expanded its aims and defined them more precisely. Even with a total of 27 Member States it manages to meet its basic goals, but further progress is being blocked by the Member States’ inability to unify around their common interests in the areas of foreign policy, energy, and
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other areas that are becoming increasingly more important. The EU most suffers from its unclear territorial identity when it comes to external relations; it cannot build permanent, long-term relationships with its neighbours if it is not clear what status those neighbours will have in the future - whether they will be candidate countries, associate members, or more or less privileged partners. Defining these terms is a task closely intertwined with internal institutional reform and, primarily, with the already partially initiated revision of the European Union’s policies regarding its neighbours, among other matters. It would be appropriate for the EU to somehow differentiate among its neighbours on the basis of clearly established criteria, to re-evaluate and unify its multi-track external relations, and then to support regional integration in other areas of the world than the one that happens to be the most successful today - i.e., the euro-centric one.

Reform of the European Neighbourhood Policy

Paradoxically, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) so far does not include the EU neighbours that are territorially the closest to it, such as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, or Serbia. On the contrary, it is concerned with countries such as Azerbaijan and Syria that cannot expect to be interested in entry to the European Union in the near future (not to mention the fact that they would be excluded from membership per current European legislation). The EU should refine the Copenhagen Criteria and better define what the granting of candidate country status means as a target towards preparing a country for full membership. The accession game, as it is currently being played out in the case of Turkey (where the end result is far from certain) not only does not contribute to mutual trust, it pretends that the status of candidate country is a value in and of itself, regardless of the uncertain prospects for membership later on. This entire process needs to be clarified.

A first step towards clarifying the future place of the EU in its region, therefore, should be a reformulation of the ENP. This process must be based on the premise that those values of the European integration process that have been in force up until now must be maintained. These values must be articulated more clearly (so people such as the current Czech president cannot just interpret them as they like) and they must be enriched by adding several new agendas, primarily to do with ‘greening the ENP’, i.e., increasing support for cooperation in environmental protection, in the fight against climate change, and in achieving energy savings. For example, this could mean the transfer of good practises in reducing industrial energy demands from the more-developed EU countries, which would be exceptionally welcome in some of the East European countries now suffering from energy dependency on the Russian Federation (e.g., Belarus after regime change, Georgia, or Ukraine). The EU should take this increased concern for the environment into consideration when evaluating projects supported within the framework of the Neighbourhood Policy financial instrument (the ENPI).

The action plans concluded between the EU and the individual countries of the ENP should be prioritised to support democratisation, the rule of law, and strengthening public participation in decision-mak-
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The European experience with democratisation can be inspirational and is not as culturally conditioned as the American neoconservative concept of 'spreading democracy.' The new Member States of the EU in particular should be more active on the EU-wide scene and should expand their purview beyond Eastern Europe to the Balkans and the Mediterranean region. A 'division of labour' is slowly being created, in which the countries of southern Europe handle policy in the Mediterranean region (the Barcelona process) while taking less interest in Eastern European policy (now actively led primarily by the Czech Republic and Poland). This is not acceptable, as it weakens the cohesion and credibility of European policy in both regions.

Diversification of relations with EU neighbours

After the most recent wave of enlargement, the European Union has gained the position of a dominant player in the region. Over the course of its existence, the European Community has established various types of bilateral and multilateral relations that are both differentiated and overlapping. The establishment of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2004 meant a significant shift in and partial unification of many of these external relations standards. However, not all participants in the ENP are similarly close neighbours to the EU, nor are they all similarly 'attuned'; moreover, as we have stated above, many significant neighbouring states are not included in this platform. It is therefore time to consider re-evaluating the institutional framework of EU external relations on the basis of what final status a neighbouring country is striving to achieve and how the European Union itself views their efforts. For the sake of argument, I will use the working terms 'ENP I, II and III' to describe what this reorganisation would look like.

The ENP I group would be comprised of candidate countries that have achieved a precisely negotiated position in accession talks aiming at full membership in the EU (of course, without any specific dates having been set). These countries would enjoy a high level of trust from the Member States; they would be internally prepared for membership, and the accession process would essentially mean transformational assistance and the transfer of tested EU know-how to these countries. Over time, this group could include all of the remaining Balkan states and a democratic Belarus, Moldova, and Turkey. Naturally, the condition for initiating talks must be the guarantee of a stable democracy, protections for human rights, a market economy and (here the Copenhagen Criteria should be augmented) support for the values of sustainable development and climate protection.

The ENP II group would be comprised of countries seeking not EU membership, but merely membership in the European Economic Area (EEA). This type of close association can correctly be termed 'privileged partnership', i.e., the de facto position enjoyed today by Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway and Switzerland in relation to the EU. It is very easy to imagine Israel and Ukraine earning this status in the future. Within the framework of mutual relations at this intensity, the partner countries would have unrestricted access to the internal market, the option of joining the Schengen system, and the option to adopt the euro, but
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they would not participate in decision-making at the Council of the EU, nor in the process of harmonising legislation, nor would they draw money from the European Structural Funds. ENP II membership would be qualified for by gradual preparations to join the EEA; within that framework, the countries would be able to draw on the experiences of current ENP II countries and transform their own internal conditions accordingly.

Finally, the ENP III group would include countries (such as Azerbaijan, Jordan and Syria) that have no interest in EU membership or any other closer tie to the European Union, but want to cooperate with the EU at the political level as a significant regional power. Russia can also be included in this category, even though relations with that country cannot be restricted to multilateral fora only.

Transfer of good practise

Active integration of countries on the continent the EU calls ‘home’ is key for its future. The European future of the Balkan countries, Belarus and Moldova is indisputable. The fates of these countries have differed from that of the rest of the continent only during the past 17 years (due to Lukashenko’s dictatorship, the problem of Transdniestrian separatism, and the wars in the Balkans). This is not a sufficient reason for these countries not to have the same rights to share in the future of Europe as those countries where democratisation began immediately in 1989.

Integration of the Middle East into the EU, however, is not part of the logic of the enlargement to the east. Today the European Union is a compromise that 27 countries have ‘made to measure’ for themselves (and mainly by themselves). It might not work in the Arab world, for example, but it does have something to offer. Any future ‘ENP Mundus’ (on the model of the student mobility programme Erasmus Mundus) should primarily aim at supporting the regional integration, along the EU model, of countries that are culturally or historically close to one another. Thanks to the export of good practise; of experience with how joint supranational institutions work; of economic, security and political integration; and of a peaceful method of conflict resolution, the European Union might give more to these countries than if it were to integrate them into the EU itself.

One example is the very good practise of the Council of Europe and its European Court for Human Rights, where the most perfect supranational mechanism for human rights protections has inspired and provoked the rise of similar regional judicial institutions in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. A ‘Mediterranean Union’, for example, could be created in a similar way, closely cooperating with the European Union (or even overlapping with it in the future). After all, the rich countries of the Persian Gulf have been testing the European model with their Gulf Cooperation Council for 25 years already. Lastly, the Caucasus is another place where the European example could help find a way to overcome long-lasting tribal and national hatreds and to create a future of regional integration in the run-up to EU membership.
Open Europe

The geographical definition of Europe must not become a pretext for its becoming a 'fortress' to the rest of the world and closing itself off to its surrounding environment. However, this does not mean that any country on earth that identifies with the values of the rule of law, democracy, and human rights should have the right to become an EU member.

Europe only has a future if the region in which it is located is secure and democratic. The eurocentric gravitational field may weaken beyond the borders of the 'old continent', but its model should be an inspiration to those who care about it, regardless of where they are in the world.
The current discussion of the US government’s request to set up part of its anti-missile system on Czech territory has provoked a great deal of commentary and political debate on the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Here I will be so bold as to claim at the start that one of the main initiators of this discussion has been the Czech Green Party. A recent Green Party declaration on this issue states that when evaluating this proposal, the party will approach the issue from the point of view of the two pillars of the Czech Republic’s foreign and security policy: NATO membership and the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Greens believe the steps the Czech Republic will eventually take in this direction must not lead to any division or weakening of relations, either with Europe or with the transatlantic partnership.

After this position was announced, one commentary in the Czech media claimed the Greens were avoiding their responsibility, and that only the most radical opponents of American policy would be willing to claim that cooperation solely inside the EU and without the USA is a trustworthy alternative on which to base our security. Here I would like to take the opportunity to explain that we are not avoiding our responsibility, but thinking of the question of security in a broader context than a merely military one. The new nature of current security threats, such as international terrorism; the spread of weapons of mass destruction, conflicts, and instability outside the Atlantic region; and the different perceptions of these phenomena in the US and in Europe, together with the emancipation of the EU in the area of foreign policy and security, are all leading to a change in the form of the relationship between the USA and Europe. However, in our view this is no reason for the partnership to weaken, whether on one side of the Atlantic or the other. Of course, in order to strengthen it we must find a new institutional framework to reflect the reality of the security agenda and the shift in EU ability to play a more active role in foreign policy and security questions.

Within the framework of the current debate on a new form for transatlantic relations, it is not appropriate to ask whether the ties between the US and its European allies are coming undone. For the time being, the most serious disruption in relations between the US and Europe (and between the individual members of the European Union) has been the controversy surrounding the American invasion of Iraq at the start of 2003. The Greens did not agree with the US’s division of Europe into ‘old’ and ‘new’ at the time it was mentioned, and now we have the feeling that the United States is once again doing its best to conclude solely bilateral treaties with the EU Member States, which is exactly what we want to prevent. We therefore ask whether locating the US radar base on Czech territory will not weaken the
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European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, and whether it will not weaken the role of NATO, which is already in a certain crisis due to this American unilateralism, even more so. However, we do not reject debate on the questions of how to face the threats represented by the Iranian nuclear programme, or the unpredictable regime in North Korea. On the contrary, we want to discuss the reasons why the radar base should be located on Czech territory.

We do not want the mistakes of the past to be repeated, in which the current American administration intentionally exaggerated the Iraqi threat and to this day does not know what to do about the results of its military intervention there. For the time being we are not convinced that the anti-missile defence system is really the appropriate instrument for facing today’s threats.

The Green emphasis on multilateralism and coordination of the CFSP

The Green approach is fully in concert with the European security strategy, which promotes a multi-lateral approach to resolving international problems. The European security strategy is based on the thesis that no state is capable of handling today’s complex problems on its own, and offers effective international cooperation as the alternative to the United States playing the dominant role in the world. We recognise the necessity of responding to security threats before they are carried out, but we emphasise a broader range of instruments, primarily the non-military aspects of security: Development cooperation, trade policy, expanding the peace and security zone, and preventing conflict through effective diplomacy.

We have, however, learned from the European Union’s failures in the Balkans during the first half of the 1990s, and we therefore believe the intergovernmental procedures inside the Common Foreign and Security Policy, which itself is still primarily of a declaratory nature, prevent it from functioning effectively. In the historically very brief time since the end of the Cold War, Europe has come a long way; what was once considered merely a confusing trade and political unit anxiously avoiding questions of defence and security has now developed a Common Foreign and Security Policy through the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 (specifically, its Chapter V). Part of this policy includes the European Security and Defence Policy, which grew out of a political agreement reached by France and Great Britain in December 1998 and is now a permanent component of the EU agenda.

One of the main projects of the current European Security and Defence Policy is that of the ‘battle groups’. These self-sufficient, 1 500 person units will be a basic instrument for future European Union operations. Czech soldiers will become part of the joint Austrian-Czech-German group, and will also lead another group in which they will work together with the Slovaks. Another significant Common Foreign and Security Policy activity focuses on crisis areas in third countries; since January 2003, when the first action of the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) was initiated in Bosnia and Herzegovina, more than 15 European Union operations have been undertaken.
Unlike the deep integration policies, such as those concerning competition on the common market or regulation of agriculture, the Common Foreign and Security Policy is an area in which the Member States continue to play a unique role, because their unanimous consent is needed to approve joint strategies, positions and actions. Even though on the one hand the principle of unanimity guarantees that the Common Foreign and Security Policy will not damage the foreign policy interests of the individual Member States, on the other hand it prevents this policy from functioning effectively. We believe it is time for a change, because this decentralised structure is no longer beneficial. European Union cooperation in the area of foreign and security policy is just as unique as the process of economic integration, and if it is to perform at a qualitatively higher level, it requires better coordination - and that must be under the thorough control of the European Parliament.

The EU Foreign Minister

One attempt at better coordinating European foreign policy was already made in Amsterdam, through the creation of the new office of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. This High Representative was intended to significantly influence the direction of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and strengthen its effectiveness. Even though everyone agreed after Maastricht that the operation of EU foreign and security policy was unsatisfactory, the small countries in particular were not willing to accept the appointment of this High Representative as a political authority. The result was that even though this new position does exist, its powers were significantly reduced.

The EU is about to make a second attempt at instituting this position, and success is not guaranteed this time around either. The discussion which finally resulted in the creation of the new office of EU Minister of Foreign Affairs in the text of the Treaty of the Constitution for Europe was based on the fact that even though the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy had very few powers and weak institutional support, he had succeeded (doubtless as a result of the personal qualities of the representative concerned) in bringing about a general awareness of the EU as the bearer of a common foreign policy. High Representative Javier Solana achieved this aim through being present in crisis areas, maintaining contacts with international partners, and supporting convergence at the Council. Specific examples of his successes are the resolution of the political crisis in Macedonia and the defence of the European security strategy.

The draft Convention was rather ambitious as far as the position of the EU Foreign Minister was concerned, significantly exceeding the limits of what had been in practise up until then. The proposed new minister would chair the EU Council of Foreign Affairs Ministers and would be given the right to initiate political steps and legal acts; a new European unit for external relations would also have to be created. The extent and significance of the competencies of the EU Foreign Minister would essentially grow - with one fundamental exception: The office holder would not be able to take decisions on his or her own.
The Future of the European Union and Green Policy

Anything the minister did would have to be approved by the EU Council of Foreign Affairs Ministers at a certain phase. Given this fact, representatives of the Member State governments concluded that the new office could be beneficial for them and would not represent a threat to their current positions. An important change also occurred in that the Member States gave up the principle of a rotating chair for this particular council, significantly limiting the possibility that each Member State would come to the council with its own agenda every six months. Should the Constitutional Treaty be ratified, fluctuating emphases in foreign policy will be replaced with continuity, personified by the EU minister.

Emancipation of the EU and a new definition of transatlantic ties

Even though the Treaty on the Constitution for Europe has yet to be adopted and the process of its ratification is expected to become even more complicated, it seems there is general agreement that the options presented by the purely intergovernmental model of the Common Foreign and Security Policy are limited and that this policy needs to be better coordinated. Should this opinion succeed in being implemented, thought should also be given to a new institutional platform, taking into consideration the essential changes in the conditions of our transatlantic ties due to the changes in the nature of the security threat and the growing security/political role of the European Union. Even though there is agreement on the identification of these threats, there do exist different ideas on the form of their resolution and the instruments to be used; these differences provoke disputes and crises (e.g., Iraq, anti-missile defence).

If Europe wants to have a mechanism in place through which it can exert a certain amount of control over the foreign policy of the United States, it must mature into an equal partner of the US, with all the pluses and minuses that such a process entails. Here I am primarily thinking of expenditure on defence. If we do not want to experience situations in which the United States, thanks to its control of the absolute majority of military means, unilaterally determines both military strategy and the selection of targets (as occurred, for example, during the Kosovo crisis) we will have to increase our expenditure on defence. It is clear that this will be an especially complicated decision for us Greens, because our priorities lie in completely different areas than in increasing expenditure for defence and security. However, in the opposite scenario, we will continue to be dependent on US policy, given our limited military capability, and this state of imbalance is not sustainable for either side.

Even though the Czech Republic is a relatively small country, it is not condemned to merely passively accommodating the larger countries during these debates, but can actively influence these processes as a member of the European Union. The EU Common Foreign and Security Policy will be whatever the Europeans make of it. The project remains open, and the Czech Greens are helping to create its outcome.
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE CHALLENGES OF A GLOBALISED WORLD

Jan Kamínek

When considering the future role of the European Union in the world and its position as a global player, we must first define the phenomenon of globalisation and its politically relevant impacts. Globalisation can be understood as a specific, historically unique concept of time and space based on a certain characteristic of the modes of human communication. At the level of the European Union, globalisation means the recognition of a shared identity and awareness of global responsibility.

We evaluate the European Union and the entire process of European integration during the past half-century as unequivocally representing, at least for the time being, the best example of the transformation of global responsibility into a formalised institution. Its starting point and mechanism for forward movement is based on responsibility, which from an international political point of view is very progressive, and the new quality of the globalising world reflects this effective multilateralism, which can be understood as the opposite of previous classic rivalries between powers over territory and strategic resources.

When viewing this issue from a 'green' perspective, we can only do so through a comprehensive approach. The basis of the 'green' perspective is the already generally recognised concept of universally sustainable development, with an emphasis on certain priorities in the area of international relations. These priorities concern support for democratisation; increased monitoring of technology transfers which might disturb the political situation in developing countries, especially those concerning military materiel; unconditional protection of basic human rights and freedoms; modern development cooperation; the elimination of extreme poverty; energy stability; and strategic security. Many of these priorities were included in the electoral platform of the Czech Greens prior to the elections to the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Republic in the year 2006, and many of them are also now expressly mentioned in the programme declaration of the Government of the Czech Republic.

We understand 'European-ness' in the context of today’s European Union primarily as a question of our own identity, not as a product of bureaucratic development, nor as a product of some of the ideological relationships which have survived 20th-century Europe. No institution is perfect, but it is an error to consider the European Union an institution concerned mostly with the creation of unnecessary regulations. Likewise, it is just as erroneous to characterise the deepening integration of the EU as the rise of a new European super-state. The European Union has already proven its ability to respond to its own past mistakes and to the common needs of Europeans.
The globalisation of responsibility

Human understanding is naturally fascinated with the world as seen from the perspective of the domestic political environment. The foreign policies of rulers and politicians have always been based on the motivation to secure and expand, to the best extent possible, the material, cultural and intellectual heritage they have been entrusted with managing. In the histories of individual empires and states we can observe periods of colonisation, imperial expansion, occupation, decline, and dissolution, all of which depend, to various degrees, on the security, prosperity and communication modes of those societies. During the second half of the 20th century, communication has undergone an unprecedented qualitative and particularly a quantitative advance, one which is directly connected to the process we call globalisation today.

Here I will go so far as to claim that what actually led to the rise of this phenomenon and its identification was, primarily, a globalising sense of responsibility. In the first phase, the tendency described above was an intellectual reflection of the times. In the second phase, it became a relatively mass-scale response to immediately occurring opportunities for the development of trade and the allocation of investments; naturally, this was also connected to the need to secure those investments, as well as with expansion, including expansion by military means. When a certain level of technological development was reached for weapons of mass destruction in the year 1945, and under the conditions of the level of democratisation of European society at that time, which reflected the tragedies of the recent world wars, there nevertheless occurred an unprecedented awakening of the values of humanism, solidarity, and an awareness of human responsibility in the broadest sense of the term. An attempt to summarise and pinpoint the direction of these ideas would require much more space than is available to us here, but the following hypothesis is helpful: Just as the rise of the nation states in Europe after the First World War was based on the nationalism or patriotism of the end of the 19th century, which was inseparably connected to the boom in communications and in education on the basis of societies defined around a common language, so during the last 50 years an institutionalisation of responsibilities has occurred which is based on the communication modes and democratising presuppositions of a global society. Europe is the space from which this tendency, with its worldwide impacts, emanates. To a great extent, its internal, international legal and economic systems reflect these tendencies today, and these experiences have also gradually become anchored and institutionalised in its Common Coreign and Security Policy.

Effective multilateralism

By enlarging to include new Member States from Central and Eastern Europe in the year 2004, the European Union unequivocally confirmed its viability and the purpose of its existence. This particularly concerns the principle of integrating democratic nation states on the basis of mutual economic advantage, as well as the ideas of humanitarianism and social solidarity, which represent the opposite of
hegemony and military expansion across territory. From a global perspective, therefore, today's EU represents a unique example of international cooperation in the form of effective multilateralism.

However, in the global context of international relations, to this day there still does not exist a similarly functioning institutional forum capable of guaranteeing the legal enforceability of rights in the form of treaty obligations. Quite frequently, therefore, post-colonial and post-bipolar methods of implementing international political power continue to predominate. We find ourselves in an environment of limited resources being 'competed' for by a certain number of forces, powers which do not always exclusively take the form of states. The problem is as old as humanity itself, but the nature of its frame of reference - a global one - is essentially new.

The role of the main international actors (and a unified Europe is doubtless one of them) is unique. In this context we must emphasise the need for a unified Europe, not a fragmented one. There must be promotion of a unified Europe based on democracy, on strict respect for the protection of the rights of minorities and human rights in general, on the unquestioned principle of peaceful coexistence, on the sharing of security responsibilities, and on the enforceability of obligations, including state obligations toward citizens.

The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU (CFSP) naturally reflects the internal principles of the EU institutions in operation, such as transparency, solidarity, and consensus; within the realms of possibility, the EU also applies these principles to its external relations. This has already occurred with great success, for example, in the areas of human rights, development cooperation, humanitarian aid, etc. Privatisation of the CFSP and its blind, unilateral targeting, as is unfortunately occurring in many European nation states, is unthinkable.

During the past decade we have witnessed the rapidly rising engagement of the European Union in addressing security risks, one reflection of which is the development of the European Security and Defence Policy. Part of the ESDP is the development of civilian crisis management, which has specifically impacted many countries of the world; the creation of battle groups; and the beginning of a discussion on establishing a common army. The idea that a comparable level of global engagement could be achieved by any individual European state on its own is unrealistic.

The vision

In summary, European integration began under the sign of economic interests leading to prosperity and as an immediate reflection of Europe's tragic past. Our contemporary era of globalisation is adding
political integration to the mix, at least in part; this process should continue through common security. All of this, without question, should occur with the intention of making a global impact.

In other words, the current European Union is drawing the attention of politicians and the inhabitants of the world around it, but more than its current, undoubtedly attractive prosperity (comparable, for example, with the standard of living of some Asian or Gulf states), this attractiveness lies in the unusual, unprecedented quality of international relations and societal coexistence inside Europe. This reality, the options it offers and its potential for future development, certainly greatly influences and inspires others in the world of globalisation. The European Union, as a way for European nations to coexist and as a progressive format for managing public affairs, exceeds the capacity of any individual state.

In conclusion, we consider the EU as an organic, internally potent system which is very open to its surrounding environment and responds to it positively. This system is currently the only example in the world of effective multilateralism and the peaceful coexistence of various social entities. It is a system which is the first-ever operational institutional embodiment of the positive tendencies of the world of globalisation, an expression of the global responsibility which goes hand in hand with global business and all of its pros and cons. I would even go so far as to say that in the case of the European Union, the system is an expression of a basic comprehension of globalisation. Even though they are themselves the product of globalisation to a great extent, the principles, institutions and mechanisms of the European Union today also represent a thoroughly thought-out, accomplished response to today’s global challenges, a response which maximally respects the justified demand of every human being to a dignified life in the context of long-term sustainability.
A global opening of the democratic political space for a just, sustainable fulfilment of quality of life: This is how the motto for the EU’s global responsibility could be summarised from the point of view of ‘Green’ policy. It is morally unacceptable, and unsustainable in the long term, to protect one’s quality of life at the cost of denying that quality of life to others. To what extent does global responsibility begin at home, as responsibility for the future form of Europe itself? Is it possible to speak of contributing to a ‘green’ future without correcting past injustices? What challenges does Green policy face if it is to pass this test?

This paper will confine itself to the economic dimension of global responsibility, i.e., the basic rules for dividing up global resources according to global needs. However, it will also attempt to sketch key dilemmas regarding the traditional values of the Greens (quality of life) and their ties to foreign policy (economic globalisation) and the European agenda (EU trade policy).

I. Green challenges

Nations and parties - crossing traditional boundaries

In the current globalised world, no one can seriously doubt that the future of the European Union is inseparably connected with the future of the world around it. It would even seem that today there are more two-way relationships in place between Europe and the world than ever before. It is surely not too off-base to claim that Europe feels the global pressures (trade and political competition with the new powers of the South; immigration and terrorism; EU dependency on foreign energy and food resources; the neoliberal concepts of the state and society; environmental threats and other global problems) no less than it is itself able to influence the rest of the world (two members with permanent seats on the UN Security Council; strong influence at the WTO, in the Bretton Woods institutions, and in other international organisations; the greatest extent of development aid in the world; the special influence of France and Great Britain on their former colonies, etc.).

The concept of global responsibility is very broad, as are the related concepts of global governance, global problems, globalisation or sustainable development. There are various interpretations of this concept with different emphases, most of which follow from the ideological starting points of those doing the interpretation. The individual political streams differ in the extent to which they adopt the concept as such (the left operates with it more than the right), as well as in the emphasis they give to its different dimensions. On the traditional political scale, interpretation of the global responsibility of the EU ranges
from the right wing’s emphasis on the fight against terrorism and the resolution of conflicts outside of Europe, the spread of democracy and rule of law; to an emphasis on humanitarian aid, development cooperation and a sustainable global environment; to the accent on Europe’s share of responsibility for a more just international economic and political system, symptomatic of left wing political streams or the more critical elements of civil society. To various extents, Green policy reflects all of these dimensions. From the point of view of Green policy, the topic of global responsibility should extend across not only the traditional national borders, but also the divisions currently in place between political parties and academic disciplines. However, Green policy itself also, understandably, represents a specific ideological starting point which has predetermined its priorities until now.

**Cross-disciplinary and paradigmatic challenges**

Green politicians naturally tend to interpret global responsibility through the prism of sustainable development. They particularly emphasise the environmental dimension and, more recently, the social pillar of sustainable development. The economic and security aspects (and the international political ones) of global responsibility have not been in the forefront of the Czech Greens’ interests so far, because they have not been part of their voters’ traditional agenda. However, if the Greens are to establish themselves as a viable political force, they must be able to express themselves credibly on, as well as join the political debate on, how to resolve today’s key security and economic problems - and not just in questions of global responsibility. The security and economic issues tend to establish, to a large extent, the rules of global life today; they define the public space and determine to what extent traditional Green values, such as sustainable development and quality of life, can be fulfilled.

In addition to the need to interconnect the domestic and foreign policy agendas, we must think through, in a transdisciplinary manner, the relationships between these ‘traditional Green’ and ‘new Green’ issues. Recent developments are accelerating the need for both kinds of reflection. The shift of the Greens into the traditional domains of ‘non-Green’ politics could in fact be outpaced by the ‘invasion’ of the other political streams into topics that have traditionally been the Greens’. Current ‘green’ topics, such as safe energy or biofuels, which require the interconnection of several traditionally separated policy areas to be properly grasped, are at the heart of today’s cross-disciplinary policy analyses and the re-evaluation of the ties between domestic and external policy in all main political streams. This development is not merely challenging us to a deeper reflection of traditional Green values and their context. Just as with the view of the European past (see below), reflection on these transformations also will lead us to finding new common denominators for economic and security discourse, a new springboard for conceiving of global responsibility.

After all, who knows whether changes of this sort are not foreshadowing a more significant shift in the political discourse or the current (‘late modern’) paradigm of civilisation? Thomas L. Friedman, the lead-
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ing commentator for The New York Times wrote recently in the Czech daily Hospodářské noviny (in 2007): 'I perceive the term "green" as geo-strategic, geo-economic, capitalist and patriotic.' Any alternative or new models of development, for now being discussed primarily by critics from civil society, are likely to bear a strong 'green' stamp. This is all the more reason why the Greens should be prepared not only to promote such alternatives globally, but also to formulate them.

The European challenge

The European Union represents a natural and important intermediary platform between the national and global levels of politics, especially for smaller states such as the Czech Republic. By the same token, it too represents another large challenge for the Green politicians: After entry into the EU, it is possible to state, without exaggeration, that the global responsibility of the Czech Republic is determined to a large extent by the global responsibility of the EU. The challenge for the Czech Greens is to establish the EU - particularly among the right wing political streams - as the space in which the Czech Republic lives and conducts politics, as a basic instrument of Czech external action. Furthermore, the Greens must defend the need to actively participate in EU policy-making. However, these are not the only challenges with regard to the EU.

Not the least of the challenges will be to artfully distinguish the Green position towards the EU so as not to question the basic value of European cooperation while at the same time facilitating an expert, constructive, critical approach to those particular European policies which contravene Green values. Such a critical pro-European approach is greatly lacking not only on the right, but also on the left. Among those aspects of European integration which are the most problematic for the economic dimension of global responsibility is the EU’s common trade policy.

The commercial whip of globalisation

In these times of accelerated economic globalisation, the trade policies of the EU and other large players belong among some of the most influential instruments in forming the global system (as they are de facto the most influential patterns of global governance). Through the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the regional and bilateral free trade agreements which the EU is negotiating today with all of the large countries and blocs of the world, the vast majority of EU trade policy simply stands also for its development policy, as well as its environmental or agricultural policy to a great extent. Trade policy defines international rules and increasingly defines the national ones as well. It is within these rules that people in third countries organise their livelihoods and the public space, define their relationship to the natural environment, and determine the quality of their lives.

European Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson’s most recent plans are very disturbing, and not only from the point of view of a ‘green’ approach to global responsibility (impacts outside of the EU). The
European Commission's new programme for external competitiveness, EU Global Europe (2006), is a good demonstration of the threat which unregulated economic globalisation presents to 'green' values inside the EU as well. The aggressive trade liberalism and double standards that the programme introduces pose the danger of negative impacts on smaller and poorer developing countries and a further undermining of multilateral cooperation (S2B Network, 2006). Further 'economisation' of life in the EU does not correspond to the internal social, environmental and political goals of the EU, and the legalisation of corporate lobbying does not correspond to the EU's democratic character (ETUC, 2006).

To speak of the EU's global responsibility in a 'green' way cannot mean merely being satisfied with the successes which Europe has achieved during the last half-century for an ever-expanding number of European nations, no matter how important and worthy of praise they are: Peace and security, freedom and democracy, stability and prosperity, internal integration. The road to European global responsibility leads through an honest reflection on European 'irresponsibilities'. First we must ask what the cost was of past European achievements, what these achievements are still costing the rest of the world (especially the developing countries) today, and to what extent these achievements are (and in future will be) truly shared by all Europeans.

II. Europe's global irresponsibility

Debt from the past - the EU's historical irresponsibility

Europe, especially its large nations, has been accustomed since time immemorial to shaping and influencing the world around it. Despite conflicts among themselves, the Europeans successfully colonised all of the other continents of the world. The stream of cheap slaves, raw materials, precious metals, foodstuffs, and later the influx of other cheap goods as well as the export of European production to new markets has secured Europe's quality of life - economic development, fulfillment of human rights, and space for its own way of politics and social development. For centuries, the vast majority of nations outside of Europe could only dream of such quality of life. However, their dreams and their own economic, social and political aspirations were often cooled down by the presence of the European military. Today an economic system inspired and later blessed by Europe keeps many of the development ambitions of the former colonies in check.

The two monstrous wars that Europe also 'successfully' exported to a large part of the world during the 20th century were the turning point of its global influence. Europe was transformed from a net exporter of capital into a net importer. The economic and political influence of the United States of America and the Soviet Union began to dominate the global scene. The colonial system officially fell apart, and the people and nations of the rest of the world were gradually awarded the important rights of the Western world. European self-reflection after the war became the starting point not only of the European integration process, but also of a new wave of multilateral cooperation.
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Nevertheless, Europe's control over the resources and markets of the developing world in many respects did not weaken. It took on a different form - a more humane and hidden one. However, the costs of the past, especially the human degradation which Europe caused to many countries which today are considered 'developing', were never fully compensated. This is what constitutes Europe's historical debt, a debt any Green policy should always bear in mind during international negotiations that impact poor countries. A large part of the global population has not begun to register progress towards achieving the standards of Europe even after the collapse of the Eastern bloc - notwithstanding the old guarantees of state sovereignty, the Geneva Human Rights Convention, the expanding global economy, and development aid programmes.

An unsustainable development model - the EU's civilisational (environmental and social) irresponsibility

During the 1960s and 1970s it began to become more and more obvious that the dominant civilisational model of development was unsustainable both domestically and externally, socially and environmentally. To be more exact, Europe's development model is proving itself globally irreplicable. During the 1980s, extensive economic growth, rapid technological development, and basic political decisions by key national and international institutions on both sides of the Atlantic created the cocktail we call 'globalisation' today. Globalisation's central 'hitch' lies hidden in the interaction between these three components, with the latter playing the key role.

Today the character of global economic development continues to copy the old model of the developed countries to a great extent. Globalisation is expanding and promoting a mass-scale consumer civilisation based on the extensive use of material (non-renewable) resources and massive waste. Given existing demographic trends, this model is arriving at a political conflict which is difficult to resolve: The greater the economic and social success of this model, the more it collides with the environmental limits of the planet (a billion cars in China by 2050?). On the other hand, the failure of this model cannot be reconciled with the political demand (of the global democratic majority) for the faster economic growth of less developed countries and communities, i.e., for the fulfilment of their basic human rights (first food, then ecology?).

With the exception of some of the Asian 'tigers', even those countries that have achieved massive economic growth still have a long way to go to achieve social sustainability as well as the fulfilment of the Millennium Development Goals. Economic differences between countries are not dramatically increasing. Conventional economic statistics, mainly thanks to the inclusion of China, even report partial successes - for example, both absolute and relative declines in poverty. However, what appears to be increasingly important is the data that doesn't make it into the customary economic statistics (i.e. externalities, market failures). Despite partial economic successes in some parts of the world (and for some social groups globally) economic globalisation is bringing about deeper and deeper polarisation inside states, including the EU (see below).
Different or new models of development are not just necessary, but possible. Economies as such and new technologies have an enormous potential to be exploited for various purposes. However, the subsequent benefit and the resulting form of development are determined by the political rules of the system as a whole. What is decisive, therefore, is the quality of the regulatory framework as defined by collective political decisions - or their absence. In today’s world, this is the greatest challenge. One of the EU’s greatest offences against its global responsibility is the fact that the export of its economic model was not followed up by an attempt to expand the corresponding institutional and governance frameworks.

This does not just concern the environment or human rights; at a more general level, it is precisely because of poorly designed or completely lacking rules that globalisation continues to bring about other 'additional' costs or externalities (the HIV/AIDS pandemic, financial instability, etc.). At the very least, the process is helping to resolve global problems at a much slower rate than they are accumulating.

**Inadequacy of the political space - the EU’s political irresponsibility**

The effort to combine both of these fundamental needs (environmental stability with the fulfilment of human rights) in order to resolve other global problems is heading towards something larger than the mere fact that environmental, development and human rights groups are coming together. Synthesizing concepts, such as quality of life, humane security, food and energy sovereignty, 'slow' and 'fair' trade, atmospheric space, or environmental 'footprints', could be the basis of a new model of development. The promotion of development alternatives which could facilitate the use of new technologies and market mechanisms for resolution of key global problems, however, runs up against the erosion of the political space, a space in which it would be possible to come to agreements and introduce new or different rules, especially at local, national and regional level.

The Bretton Woods system was meant to represent just such a new model in the 1980s after decades of Keynesianism, liberation theology, and efforts at national autarky. However, during the 1990s it was demonstrated that the new model had problems not just with the environmental and social costs of economic reforms, but with economic sustainability alone. The series of economic crises, especially in the developing world, including debt and financial crises, continues to this day. Just as in contemporary European societies, the idea has persisted in these countries that serious (liberal market) economic reforms are unavoidable.

Under pressure from civil society, academics, and the evidence submitted by the developing countries themselves, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund gradually withdrew from the active promotion of Structural Adjustment Programmes. Instead, they began to speak much more of the need for good governance, institutional frameworks, and social capital. However, neo-liberal approaches continue to survive, not only in some of their policies (e.g., their loan programmes), but particularly in the
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Trade agreements at WTO level, in regional networks, and bilateral agreements on free trade which are replacing and exceeding the multilateral trade system to a greater and greater extent. According to the former chief economist of the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz (2003: 17) these mistaken political 'decisions have been taken on the basis of a kind of bizarre mixture of ideology and bad economics, a dogma which was sometimes just a threadbare cover for the separate interests involved.'

Historical changes have always been marked by efforts at reform. However, today's reforms differ from past ones in terms of who the main actors are. The main instrument of development for China, Europe, India, Japan, and the USA has been the nation state and its policies. Globalisation, however, promotes the dominant role of the private sector, which today is globalised to a far greater extent than is national policy-making (particularly the financial markets). Today, collective decision-making mechanisms in either the North or the South are attacked at every step by the expansion of market mechanisms - liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation (or rather a peculiar type of regulation). 'Trade liberalisation strengthens supranational firms by undermining the policy options available at the national level. This is a reflection of a philosophy according to which state failures are far worse than market failures when it comes to pursuing the common good' (Sachs, Santarius 2007: 53). This essentially means, however, that one type of regulation and organisation of social life is being replaced by another.

The neoliberal model of development, the viability of which was extended by the fall of the Iron Curtain, has not proven effective. Europe did nothing to prevent its expansion on the global scale; the EU did not even make sufficient attempts to significantly correct it outside its borders. The historical debt and global responsibility for a truly democratic, sustainable civilisation development model gave way to self-interest. For a long time it seemed that European firms, and indirectly the entire economies of Europe, were benefiting egregiously from the policy of the Washington consensus, WTO trade policy, and free trade agreements. Today it is even more apparent that the benefits of this inequitable, unsustainable international order have neither been reaped not by the majority of Europeans, nor by the entire European economy, but primarily by a few selected firms. The large global firms that dominate in Europe as elsewhere do not waste any time on patriotic or European sentiments. However, today Europe is paying for this 'external' political irresponsibility - not only has the EU begun to fall behind in the ferocious, poorly regulated system of economic globalisation, the rules of those around Europe are beginning to undermine basic values inside the EU itself.

III. Internal European irresponsibility

Polarisation inside Europe - the EU’s social irresponsibility

A significant part of Europe today is realising the limits of a universal model based primarily on economic growth unencumbered by state bureaucracy. However, the political context of that model’s lingering strength is less obvious to Europeans. The distance from awareness to change, therefore, is still far, as is
the distance between words and actions. However, for Green policy this opens up unprecedented room both in the direction of global responsibility and in the direction of quality of life inside Europe.

On the basis of similar reflections on the EU's global position, the European Commission and the EU Member States jointly initiated the Lisbon agenda in the year 2000 - an effort to make Europe the most competitive economy in the world within 10 years while guaranteeing sufficient resources to maintain Europe's economic prosperity, its social model, and its successes in the field of environmental sustainability. Economic growth and employment were labelled key instruments, global competition and an aging population the main problems.

The need for a more balanced concept of development, as has been formulated, for example, at several UN summits (Rio de Janeiro, Johannesburg), is currently being projected much more strongly into Europe's internal measures than into its external policy. Of course, even the internal strategy encounters significant problems due to the external pressures of economic globalisation when it comes to its realisation in practice. This occurs inter alia as a result of three phenomena: Policies that are not coherent with one another, the polarisation of society, and the EU's democratic deficit. The latter plays a key role. Europeans are beginning to lack a political space, just as poor communities, developing countries, and global civil society do.

Since the beginning of its existence, the European Union has been one of the most active advocates of multilateral cooperation (the EU and the Member States together provide EUR 48 billion - more than all other official development aid), international law and active resolution of global problems. However, despite increasing efforts in recent years, the EU remains very limited in its ability to harmonise various EU policies with the aims of sustainable development, including the Millennium Development Goals. This policy incoherence concerns the policies of individual ministries in the Member States as much as EU policies. The policies themselves are not harmonised, and often the goals and implementation within one and the same policy are mutually contradictory. Trade policy, once again, is among the most flagrant violators of political obligations at the highest level.

The results of the exporting of these incoherent polices to the international level are serious - rules are bent (the escalation of customs duties on imports with higher added value, etc.), double standards applied (long-term exemptions from competition for areas of comparative advantage to the developing countries, such as agriculture and textiles), and international agreements are paralysed (e.g., the WTO agreement on trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights - TRIPs, versus the Cartagena Protocol on biodiversity).

Even though Europeans continue to enjoy a high quality of life, their economic growth is being purchased more and more at the cost of the declining real incomes of the middle and lower classes, the disappearance of small farmers, growing insecurity and precarious forms of employment, the slow erosion of the welfare state, a deteriorating approach to public services, and a reduced ability to adapt to rapid change while pre-
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Serving their identity. Society is becoming more and more stratified, and the European social model is facing the threat of a growing level of **social polarisation**. As even the European Commission admits, due to the strong influence of 'special interests' the gains of globalisation and trade liberalisation are not being transferred to the inhabitants of the EU either automatically or fairly (see European Commission 2006: 9).

The classification of these interests brings us to the heart of European irresponsibility. The erosion of the democratic, public and political space is the common denominator of many of the problems described above.

**Economic power instead of political power - the EU's irresponsibility in terms of power**

For a long time, Europe enjoyed the power to establish and legislate international rules in its own interest thanks to its geopolitical and military strength. Even after the collapse of the colonial system, Europe retains many **foreign policy and economic instruments** for exercising its influence over a significant part of the world (the mechanisms of the Commonwealth, the monetary union of francophone Africa, development and loan policies, the conditionality of aid, significant voting power in the regional development banks and the Bretton Woods institutions, etc.).

At the same time, thanks to the **European social model**, for a long time Europe succeeded in sharing a significant portion of the profits flowing from these inequitable rules with the citizens of (Western) European countries. Post-war reconstruction turned into the building of real democracy and welfare states. Democratic dialogue and social welfare policy guaranteed the legitimacy of the Western European model in the face of the Eastern European alternative.

With the **collapse of the bipolar world** (Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ meant not just the global victory of democratic capitalism, but also the end of competition among political systems) and the acceleration of globalisation, economic instruments of power began to increase in importance on the one hand, and on the other hand it is no longer possible to change the international rules as quickly to Europe's advantage today as it once was. Besides the USA, other strong economic and political competitors are emerging on the global scene (Brazil, China, India) to defend their interests.

On the one hand the loss of the European monopoly over the creation of the global rules and the rise of non-Western nations is proof of the more democratic character of today's international relations. On the other hand, the current model of globalisation continues to suffer from a significant democratic deficit. However, this is not distributed along geographic lines, but along completely different ones: large-small, poor-rich, elites-local communities, capital-labour, men-women.

It does not seem likely either, though, that the crisis of Europe's 'welfare state' could have been caused by European failure in the field of **global economic competition**, i.e., by a lack of opportunity or an inability to
earn enough to achieve the quality of life enjoyed in Europe. Despite the image that is currently widespread, the European Union is doing very well macro-economically, even according to conventional economic measures. The EU is the best in the world in the area of services and even maintains its share of industrial production on the global market (see European Commission, 2006). True, for a long time it has reported slower GDP growth than the Asian superpowers and the USA, as well as a higher level of unemployment, and it is 'behind' on the latest technologies. Nevertheless, in absolute terms the vast majority of economic indicators which are really important for the majority of Europeans, including indebtedness, are at a satisfactory level. The EU's share of international trade, investments, or other financial flows has not been reduced by any significant extent.

Moreover, for European trade the internal market remains far more important. According to the most recent Eurostat data (2007:35) more than 68% of the total exports of the EU-27 are intra-EU exports. The regional market and regional competition are also much more relevant for European GDP and indirectly for European employment than are global competitiveness and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Even though in some of the smaller countries the value of FDI is almost equivalent to the total value of their GDP, in 2006 it was only 15.3% of GDP on average in the EU-15 (EUROPE IN FIGURES, 2006 - 2007: 176).

Erosion of the public arena - the EU's democratic irresponsibility

It seems that the European social model, and indirectly a more sustainable model of development in general, is coming under the greatest pressure from within the EU itself. The source of this pressure is the circle of large economic players. Many of these already find it undesirable to be labelled 'European firms' because their capital and ownership structures are global (supranational). Even though they continue to be able to employ many EU inhabitants (even for highly qualified positions) and pay some taxes, a large part of their activities and capital flow is already able to head outside of Europe. The efforts of these corporate vessels (no matter what flag they sail under) to expand their fields of operation has been obvious for a long time, and is not restricted merely to the world beyond the borders of the EU.

The motor of economic globalisation is to be found precisely in the powerful economic resources of the corporate world, their coordinated pressure, and the trespass of their influence on representative democracy behind the scenes. They are responsible for the lion’s share of the erosion of the democratic political space. Europe is no exception to this trend of inverted public control. Instead of democratic collective elections defining the framework and rules of economic (and technological) development, it is more often the technologically advanced large economic players who shape the political framework of the nation states and international cooperation to meet their own interests. For example, clauses are slowly beginning to make their way into free trade agreements with weaker countries that open up the possibility for foreign firms to sue the state for discrimination.
The global (ir)responsibility of the EU - Green challenges

Even in Europe we have witnessed the ongoing pressure for more liberalisation and privatisation of services, including public ones (for example the 'Bolkestein directive'), and for the growth of internal competition and external competitiveness (Global Europe) in particular. Many of the regulations enacted through European directives are a form of more or less covert deregulation, or rather a form of regulation/competition meant to benefit a particular economic interest.

Social support for and political legitimacy of the commodification of European life is being ensured by a multi-layered process - marketing, media, PR agencies, fashion, cultural trends and other societal mechanisms. Massive corporate lobbying forms only the tip of the iceberg, but it is of essential importance because it represents the main lever for transferring private interests into the public decision-making process (Deckwirth, 2005). Even some representatives of the Member States at the Council of the EU have admitted that some of the outputs of the European Commission come about irrespective of their (Member States) political demands.

Loss of public control over a number of key social processes has been projected not only into the growing polarisation of European societies and European policy incoherence. It is one of the key factors behind the deepening of the democratic deficit in the EU and the current crisis in the project of European integration. The growing feeling of Europeans that neither they nor their political institutions hold the reins of social development and European life completely in their own hands has been obvious from the stalemate surrounding the Constitutional Treaty. The renewal of the democratic political space represents the primary challenge not only for European global responsibility, but especially for the EU’s own future.

Conclusion

A simple slogan for the contribution of Green policy to the European future and to global responsibility could be: ‘More democratic Europe, less economic globalisation.’ Support for the democratic public space and high-quality institutional regulations at the local, national and European level, as well as in international relations, seems the best way to atone for Europe’s debt from its colonial past and to correct many of its internal and global irresponsibilities. Unless the political arena takes on a new quality, it will be difficult to open the way for alternative models of development which could move beyond the current clashes, so difficult to resolve, between the environmental limitations of the planet, the fulfilment of human rights, and economic interests.

Through economic globalisation, economic interests are beginning to enjoy supremacy in Europe. EU trade policy is contributing to the global spread of market mechanisms' domination (of the neoliberal model of development) which, however, tends to backfire in two ways: 1) in the growing costs of global problems and 2) in the erosion of its own values and a growing democratic deficit inside the EU. If the financing of the European (social) model from the unjust profits of an unsustainable international sys-
tem is no longer possible, then the solution cannot be the dismantling of that (European) model, but the reform of the globalisation rules. A key challenge for Green policy is to cut across the following vicious circle: More economic growth - more competition (and competitiveness) - more (rigged) deregulation. However, changes to the predominant political model demand that traditional Green values be viewed not only through the prism of current Green topics, but also through disciplines which are not traditional for the Greens (economics, security issues). A more influential promotion of alternative models of development cannot be imagined without more dramatic shifts in the civilisation paradigm, which requires the ability to transcend borders not only between states and disciplines, but also to transcend the borders of the perspectives held by political parties. It will not be possible to promote any more systematic changes globally as long as Europe itself does not promote and practise those same changes. It seems that in the current Czech Republic, Green policy is facing more closely than ever before a unique opportunity to create critical pressure, expand the democratic space, formulate alternatives, and move the boundaries of their implementation. The future of Europe and global responsibility begins at home.

Sources

Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2003): Jiná cesta k trhu - hledání alternativy k současné podobě globalizace. ['Another road to market - seeking alternatives to the current form of globalisation'] Prostor, Praha.
Ondřej Liška's contribution focuses on the future institutional order of the EU, primarily in the context of the Treaty on the Constitution for Europe. He views the recent article by former German President Herzog which warns of the necessity to strengthen the transparency of decision-making at the Council of the EU as an interesting crossroads in the debate between the supporters and opponents of deeper integration, and notes that increasing transparency is also a goal of the European Greens. An important benefit of the Constitution as drafted by the Convention on the Future of Europe is its anchoring the EU on a human rights base. European integration is a key interest of Czech society, and the Greens are attempting to have the Czech Republic participate as actively as possible in its further development and intensification. However, it is necessary to open up space for citizens to participate in the EU decision-making processes.

Milan Horáček is concerned with the question of the changing role of the nation state in the context of intensifying European integration. In the area of economics, there has traditionally been a strong tendency toward close cooperation and toward intensifying the integration of the European internal market. However, political integration has also been a reality from the very beginning of the European Community, and in the context of globalisation it is needed more than ever before. The dynamic of deeper political integration of the continent must be transferred from the political elites of the nation states to full participation by European citizens.

Dana Kuchtová views the future of the European Union not just as the future of its institutions and policies, but primarily as of its current and future citizens. Our task is to prepare ourselves for an open European arena in which we already today are encountering stiff competition from almost half a billion of our fellow citizens from the other EU countries. The path to achieving this goal is the creation of a 'Europe of knowledge' as the basis for a unified European space for all levels of education. The future European Union should better reflect contemporary topics in its education system and prompt students and pupils to reflect on current questions concerning not just the future of their own countries, but of the EU and the planet in general.

Alexandr Prokop and Ondřej Mirovský have been working on the issue of research, development and innovation (RDI). They point to its growing importance in terms of the future of Europe, focusing primarily on various aspects of building one of the basic pillars of the Lisbon Strategy, the common European Research Area, as well as reflecting on the progress made in this area since Lisbon was proclaimed. The central part of the paper presents a brief overview of the Czech Republic's innovation potential and various options for its development, including exploiting synergies with the Structural Funds. In conclusion, the authors discuss how to lead the public discussion on RDI from the Green Party point of view.

Kateřina Jacques devotes her text to the significance of eliminating discrimination and to legislation for equal treatment in the European Union. She especially emphasises the progress the EU has made in human rights
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legislation in recent years and simultaneously emphasises the EU’s responsibility to seek the universal application of human rights and freedoms in its policies on other countries, primarily totalitarian regimes. This aspect concerns not just foreign policy perspectives, but also, for example, continued tolerance of child labour in developing countries, the products of which are imported to Europe.

Džamila Stehlíková focuses on the advantage of European antidiscrimination law for the Czech political system in relation to the creation of an open, multicultural society. She emphasises the significance of the 2007 European Year of Equal Opportunity for All in connection with the idea of equality which is the starting organisational principle of all democratic societies. One of the priority aims of European policy should also be increased protection of ethnic minorities and assistance with the integration of immigrants in the EU Member States.

Gabriela Hrabaňová discusses the vision of a future European Union as a multicultural society capable of a mutually enriching coexistence between ethnic and religious minorities who have long been settled on European territory with the newly arriving immigrants. She considers multiculturalism to be a relatively new ideological direction which emphasises the benefit of cultural diversity to society and the state and aims for coexistence among different people who, regardless of their origin, nationality, or beliefs, do not have to give up their cultural differences.

Ondřej Mirovský concentrates on the topic of the establishment of the EU Structural Funds with a view to the long-term priorities of the Green Party. This primarily concerns the effectiveness of the funds spent in the areas of support for disadvantaged regions, transportation infrastructure, and environmental protection. In many EU regions this investment has taken the form of wastewater treatment plants, canalisation, and waste incinerators, but very little investment has been directed towards prevention of these problems. Countries which have received the most funding from the EU have also recorded the highest growth in greenhouse gas emissions. It is necessary, therefore, to more markedly support environmentally sustainable use of the funds to benefit innovation and new energy-saving technologies.

Vojtěch Kotecký calls for the need for a new EU energy policy. The aim of this ‘green industrial revolution’ must primarily be to increase energy efficiency by restricting energy loss and waste. The potential of ‘negawatts’, i.e., energy conserved, is far greater than the options represented by various energy resources. The EU needs a systematic effort to shift taxation from labour to pollution and natural resources, to focus EU Structural and Cohesion funds on energy efficiency and renewables, to enact new laws motivating industry to invest in energy efficient technologies and renewable energy; and legislative annual CO₂ emissions reduction targets.

Václav Nekvapil devoted his contribution to the future position of the EU in its surrounding region. He primarily focused on reform of the European Neighbourhood Policy and deficiencies in the EU’s current
Summary

international relations concept. The establishment of external EU relations is closely related to the entire institutional reform of the EU and the establishment of more precise criteria for membership. His article proposes diversifying the Neighbourhood Policy into three zones: States that aim for full membership, states only interested in joining the European market, and states that merely want to establish relations with the EU at multilateral fora.

Jiří Čáslavka introduces his piece by focusing on the current debate on the construction of an American radar base in the Czech Republic. The Green Party contributed significantly to this debate, mainly by confirming the values of the transatlantic partnership while simultaneously striving to emancipate and coordinate the European pillar of our security. One of the important features of Green foreign policy is its emphasis on multilateralism and aspects of security which do not concern the military, such as development cooperation, trade policy, and conflict prevention.

Jan Kamíněk concentrates on the challenges presented to the EU by development in a globalising world and how the EU should respond. He especially emphasises the effective multilateralism the EU is promoting on the international stage. In this context, the understanding of European-ness as an expression of identity in a bureaucratised world is also important. Europe's task is to globalise responsibility. The current European system is an expression of an understanding of globalisation and a competent, strategic response to global challenges.

Petr Lebeda is concerned with the shortcomings in the EU’s global responsibility, as well as how that responsibility fits with traditional Green values (quality of life), the surrounding environment (economic globalisation) and the EU’s own agenda (trade policy). Europe should better reflect on the debts it owes from its colonial past and assist other countries not to repeat the unsustainable civilisational development model that it has been undergoing itself. Decisive, constant pressure to open a democratic political arena for a more globally responsible decision-making process both inside and outside Europe belongs among the most valuable concepts Green policy can contribute to the future EU.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Jiří Čáslavka is an ethnologist and economist who leads the Foreign Section of the Czech Green Party. He studied ethnology at the Philosophical Faculty of Charles University and is currently completing his doctoral studies at the Faculty of International Relations of the University of Economics, Prague. He primarily focuses on economic anthropology and development studies. He also works as the regional director for Central Europe and the Balkans in an international IT firm.

Milan Horáček is a Member of the European Parliament for the German Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) since 2004. He is a member of the EP Subcommittee for Human Rights and the EP Delegation in the EU-Croatia Joint Parliamentary Committee. He is an alternate on the EP Committee for Foreign Affairs, the EP Committee for Agriculture, the EP Delegation of the Parliamentary Cooperation Committee of the EU and Ukraine, and the EP Delegation for Relations with Belarus. Prior to 2004 he worked as the director of the Prague office of the Heinrich Böll Foundation.

Gabriela Hrabaňová is currently a Fellow of the Roma Initiative Office of the Open Society Institute (Budapest). She is studying in the Masters programme at the Anglo-American College in Prague in the department of International Relations and Diplomacy. She has been the president of the Athinganoi civic association in the Czech Republic and a trainer of Roma non-profit organisations for the Foundation for Civil Society Development within the framework of the Phare programme. She is a member of the Committee for the Decade of Roma Inclusion of the Czech Government Council for Roma Community Affairs and of the Czech Government Sub-committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.

Kateřina Jacques is a Member of the Parliament of the Czech Republic for the Czech Green Party; the chair of the Czech Green Party’s Parliamentary Club; a member of the Czech Government’s Foreign Affairs Committee and Committee for Security; and a member of the Organizational Committee of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic. She studied political science and the translation/interpretation of German at the Philosophical Faculty of Charles University. Prior to going into politics she was active as the director of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Section of the Office of the Government of the Czech Republic.

Jan Kamínek is a lawyer, a member of the Czech Green Party’s National Council, and a member of the Czech Green Party’s Foreign Section. He studied law at the Law Faculty of Charles University in Prague. He currently works as department head at the Human Rights Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic. He focuses on the UN and EU with an emphasis on human rights issues.
About the Authors

**Vojtěch Kotecký** is an environmental campaigner who studied systematic biology and ecology at Charles University. He has authored many expert studies, analyses and research reports. He is a member of the Czech Government Council for Sustainable Development and the Czech Ministry of Industry and Trade’s Council on Resource Policy. He is not a member of any political party.

**Dana Kuchtová** is first vice-chair of the Czech Green Party and the former Minister for Education, Youth and Sports. She graduated from the Pedagogical Faculty in České Budějovice and then worked as a teacher and translator. She has worked on the issue of nuclear energy for many years (she co-founded and for many years presided over the South Bohemian Mothers’ civic association), as well as on the participation of women in political events and Austrian-Czech relations.

**Petr Lebeda** is the director of the Prague Global Policy Institute - Gropolis. He studied international politics and diplomacy at the University of Economics, Prague and earned an M.A. in international policy studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in the USA. He is the author of a number of articles and studies on the themes of globalisation, global problems, development aid, political economy, and international trade.

**Ondřej Liška** is a Member of the Parliament of the Czech Republic and Czech Green Party vice-chair for foreign policy. Between 2006 and 2007 he was chair of the Committee for European Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic and member of the Sub-committee on the Czech Presidency of the Council of the EU. Since December 2007 he has been Minister for Education, Youth and Sports. He studied political science and religious studies at Masaryk University in Brno.

**Ondřej Mirovský** is an ecologist and chair of the Finances Committee of the Prague 7 Municipal Council. He studied environmental protection and the creation of environments at the Faculty of Natural Sciences of Charles University and environmental management at the University in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. He focuses on working in communal politics, on the EU Structural Funds, and on environmental protection within the context of the EU. He also works as an inceptor at the Faculty of Natural Sciences of Charles University, focusing on the environmental aspects of suburbanisation and the territorial development of Prague.

**Václav Nekvapil** is a political scientist, research fellow, and Research Director of the Association for International Affairs (AMO), an independent Czech foreign policy think-tank. He studied political science at the Philosophical Faculty of Charles University, where he works as an internal inceptor. He also lectures at the Tertiary Technical School of Journalism in Prague. His focus is French politics, the EU, Czech foreign policy, and the issue of contemporary anti-Semitism.
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**Alexandr Prokop** is a chemist and a member of the Foreign Affairs and Schools and Education sections of the Green Party. He works at the Technology Centre of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic as the national contact worker for the thematic priorities 'Nanoscience, materials and new technology' and 'Space research and air transport' of the Seventh Framework Programme. He graduated in the field of organic chemistry from the Faculty of Natural Sciences at Charles University. During his doctoral studies he worked for five years at the Centre for Complex Molecular Systems, the Jaroslav Heyrovský Physical Chemistry Institute, and the Institute of Organic Chemistry and Biochemistry of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic in Prague.

**Džamila Stehlíková** is the Czech Government Minister for Human Rights and National Minorities and a member of the Czech Green Party's National Council. She was born in the Kazakh city of Alma-Ata and graduated from medical school in Moscow, continuing her post-graduate studies in Moscow and in Prague, specialising in psychiatry. In addition to her medical practice in Chomutov, she lectures on environmental psychology and cultural anthropology at the University of Jan Evangelista Purkyně in Ústí nad Labem, Czech Republic.
MISSION STATEMENT OF THE HEINRICH BÖLL FOUNDATION

WHO WE ARE, WHAT WE DO

The Heinrich Böll Foundation is part of the Green political movement that has developed worldwide as a response to the traditional politics of socialism, liberalism, and conservatism. Our main tenets are ecology and sustainability, democracy and human rights, self-determination and justice. We place particular emphasis on gender democracy, meaning social emancipation and equal rights for women and men. We are also committed to equal rights for cultural and ethnic minorities and to the societal and political participation of immigrants. Finally, we promote non-violence and proactive peace policies.

To achieve our goals, we seek strategic partnerships with others who share our values. We are an independent organisation, that is, we determine our own priorities and policies.

We are based in the Federal Republic of Germany, yet we are an international actor in both ideal and practical terms.

Our namesake, the writer and Nobel Prize laureate Heinrich Böll, personifies the values we stand for: defence of freedom, civic courage, tolerance, open debate, and the valuation of art and culture as independent spheres of thought and action.

1. We Are a Green Think Tank

- We promote democratic reforms and social innovation.
- We work on ecological policies and sustainable development on a global level.
- We provide space for the presentation of and debate on art and culture.
- We transfer knowledge and skills from experts to political actors.
- We provide a forum for open debate and promote dialogue between politics, business, academia, and society.
- We support talented students active on socio-political issues both in Germany and abroad.
- We document the history of the Green movement in order to promote research and provide political inspiration.
2. **We Are an International Policy Network**

- We are part of the global Green network and promote the development of the Green political movement on all continents.
- We focus especially on the broadening and deepening of the European Green movement.
- We work actively for the development of a political European public.
- We support the participation of civil society in politics and, within the framework of multilateral organisations, take part in conferences and negotiations.

3. **We Are Active on Ecology, Democracy, and Human Rights Worldwide**

- We consider ecology and democracy to be inseparable. We therefore support individuals and projects that are committed to ecology, human rights, democracy, and self-determination.
- We support respect for the rule of law and democratic participation in all parts of the world.
- We promote the abolition of conditions of dominance, dependency, and violence between the sexes.
- We consider ethnic and cultural diversity to be an essential part of democratic culture.
- We encourage civic and civil-society activism.
- We train activists so that they can successfully self-organise and participate in political processes.

**OUR CULTURE**

Commitment, expert and social competence, creativity and flexibility are features of our employees, both in Germany and abroad. They are highly qualified, team-oriented and, with their high level of motivation, they constitute the most important asset of the Foundation.

Equality of opportunity and respectful dealings between women and men of different ages, religions, ethnic origins and sexual orientations are constitutive for the foundation. Intercultural competence and a productive engagement with diversity are part of our corporate culture.

Mutual respect and trusting co-operation among ourselves and with our partners are the bases of our business relationships.

We constantly evaluate and improve our work. We undertake and take seriously both internal and external evaluations. We handle the funds at our disposal economically and efficiently and assure transparent operations.

We work in close co-operation with our co-foundations in all of Germany’s 16 states.
Mission Statement of the Heinrich Böll Foundation

We are a reliable partner for volunteer work and for co-operation with third parties.

As a political foundation, we act independently; this also applies in respect to our relationship with the German Green Party. We are autonomous in selecting our executive officers and staffing our committees.
In December 2007, after intense discussions and negotiations about the future of the European Union, the Heads of State or Government of the 27 EU Member States signed the Treaty of Lisbon. The Treaty of Lisbon will apply only after being ratified by each of the 27 members. It is due to come into force in January 2009. At that same time, the Czech Republic, for the first time ever, will hold the Presidency of the Council of the European Union.

This publication presents a discussion of the future of the EU from a Green perspective. In what direction should the European Union head now? What should the future distribution of tasks between the EU institutions and the Member States look like? Where should the external borders of the EU lie in the future? How is it possible to reconcile the political, social, and cultural diversity of Europe with a joint capacity for action?

The articles included herein aim to provide inspiration for a broad, constructive debate, and demonstrate how the European project might move forward.